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The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is so far the largest emissions trading system in the world. A rigorousex postempirical analysis of the scheme is presented. The effect of the scheme on firms' investment decisions in carbon-reducing technologies is analysed by using detailed firm-level data from Swedish industry. Based on difference-in-difference estimation as well as a before–after difference estimation, the results reveal that the EU ETS has not had a significant effect on firms’ decisions to invest in carbon-mitigating technologies. However, although the EU ETS appears to have no direct effect on investments, it is too early to dismiss the system. Consideration is given to how the EU ETS can realize its potential to become an effective tool in the EU climate and energy policy portfolio. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme. Policy relevance This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The climate change issue faces a big challenge, perhaps the biggest challenge of all ç politics. Pakistan has taken many noticeable steps in relation to climate change: (1) it is the only country in which the Prime Minister is heading an inter-ministerial task force on climate change, (2) it is the first developing country to establish a specialized, self-financed scientific centre to research the impact of climate change, and (3) it is the lead country to earmark budgetary funds for a national carbon sequestration programme. Pakistan, together with many developing countries, has much to offer the climate change issues. The author proposes five approaches to build consensus among climate policy negotiators: (1) reinforcing the polluter pays principle and ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, (2) active partnership by developing countries, (3) recognizing the voluntary actions taken by developing countries, (4) reinforcing the issue of adaptation, and (5) considering the option of equal per capita entitlements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]