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This paper proposes epistemic environmentalism as a novel framework for accounting for the contribution of the environment – broadly construed – to epistemic standings and which can be used to improve or protect epistemic environments. The contribution of the environment to epistemic standings is explained through recent developments in epistemology and cognitive science, including embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition and distributed cognition. The paper examines how these developments support epistemic environmentalism, as well as contributes theoretical resources to make epistemic assessments of dynamic environments. The epistemic environmentalist procedure from the assessment of an individual environment to changes made to that environment based on promoting the attainment of epistemic goods is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science-informed approaches have gained considerable influence in education in the UK and internationally, but not much is known about how teachers perceive cognitive science-informed strategies or enact them within the contexts of their everyday classrooms. In this paper, we discuss the perceptions and experiences of cognitive science-informed strategies of 13 teachers in England. The paper critically explores how the teachers understood and used cognitive science-informed strategies in their teaching, their views of the benefits and challenges for different subjects and groups of learners, and their reflections on supporting factors and barriers for adopting the strategies in their schools. The teachers' accounts illustrate some of the many complexities of adopting cognitive science-informed approaches in real-life educational settings. Drawing on their narratives, the paper emphasises the importance of acknowledging different contextual dimensions and the dynamic interactions between them to understand when and how teachers enact cognitive science-informed approaches in their classrooms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marek Pokropski's "Mechanisms and Consciousness Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science" reopens the question about the possibility of naturalization of phenomenology. The author adopts the position of nonreductive mechanistic integration, which, he claims, has offered new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. In this paper, I outline the context of the discussions on the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive sciences, and (§2) discuss the approach proposed by Pokropski, pointing out the main arguments and the most important research achievements. Then I focus on some difficulties of this position. The first of these I associate with a procedure which I call a dismemberment of phenomenology (§3). The second (§4) concerns the concept of constraint, which is key to Pokropski's analyzes, and some consequences of its application and alternative reading. Finally, in §5 I draw attention to two difficulties. The first is whether it is possible to read phenomenology in terms of functional analysis; the second is related to the doubt whether psychological or phenomenological functional explanations can be treated as mechanistic (which is a strong premise of Pokropski's argument). In Conclusion I make an overall assessment of the presented approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we demonstrate the advantages of combining the detailed military history of actual battles with contemporary decision-making cognitive theories. Specifically, we analyse two battle decisions made in Israeli-Arab wars, and interpret, through a cognitive lens, some of the decisions that were subsequently deemed "incomprehensible" in the civilian and military literature. This perspective permits analysis of multiple processes – such as risk evaluation, mental completion of unknown information, and estimation of enemy response. Moreover, it predicts that even highly experienced commanders are prone to the effect of cognitive biases, and may therefore make bad decisions with disastrous consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) object to using the term "new paradigm" to describe recent developments in the psychology of reasoning. This paper concedes that the Kuhnian term "paradigm" may be queried. What cannot is that the work subsumed under this heading is part of a new, progressive movement that spans the brain and cognitive sciences: Bayesian cognitive science. Sampling algorithms and Bayes nets used to explain biases in JDM can implement the Bayesian new paradigm approach belying any advantages of mental models theory (MMT) at the algorithmic level. Moreover, this paper argues that new versions of MMT lack a computational level theory and questions the grounds for MMTs much-vaunted generality. The paper then examines common ground on the importance of small-scale models/simulations of the world and the importance of argumentation in the social domain rather than individual reasoning. Finally, the paper concludes that although there may be prospects for moving reasoning research forward in a more collective, collaborative manner, many disagreements remain to be resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contributions of Allan N. Schore, Wilma Bucci, and James L. Fosshage in this issue highlight the continuing efforts of these researchers to understand and illuminate the nature of implicit and explicit processing and to construct theories based on their observations and their relationship to therapeutic action. An examination of the core elements of each theory-Schore's focus on right brain processes and the importance of affect, Bucci's further delineation of subsymbolic processes that participate in the formation of emotion schemas, and Fosshage's emphasis on the importance of imagistic symbolic encoding and processing and the interplay of implicit and explicit processing in creating two pathways to therapeutic change-is presented with emphasis on aspects of interpenetration and difference. Areas of further investigation that highlight the importance of implicit processes are discussed. They include inference making, the supervisory paradigm as a means of promoting change in clinical work, the use of videotapes in parent/child observation, and the interactive use of images and memory triggers in an experimental design to assist Alzheimer's patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary examines a very fundamental aspect of human psychology: the nature of unconscious knowledge and the process of self-reflection. However the term implicit is associated in cognitive science with unconscious procedural knowledge (of motor acts) rather than unconscious meaning, which is the business of psychoanalysis. Further, the Boston Change Process Study Group authors do not compare or contrast their ideas to analogous concepts within psychoanalytic theory such as Freud's concept of the preconscious, which was descriptive of a reflective verbal domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports on the 1st European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems, held at St. Catherine's College in Oxford University in Oxford, England. Increase in the number of European researchers in the area of multi-agent systems; Aim of the workshop; Sessions in the workshop; Details of the second Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems.

