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This paper proposes a conceptual and analytical framework of states' legitimacy-seeking to comprehensively investigate the motivation behind China's climate and environment policy. While previous research has largely overlooked political factors that underlie China's climate policy, this paper argues that these factors are crucial in understanding China's policy changes, which are evident at both domestic and international levels. By examining sources such as government documents, leaders' speeches and authoritative literature, this study contends that China's climate change initiatives are part of a broader effort to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. The issue of climate change has become highly politicised in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and it serves as a crucial test of the ruling party and the state's capacity to govern effectively. As such, legitimacy-seeking is the key driver that links China's domestic measures and international commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The politics of international finance for coal power plants have intensified since the 2015 Paris climate agreement was negotiated. Over the past few years, Japan and South Korea have signaled their intent not to fund new coal projects overseas, leaving China and its Belt and Road Initiative as the 'financier of last resort.' In September 2021, China too announced its intent to stop providing finance for overseas coal projects. What accounts for their decision to cease financing overseas coal projects despite prominent differences in political systems, degree of internationalization of their financial systems, and economic size? Drawing on datasets of coal projects and financing supplemented by case material and interviews, this paper explores the dynamics of coal export finance and how the combination of international reputational pressures and declining demand for coal finance diminished the domestic support for incumbent coal exporters in all three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States (U.S.) and China are key to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and reaching carbon neutrality by around mid-century. Despite differences, carbon neutrality will be met more rapidly if the two countries coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy development and implementation. Building on long-term pathway models in the U.S. and China, current emissions trends and sources, and a policy analysis, this paper puts forward a novel framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality. The analysis reveals similar technology and policy pathways, policy gaps, and shared milestones for decarbonization in 2030, 2040, and 2050-2060. The main technological pathways focus on reductions in energy demand and non-energy-related CO2 emissions, decarbonization of electricity and fuels, and increases in electrification rates and CO2 sequestration. Given existing domestic policies and opportunities for further action, areas for coordination on carbon neutrality include common policy milestones; dialogue and technical exchange; research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); and international climate leadership. Despite escalated tensions between the U.S. and China, and challenges for climate cooperation, coordination between both countries on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. Carbon neutrality will be met more swiftly if the U.S. and China coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy. Despite the rise in geo-political tensions between the U.S. and China, coordination on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. An analytical framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality, includes technology and policy pathways, and common milestones of key sectors' decarbonization for 2030, 2040, and 2050-2050. The two countries could coordinate on common policy milestones, dialogue and technical exchange, research and development, and international climate leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been increasing interest in whether low carbon cities developed under Chinese institutional arrangements can facilitate a transformative change. Unlike their western counterparts, Chinese low carbon cities are mainly developed through a top-down approach characterized by strong regulatory influences and centrally-led pilots. Inspired by insights from institutional theory, this paper assessed the progress that has been made in Chinese low carbon cities through understanding urban actors' willingness and capacity to pursue more radical changes. Based on semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis, it is found that due to the low recognition of the intrinsic value of carbon reduction, low carbon transition was largely represented as a practical discussion around national binding targets and local economic development. Following this, it is suggested that any attempt to speed up urban low carbon transition should consider strengthening incentive structures for cultural or paradigm change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a growing focus on uncertainty as a distinct concept in the risk literature. This paper is concerned with how those involved in the design and implementation of climate change policy conceptualize risk and uncertainty. Based on interviews with policy and industry elites in Australia, China and the UK, it finds that participants did not distinguish between "risk" and "uncertainty" in their conceptualization of climate threats. For the majority of them, politics was the most significant source of risk and uncertainty in climate policy, but delegation of otherwise political decisions to the market was seen as the best solution. The conclusion suggests that the conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty is less important, for policy and industry elites, than the need to develop mechanisms that account for both persistent scientific uncertainties as well as interpretive and moral ambiguities in climate policy design and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change poses a potential risk to coastal infrastructure, thus threatening the economics or even the safety of human beings. Thus, a better understanding of the attitude of port organizations toward climate adaptation and mitigation is essential. This paper addresses this research gap by investigating 18 port organizations in China. The questions include the impediments and the impact of context, systems, and other factors on the implementation of adaptation strategies. The results indicate that port organizations are generally aware of climate change impacts and agree that some further steps are needed. However, policy support