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The delegation of functions to a range of quasi-autonomous bodies has formed a major challenge to the operation of representative democracy, in both administrative and democratic terms, since the formation of the modern state. These challenges have been more pronounced within Westminster-style democracies that are founded on the logic of ministerial departments and the convention of individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Towards the end of the twentieth century, these challenges became more pronounced as the centrifugal dynamics of New Public Management led to what has been termed the 'unravelling' or 'unbundling' of the state. In many countries around the world concerns regarding a 'democratic deficit' and patronage stimulated reform campaigns demanding territorial devolution in the belief that new regional democratic structures could increase accountability and transparency. This was particularly true in the UK where proponents of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland claimed that such a reform would lead to a 'bonfire of quangos'. This article draws upon theories derived in relation to multi-level governance in order to frame an analysis of how devolution has altered the sphere of delegated governance. This reveals a complex pattern of resource dependencies, motivations and incentives that have led to markedly different reform trajectories but certainly not the 'end of the quango state'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The parliamentary decline thesis overstates the dominance of the executive. The relationship between the executive and legislature is actually far more complex and balanced than is commonly recognised. After exploring recent developments in Australia and New Zealand, this article draws upon an audit of parliamentary modernisation in Britain since the election of New Labour in 1997 and suggests that a reforming parliament occurred during 2001–05 in which an executive with a majority of 166 was forced to acquiesce in the introduction of a raft of reform measures in the House of Commons that were designed to shift the balance of power. At the same time, the ‘transitional’ House of Lords displayed a new-found zeal and activism in a way that further frustrated the executive's control of parliament. This is not to overstate the degree of change: party loyalty remains the primary glue in the executive–legislative relationship and the executive remains dominant. However, it does suggest that in the British context the executive must still work within the limits and constraints of the parliamentary framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]