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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in the Chinese economy and are also crucial instruments for implementing the Party-state's policies and strategic initiatives. SOE reform is not only crucial to China's transformation from an economy overly dependent on exports and investment to one more driven by domestic consumption, but is also a test of the political will and capability of the Chinese authorities to develop a market-based domestic economy. Despite the Chinese government's commitment since 2013 to forging ahead with the SOE reform process, little real progress has been made so far. Reform of the SOEs is a central component of the government's agenda for sustaining domestic economic growth and tightening the political control of the Chinese Communist Party over all aspects of the nation. The current wave of SOE reform has, however, focused on the state's push for consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, rather than pursuit of improving corporate governance. Far from being in retreat, the state is marching in and the market is retreating. This SOE reform process appears to contradict the state's proclaimed commitment to deregulation and development of a market-based competitive economy in China by allowing "the market to play a decisive role". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has become a fast-growing economy with an unbalanced economic structure. Economic policies, especially fiscal and financial policies, contribute to the current growth model by depressing household disposable income and reducing the social services provided by the government. Laws that have been used by the government to subsidise investment and production by distorting factor markets are also to blame. Finally, rebalancing China’s growth pattern has proven to be extremely difficult due to political obstacles, including pressure from interest groups, gridlock caused by factional politics, and ideological discrimination against private entrepreneurs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When Keynesianism received renewed interest in the global financial crisis, some economists regarded China’s response as exemplary of effective Keynesian counter-cyclical strategy or even a non-crisis development strategy. At the same time, there have been critical voices against China’s Keynesian measures. This article therefore asks: To what extent was China’s response to the global financial crisis Keynesian? What factors determined the Chinese characteristics of Keynesian policy both in design and in implementation? It points out that China did follow a Keynesian formula in its crisis response, boosted infrastructure construction, GDP growth and created some employment. However, Chinese Keynesianism is a vulgarised version that is merged with its developmental state model. It simply boasted a big state and massive deficit spending, and socialised investment without really benefiting consumers or the private sector. This article also provides an analysis of how ideational and institutional politics in China vulgarised Keynesianism and exacerbated socio-economic problems. Ideational politics included the dominance of Keynesian discourse at the beginning of the crisis and an obsession with short-term results. Institutional factors included ‘firework’ local government politics, the state being captured by state-owned enterprises and a concentration of central distributive power without proper monitoring over implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The split share structure reform was started in 2005 with the object of re-designating state-related, nontradable shares into tradable shares. The article compares the two major forms of state ownership in China (direct or indirect ownership) showing that, close to the reform period, companies directly held by the state experience a significant increase in market performance relative to indirectly held companies. Results suggest that investors’ perception about the worth of these two forms of state ownership may have suffered a reversal, thus bringing to light value-related consequences ensuing from protective schemes usual in China and elsewhere. The article also addresses a recurrent pitfall relating to the use in empirical models of fractions of the same total and shows that U-shaped patterns found in the relationship between ownership and performance are transient rather than stable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The state sector still plays an important role in China's economy. One of the key development phenomena characterizing the Chinese economy is the rapid ascendency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the resurgence of the state. The strength of China's SOEs is projected in the centrally administrated state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). They are the backbone of the national economy, spearheading national economic development and Beijing's ‘going-out’ strategy. The CSOEs have expanded their reach and increased their power, domestically and globally. In seeking to boost local GDP growth, the eastern provinces in China have joined the western provinces in a fierce contest to attract investment from SOEs. Nevertheless, the rapid ascendency of the SOEs has brought many negative consequences for China's economic, social and political development by causing conflict with the market-oriented development direction of Chinese economic reform and hindering fair competition between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After more than a decade of preparation, China finally passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) on 30 August 2007. This paper examines the debate over whether or not administrative monopoly should be included in the ambit of the AML, which took place throughout the drafting process of this new law. Administrative monopoly refers to the abusive use of administrative power by government agencies to engage in monopolistic activities. Owing to the administrative nature of this type of monopoly, the intent to regulate it by an economic law, such as the AML, has stirred up much controversy. Having analyzed the arguments both in support of and in opposition to the inclusion, this paper suggests the need to adopt a more comprehensive scheme in tackling administrative monopoly. Also, the enforcement mechanism of the AML will have to be strengthened in order to prevent this new law from degenerating into 'a toothless tiger'. Furthermore, the competition law regime of China will benefit from in-depth research in overseas anti-monopoly practices. In particular, the experiences of the former socialist states in Europe should be taken into account, given that they are similarly undergoing the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chapter 7 of the book "A Tortuous Road: The Relative Merits of State and Private Enterprises" is presented. The effects of China's government business enterprises and private corporations on regional economic development are examined. Private businesses are centered in the coastal regions of eastern China, while government businesses are inordinately located in the western regions. Due to the far more rapid rate of growth and profitability of the private enterprises, a serious and growing regional disparity in economic growth has been created.