serves as a key factor in implementing adaptation plans. Apart from offering important insight on the attitude of port organizations, the study also serves as a platform for further research on climate adaptation planning in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2015, China joined 190 plus nations at Paris in committing to the goal of limiting the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below’ 2°C. Carbon budget analysis indicates that goal will require not only that the European Union and US reduce their emissions by greater than 80% by 2050, but that China at least comes close to doing so as well, if any budget is to be left over for the rest of the world (RoW). Given that RoW emissions are, and will come from, low-income and emerging nations, China’s emission reduction potential is of no small consequence. In this paper, we use the Kaya identity to back out changes in the drivers of CO2 emissions, including gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity (E/GDP) and the carbon content of energy (C/E), the latter two calculated to be consistent with China’s long-term GDP growth rate forecasts and specified 2050 CO2 emission reduction targets. Our results suggest that even achieving China’s highly optimistic renewable energy targets will be very far from sufficient to reduce China’s CO2 emissions from 9.1 Gt it emitted in 2015 to much below 3 Gt by 2050. Even reducing its emissions to 5 Gt will be challenging, yet this falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its ‘well below’ 2°C commitment. Key policy insights Under the Paris Agreement there is great pressure on China to very substantially reduce its emissions by 2050. While China has attached great importance to renewables and nuclear energy development, even achieving the most optimistic targets would not be sufficient to reduce China’s emissions from 9.1 Gt in 2015 to much below 3 Gt by 2050. China’s emission reduction potential falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its Paris ‘well below’ 2°C commitment, even if the EU and US reduce their emissions to zero by 2050. Emission cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement will require that China and the world give much greater weight to advancing research and development of scalable low-, zero- and negative-carbon sources and technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how piloting programmes in China can promote local policy innovations. By using one of the piloting emission trading schemes (ETS) in Guangdong province as a case study, it is argued that the main features of the piloting experiments, particularly in the climate change domain, are largely different from previous local marketization experiments that dominate the reform period of China. Whereas previous experiments are often characterized as bottom-up or indigenous initiatives with strong patronage relations to the pro-reform politicians at central level, the current piloting programmes are often crafted in a top-down fashion that is often misaligned with local market or corporate interests. Hence, local policy innovations are designed, developed and brokered by the local state officers, in order to bridge this central–local interest gap. As a result, successful implementation of these policy innovations largely depends on local political traditions, bureaucratic culture and perceptions of distinctive development needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the making of local climate governance in the Chinese setting where central-local inter-governmental relations continue to play critical part in almost every policy domain. Through analysing the climate responses of the three provincial-level governments at the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), the paper argues that the process of “experimentation under hierarchy” is relevant to understanding the evolving of the subnational climate regime in the YRD region. We find the preponderance of the central authorities in initiating national climate strategies and galvanising responses at the local level. Meanwhile, provincial governments have been able to leverage climate plans and actions to achieve their own gains. These findings suggest that any optimism about subnational climate activism in a Chinese setting has to be mixed with caution. In fact, the shadow of hierarchical authority structure lingers and plays important part in the initiation of subnational response and spurring climate responses and innovations from below. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we provide an overview of local and regional climate change plans in China by scrutinizing planning documents from 16 cities, four autonomous regions, and 22 provinces. We develop and apply an evaluation protocol to understand goals, process, and strategies in these plans. We also conduct interviews with government officials to provide a context for subnational climate change planning. The results indicate that current climate change planning in China is characterized by the ‘top-down’ approach, in which the central governmental incentives play a vital role in shaping provincial and municipal plans. In addition, most plans have the following issues: vague definition of what characterizes a low-carbon city/region; deficiency in the quality of greenhouse gas inventory and reduction targets; insufficient strategies provided to respond to climate change; inadequate stakeholder engagement; and weak horizontal coordination. Finally, we offer recommendations to improve climate change planning in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, China has become a global economic force. However, this economic growth has led to significant increases in carbon-intense energy consumption, with potentially disastrous impacts on the global environment. Fueling this energy explosion is an increased demand for automobiles in China, which has been met by an expanding auto production industry. This paper reviews China's current and projected energy and environmental milieu, with particular emphasis on automobile market development. The paper links China's sustainability potential to its technologies, policies, markets, and automobile industry structure. The paper concludes by characterizing the type of research that is needed to help meet China's growing transportation needs in a sustainable fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid growing alarm over the rising atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, increasing attention is being given to ‘geo-engineering’ technologies that could counteract some of the impacts of global warming by either reducing absorption of solar energy (solar radiation management (SRM)) or removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Geo-engineering has the potential