In this paper, I discuss the emerging field of conceptual engineering from the perspective of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I explore the role the latter disciplines can and do play by specifically focusing on how different notions of what a concept is affects the general conceptual engineering framework, both positively and negatively, before considering a particular account that eschews talk of concepts altogether. I call this project 'Cappelen's challenge' as it draws from suggestive remarks in his work (Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Oxford: Oxford University Press). I argue that by appreciating the range of options that each theory of concepts brings with it, the field as a whole can come to better grips with its foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at integrating insights from ecological psychology, pragmatism, and embodied cognitive science to shed light on the aesthetic dimension underlying daily activities. For this purpose, we discuss conceptions of the aesthetic developed by authors from diverse traditions, including Dewey's pragmatism, Carroll's cognitivism, and Saito's everyday aesthetics. We focus on the activity of reading, which has traditionally been conceived as involving the establishment of letter-sound correspondences and the rule-based deduction of information. However, an embodied framework opens up a more ecological understanding of this activity encompassing dynamic, multimodal perceptual engagement which is dependent on: (i) who the reader is (ii) the task or purpose, and (iii) what the person-environment-system affords. This form of engagement, even in mundane everyday-reading, we argue, brings forth an aesthetic dimension to it. Specifically, we explore how bodily engagement such as olfactory, tactile, and prosodic processes, saturate even logical judgements and reasoning. This integration of embodied and aesthetic processes in a particular context, we claim, can effectively emphasise and cultivate an aesthetic attitude. This, in turn, will provide insight into how the aesthetic dimension of reading can be cultivated intelligently, enriching the overall experience and will also illuminate why we read at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the education sector has received considerable attention from scholars; however, its potency and application among tourism learners are yet to be discerned. Accordingly, this research note articulates the potential impact and limitations of the AI chatbot, ChatGPT, in tourism education practices. In particular, the paper aims to raise awareness among tourism educators regarding the disruptive potential of ChatGPT and its impact on academic integrity and ethics. This paper contributes to tourism education practices on AI and robotics by critically discussing ChatGPT from a cognitive science perspective and providing recommendations on how to minimise AI plagiarism in tourism education. This research argues for adapting novel pedagogies as technology evolves and raises the need for AI ethical use guidelines in tourism education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper stresses the importance of biases in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). To foster efficient algorithmic decision-making in complex, unstable, and uncertain real-world environments, we argue for the implementation of human cognitive biases in learning algorithms. We use insights from cognitive science and apply them to the AI field, combining theoretical considerations with tangible examples depicting promising bias implementation scenarios. Ultimately, this paper is the first tentative step to explicitly putting the idea forth to implement cognitive biases into machines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents ideas for constructing mathematics homework assignments based on lessons from the cognitive science of learning and memory. In particular, we focus on two popular techniques from the field: spaced practice and mixed practice. The paper describes the techniques and supporting research, and then discusses various straightforward ways to incorporate them into mathematics instruction via homework assignments. The ideas presented can be applied at virtually any level of instruction and may be of interest to educators looking to implement research-based practices from cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the significance of the concept of noise for cognition and computation. The concept of noise was massively transformed in the twentieth century with the advent of information theory, cybernetics, and computer science, all of which provide formal accounts of information and noise centrally concerned with contingency. We show how the concept has changed from these classical formulations, through developments in mathematics (topology and topos theory), computing (interactive computing and univalent foundations), and cognitive science (predictive processing and cognitive morphodynamics). Ultimately it argues for the central importance of noise not only within a topological conception of cognition and computation, but also in the transcendental-empirical torsion of image schemata and the social interactive elaboration of freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historical significance continues to be the forgotten