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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a massive Chinese state/capitalist programme of transnational infrastructure construction initiated in 2013. Between 2013 and 2016, Chinese banks extended hundreds of billions of dollars –principally across Asia, but also Europe and Africa – for transportation and energy networks. Recently released statistics, however, suggest that project lending for the BRI collapsed from 2016 onwards. Our paper examines the reasons for this contraction through a case-study of the BRI in Africa. We contend that the lending contraction resulted from political and economic contradictions generated by this form of international interconnection, including the types of debt traps it helped create. This outcome is explained partly by the fact that the BRI is simultaneously a geopolitical and geoeconomic project. Whereas the balance of economic risks is arguably skewed against borrowers (in some cases leading to debt traps), from a geopolitical perspective, the Chinese state also seeks to expand influence in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. This creates counter-pressure on further expansion of such financing, which, complemented by domestic economic implications of loan failure, helps to explain the contraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's breakneck economic growth has been accompanied by an expanding development finance agenda. Many have hypothesized that China is undermining the West's drive to promote good governance globally, and in Africa in particular, by predominantly distributing money to poorly governed countries. This paper explores whether the determinants of Chinese development finance in Africa differ from those of Western countries. It finds that Western countries send more development finance than China to better governed African countries—those with lower corruption levels, better democratic outcomes, and a better human rights track record (though only the latter two have a negative relationship with Chinese development finance in absolute terms). This paper also finds that bilateral trade and UN voting alignment have a stronger impact on China's development finance than that of Western countries and that China allocates more development finance than the West to richer and more resource-dependent African countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through document analysis and interviews, this paper examines the patent narratives of Transsion, a Chinese company dominating Africa's smartphone market and a leading innovator in facial recognition technologies (FRTs) optimized for darker skin tones. We identify two major narratives concerning Transsion's FRT patenting practice. First is 'empowerment', through which Transsion argues that there are 'blind spots' in conventional AI technologies and presents its AI camera as a remedy and an empowerment tool for dark-skinned users by 'seeing' their beauty. Second is the 'warfare' narrative, which is shaped by the heightening market competition and accelerating patent races among Chinese phone makers. As the battle for tech supremacy intensifies in Africa, Transsion expresses a strong sense of crisis and considers its FRT patents as 'weapons of competition' in preparation for a future smartphone warfare in Africa. This study makes two contributions. Empirically, through analyzing patents, we examine a relatively less-known Chinese tech company that has tremendous impact in the Global South. Theoretically, we interrogate the possibility of algorithmic empowerment against racist AI and technological independence through patents, although developing AI as weaponry, in the China-Africa context, also hampers the politics of decolonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing China's 2006 and 2015 Africa policies, this article reveals how China's political discourse has become more confident, practical, and depoliticised. In particular, this paper shows how education is allocated, promised, and embedded in China's 'shared' agenda, which is centred on development co-operation and mutual learning. It then reflects on the extent to which China may move towards traditional donors. This paper concludes that, despite fragmented convergences in the discourse and an increased recognition of a Chinese model, China maintains its distinctive role and position in the post-2015 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While debates continue about China's role in sub-Saharan Africa, there is growing consensus that China is a different kind of development partner. One distinct feature of Chinese partnerships is that they include support for the tobacco industry, a sector other donor states and institutions shun. Not only is tobacco a primary agricultural export in a number of Africa states, the state-owned Chinese National Tobacco Corporation is the largest tobacco company in the world. This paper analyses Chinese support for the tobacco industry in three states – Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia – documenting how co-operation is shaped by Chinese state capitalism and assessing the development and governance implications. Following an introduction situating the analysis within the context of China–Africa co-operation and tobacco's global value chain, Chinese engagement in each country is analysed. Findings indicate that, despite differences across case studies in terms of development outcomes, common governance implications are apparent. African elites initiated tobacco-related co-operation to meet their interests, but Chinese interests dominated implementation. Consequently, Chinese investments have maintained hierarchal governance of an exploitive and harmful industry. Analyses of Chinese African co-operation need to move beyond public–private paradigms and interrogate the nuances of Chinese state capitalism in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainland China's involvement in African aviation is qualitatively and quantitatively different to participation by European, American and Persian Gulf countries. This paper contextualizes and outlines the Chinese emphasis on airport finance, design and construction on the continent; Chinese airline service is secondary (and Africa-dominated), and joint operational ventures are in their infancy. The prominence of one foreign country in airport provision in Africa, the recency of Chinese involvement, its pace, its price-tag, its conditionality, and minimal concurrent Chinese airline route building to and from Africa, fix the novelty and perhaps significance of Chinese involvement in African aviation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every few years in the West – in the media and in political circles – there is a moral panic about the rise of China. Africa often plays a central role in this: as a supposedly predatory China is counterposed against representations of hapless and powerless African victims. As Deborah Bräutigam notes in her paper, this currently takes the form of the meme of 'debt-trap diplomacy', which is largely unjustified. However, intensified relations of dependence are being established between China and Africa, and increasing levels of debt are both a vector and an outcome of this, which in some instance may result in a debt trap. The construction of a debt trap implies intentionality, but while this may not be the case, development outcomes may include excessive overseas borrowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spectacular scale and speed of China's domestic renewable energy capacity development and technology catch-up has in recent years been followed by the 'go out' of Chinese clean energy technology firms seeking new markets and opportunities in sub- Saharan Africa. This paper explores the growing involvement of China in the development and transfer of renewable energy technologies in Africa and examines the key drivers and obstacles shaping Chinese renewable energy investments and exports. Far from there being some kind of grand or harmonious strategy directed by a single monolithic state, we argue that fragmented and decentralised state apparatuses and quasi-market actors in China are increasingly pursuing their own independent interests and agendas around renewable energy in Africa in ways often marked by conflict, inconsistency and incoherence. Moving beyond the