Chapter 5 of the book "A Tortuous Road: The Relative Merits of State and Private Enterprises" is presented. China's government business enterprises and its privately owned corporations are compared. The government enterprises do not generate the same profits or tax revenues as do the private corporations, and their rate of growth has slowed in absolute terms. Thus, corporations organized on the capitalist model become an ever larger sector of the economy, while the government-owned sector continues to shrink. Speculation is presented as to how long the government will operate its businesses which lose money.

Chapter 2 of the book "A Tortuous Road: The Relative Merits of State and Private Enterprises" is presented. The history of government-owned business enterprises in China after the Communist revolution of 1949 is examined. A significant number of these businesses were already operating in areas of China controlled by the Communist party prior to its taking power. The divergence between the actual imposition of a Communist economy in China as opposed to the theoretical Communism envisioned by Karl Marx is described. The free market reforms instituted in China since 1976 have resulted in a massive decline in the financial value of China's state-owned businesses and their relative influence in its economy.

Through field trips and interviews, which took place in June and November 2000, this article discusses recent developments in the economic restructuring of five large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in one city in Liaoning. We found that most of the firms we interviewed have attempted to compete in the market and upgrade technologies. This is most apparent in attempts to separate the production and social welfare functions of the enterprise and related progress in the areas of housing, medical care and pension reform. However, we also found that the SOEs we interviewed are still heavily dependent on preferential government policies. In particular, several of the SOEs interviewed for this article appear to be primarily profitable due to government policy favors (debt-for-equity swaps, outright debt write-offs and subsidized loans). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports on the results of a survey of state-owned enterprises in China's coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and Shanghai-shi in 1993. Efforts by the central and provincial governments to reform state-owned enterprises; Two-stage approach to estimating total factor productivity growth; Implications on policy.

The article focuses on the formation and evolution of the unit system in China. The efforts of the Chinese leaders to establish socialism as they envisioned it and to promote industrialization led to the formation of a peculiar type of organization in the urban economy, especially in the state sector. The principal characteristics of this organizational form were as follows: one, with the elimination of market relationships, state control over the allocation of resources through administrative means, and the requirement that the enterprise shoulder the responsibility for the workers' permanent employment and welfare, the working people became comprehensively dependent on the workplace, and in effect the individual became dependent on the state; two, the fact of direct party control over society meant that law did not become the principal means of rule. Instead, economic organizations, having been absorbed into the state structure on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, became the means of direct state and party control over society; three, for the same reason, with the party organization present in all workplaces, the workplace became the principal place in which the workers took part in the political processes; four, for the individual, the party organization and the workplace administrative authorities were not only the managers of the labor process, but represented the party and the government in the political and legal senses.

Chapter 6 of the book "A Tortuous Road: The Relative Merits of State and Private Enterprises" is presented. The overall financial performance of China's government business enterprises and its capitalist corporations are compared, as are their relative contributions to that country's economy. Projections are made as to extra tax revenues which would be generated by a further expansion of the private sector, and as to the savings in public expenditure that would result. It is noted that government business enterprises are responsible for old-age pensions and medical care benefits for their employees. The economic data suggests that transferring those responsibilities directly to the government as government business enterprises continue to shrink could result in a dramatic increase in the amount of money available for public welfare spending.