to dramatically alter the dynamics of global climate change negotiations because it might cool the climate without constraining fossil fuel use. Some scholars have expressed concern that certain states may be tempted to act unilaterally. This paper assesses the approach that China is likely to adopt towards governance of SRM and the implications this holds for broader international climate negotiations. We survey Chinese public discourse, examine the policy factors that will influence China's position, and assess the likelihood of certain future scenarios. While Chinese climate scientists are keenly aware of the potential benefits of geo-engineering as well as its risks, we find that no significant constituency is currently promoting unilateral implementation of SRM. China will probably play a broadly cooperative role in negotiations toward a multilaterally governed geo-engineering programme but will seek to promote a distinctive developing world perspective that reflects concerns over sovereignty, Western imperialism and maintenance of a strict interpretation of the norm of common but differentiated responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Mobility has been argued to be the single factor explaining why some pastoralists do relatively well during extreme climatic events, while others do not, because mobility works by taking advantage of the spatial and temporal structure of resource failure by moving away from scarcity towards abundance. In spite of this, a common governmental management strategy is to resettle pastoral populations and thereby significantly reduce mobility. By revealing the underlying logic of mobility for Tibetan pastoralists, this paper questions official policy that aims at privatizing communally owned rangelands since it reduces pastoral flexibility and access to key resources. This is especially pertinent in the face of climate change. While little is known as to the specifics of how climate change will affect nomadic pastoralists, environmental variability is likely to increase. Consequently, policies resulting in decreased mobility may exacerbate the negative effects of climate change because of a positive feedback between climate and negative density dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change, over abstraction, pollution and questionable engineering-based paradigms are contributing to a state of crisis in water governance. This paper reports on preliminary research in Lake Baiyangdian catchment, China, which has the potential to realise more systemic and adaptive forms of water governance through development and use of a method that reframes water catchment management in the form of social learning. A cross-disciplinary research group worked together with multiple-department managers and stakeholder representatives within a purposefully designed ‘learning system’ to create an insipient social learning platform. The results demonstrate the potential to reframe water catchment management in Lake Baiyangdian so as to better address the questions: who should manage the water catchment and what in the catchment should be the focus of managing? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part one will argue that the climate change discourse has all the hallmarks of a new metanarrative. However, the emergence of this metanarrative was in contradiction to neoliberal theory of the environment. Therefore, in an effort to reconcile the two metanarratives, an economic discourse emerged that conceptualised climate change with the neoliberal market model. The economic merging of climate change and the market discourses proved politically unsustainable, as was evident at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit. Part two places the contradictions between the climate change-come-neoliberal metanarrative into a global political context, arguing that neoliberalism has so marginalised many developing countries that their sovereignty is in question, with a state of exception always in play. As such, they are highly vulnerable to any global climate change solution imposed by the corporate market on them. Lastly, the paper will argue that China is unique in its response to climate change. It is a rapidly developing state with a unique history of modernisation that places it in a position to use non-market means to address climate change. What limits the Chinese state from doing so is the political instability that this would cause to the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy built on socialist-capitalist modernisation and by the vested interests tied to economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the pressures of climate change, many countries are trying to adapt to a low-carbon economy. In this paper, we review the development pattern of the low-carbon economy of major countries and its impact on the world economy. We then argue that economic development and abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in China should be balanced. The challenges that China faces should also be considered carefully. It is necessary for China to find an approach to solve the issues of climate change, which should include new technologies and establishing incentive mechanisms and reform-oriented policies. These guidelines can adjust the structure of the economy and energy use, improve energy efficiency, promote the development of alternative and renewable energy, enhance the potential of carbon sinks, and develop advanced technology to perfect a 'Clean Development Mechanism' and sustainable development through international cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cement is a low-cost construction material whose manufacture generates significant carbon dioxide emissions. As these emissions enter a carbon-constrained world, they may ultimately have a significant impact on the industry's financial performance. Consequently, the cement industry is developing a response to climate change management and the connected political process. Ten of the world's leading cement-producing corporations, representing more than one-third of global cement production, published a joint Agenda for Action in 2002 to address sustainability issues for the industry, including climate change. Other issues identified are emissions reduction, use of fuels and raw materials, employee health and safety, local impacts on land and communities, and internal business processes. Examining the rationale for, and the effects of, proactive climate initiatives in the cement sector, this paper elaborates on the conditions for the spread of cement-related climate action to China, where more than one-third of global cement production occurs, 80% of which involves inefficient kilns using outdated, highly polluting technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]