state-centric analysis common in much of the research on contemporary China-Africa relations, we examine the motivations of a range of non-state and quasi-state actors, as well their different perceptions and constructions of risk, policy environments and political stability in recipient countries. The paper explores the case study example of South Africa, where Chinese firms have become increasingly significant in the diffusion of renewable energy technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the notion that China's proposed development of ports and supporting hinterland infrastructure on the East coast of Africa serves greater geostrategic interests within Africa and the Indian Ocean. It cautions against a trend which accuses Chinese commercial infrastructural and resource development of being symmetrical with an almost colonial-like political influence. Through a comparison with nineteenth-century German and British colonialism in the region, the paper argues that, while there are certain affinities, the Chinese presence today is significantly different. Central to the argument is that Chinese port and hinterland developments are supplemented by a host of other actors, including host states, multinational corporations and regional development funds. The broader market economic system in which China and Africa engage today entails that Chinese unfettered access to projects is complicated by the interests of multiple stakeholders. The Chinese presence has been exaggerated at the expense of other actors and thus, in any future conflict, it cannot be assumed that China will be able to mobilise this infrastructure in its interests. This has implications for the broader analysis of China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade witnessed the intensification of the commercial and political activities of emerging powers in Africa. These activities are analysed in terms of their impact on Africa, but also how they have potentially displaced the European Union and its leading member states as the key policy interlocutors in Africa. In many domains, the EU and its member states have now been normalised to strategic partners among other strategic partners. This has not been without implications for EU policymaking in Africa. This paper claims that the complexity and multifaceted nature of interaction between the European Union and emerging powers, notably China, in trilateral cooperation in Africa suggest that these actors have mutually accepted cooperation in Africa as a necessary end to be pursued. They have as a result of their respective presence and engagement in Africa modified their policies. While cooperation is a stated end, China is seen not only as a driver of certain EU objectives, including development, but it is perceived as a brake on the codification of certain EU norms such as democracy and human rights. Similarly, the willingness of China to pursue and deepen trilateral cooperation in Africa does not appear to be an urgent policy priority. Thus, this paper contends that in addition to an understanding of trilateral cooperation, a study of individual bilateral strategies and policy adaptation sheds more light through which relations between these actors should be analysed. In the main, the paper seeks to go beyond zero-sum analyses by arguing the relationship between the EU and emerging powers, particularly China, as deserving more nuanced and fuller analyses than it currently receives, in order to understand the impact on EU policymaking on Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in 2006, China's renewed interest in Africa has garnered a lot of attention and generated a lot of debate. Western media and analysts have, perhaps not surprisingly, been generally very critical of China's rising influence in Africa. The African reaction, however, has been more mixed. African leaders have welcomed what they see as a new approach to development and increased potential for meaningful South-South co-operation. African civil society groups have been more cautious and are worried about the possible negative repercussions on governance, the environment, human rights and overall economic development. This paper focuses on Chinese foreign aid to Africa and discusses the opportunities and challenges that it presents for China, the African continent, and the international community. This allows the uncovering of many misconceptions regarding the potential impact (whether positive or negative) of this renewed interest by different parties. The paper argues that if one adopts an approach that puts ordinary Africans first, at the centre of development, then the only option available to us is to engage China in a constructive partnership in order to make its aid effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global health has become an increasingly prominent component of foreign policy in the last decade. The term health diplomacy has been used to describe this growing interface between foreign policy and global health, and it encompasses both the concept of using health to further foreign policy objectives as well as the idea that diplomatic tools can be helpful for attaining public health goals. The Chinese presence in Africa has grown in the last 15 years, generating increased interest in Sino-African relations. While much has been written in recent years about the Chinese presence in Africa, the growing numbers of Africans in China have attracted considerably less attention. Many are small-scale traders and might be expected to face many of the health challenges common among foreign migrants, but their health needs have been largely unrecognised. In this paper, we consider how a health diplomacy approach could be applied to African migrants in China, and the potential advantages and limitations of this strategy. We identify areas of overlap between public health, trade and foreign policy goals that can be emphasised to generate support for improved services for African migrants in China and to engage partners from a diversity of sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses China's use of infrastructure-for-resources loans in Africa as a win–win economic cooperation tool. This formula, offering generous loans for infrastructure in exchange for resource access, came into being largely as a default cooperation tool, inspired by China's own domestic experience, its competitive advantages and Africa's receptivity to this kind of barter deal. Embodying the principle of mutual benefit, China has consistently combined the extension of financial assistance for infrastructure construction in Africa with the expansion of Chinese business interests and the pursuit of resource security goals. The analysis focuses on whether this instrument is actually promoting African development or fuelling instead China's economic growth at the expense of African economies. The author argues that the impact has been mixed. Although there are some meaningful positive signs, many challenges persist, and as such the long-term developmental impact of this particular tool remains uncertain. The responsibility to ensure a positive outcome rests, however, on the African side as much as on China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past 50 years of Africa's history have been blighted by a lack of good governance, which has hindered economic growth and political stability. The continent continues to maintain weak states which are clearly evident in the persistent corruption, unconstitutional behaviour, inefficiency, waste and unnecessary bureaucracy that remain widely practised. However, owing to emerging markets such as China and India that have promoted foreign direct investment in developing countries, a lot of speculation has arisen regarding the impact of the Forum for Cooperation between Africa and China on continental governance. The speculation tends to focus on whether the multilateral trade agreement between Africa and China will be mutually beneficial, or promote bad governance practices such as corruption. This paper argues that in order for any multilateral agreement to become economically beneficial in Africa, the continental elites must first implement good governance best practices. Furthermore, the onus is on the African states, not their regional or trading partners, to implement economic institutional change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]