element of history education. Without student capacity to establish what they think is important, or why they would care about certain events and people from the past, students will continue to be disinterested in the study of history. This paper draws on the results of a three-year study aimed at understanding how the Stolen Generations in Australia becomes historical significant for pre-service teachers. Rather than being disinterested in stories of the Stolen Generations, we find that these students are vitally invested in such narratives to the extent that they, on occasion, cannot bear to hear the story. While they acquire knowledge, they also resist and ignore it. Hence, we argue that neither reason or cognitive science are up to the task of resisting either the student's drive to ignore, or their assimilation of difference into the same. For history to be significant in the classroom for students, it must be understood as more than an epistemological pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers increasingly explore deploying brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) for able-bodied users, with the motivation of accessing mental states more directly than allowed by existing body-mediated interaction. This motivation seems to contradict the long-standing HCI emphasis on embodiment, namely the general claim that the body is crucial for cognition. This paper addresses this apparent contradiction through a review of insights from embodied cognition and interaction. We first critically examine the recent interest in BCIs and identify the extent cognition in the brain is integrated with the wider body as a central concern for research. We then define the implications of an integrated view of cognition for interface design and evaluation. A counterintuitive conclusion we draw is that embodiment per se should not imply a preference for body-mediated interaction over BCIs. It can instead guide research by 1) providing body-grounded explanations for BCI performance, 2) proposing evaluation considerations that are neglected in modular views of cognition, and 3) through the direct transfer of its design insights to BCIs. We finally reflect on HCI’s understanding of embodiment and identify the neural dimension of embodiment as hitherto overlooked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses adapting Churches' approach to large-scale teacher/researcher conceptual replications of major "science of learning" findings, to increase teachers' engagement with empirical research on, and building research networks for, gathering data on the science of learning. The project here demonstrated the feasibility of teacher-led randomised controlled trials for conceptually replicating the effects of cognitive science on learning, as specified by researchers. It also indicated high levels of interest by teachers in applying more science of learning in their practice. The approach gave freedom to teachers to design interventions, choose research methods, and measure outcomes, even though such freedom would be in tension with some scientific research which relies on constraining the sources of variation. This paper discusses how a balance can be struck between the objectives of teachers and researchers engaged in replicating cognitive science findings, and promoting teacher engagement in conceptual replication research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past two decades, human categorisation research has achieved significant progress via the rigorous and systematic study of concepts in terms of category structures and their families. The importance of these structure families stems from evidence suggesting that learning and categorisation performance are not only limited by low- and high-level generalisation mechanisms but by the inherent nature of the environmental and mental stimuli entertained by observers during the concept learning process. In this paper, we propose a new direction for concept learning and categorisation research based on several dual paradigmatic tensions that hinge on the inherent nature of the components of stimuli, limitations of the innate abilities of the observer to process such components, and the relationship between the two. The tensions range from the various possible properties and constraints of the dimensions underlying categories of object stimuli to various notions of supervised learning capable of significantly altering concept learnability. The substantial extant literature on concept learning research indicates that rigorous empirical investigations targeting these tensions are either non-existent or, at best, severely lacking despite their ecological significance. We shall argue that future theory building about concept learning should attempt to resolve these tensions and that without the proper empirical and theoretical focus on them, concept learning research will fail to achieve its ultimate goals anytime soon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science is unusual in that cognitive scientists have dramatic disagreements about the extension of their object of study, cognition. This paper defends a novel analysis of the scientific concept of cognition: that cognition is the sensitive management of an agent's behavior. This analysis is "modular," so that its extension varies depending on how one interprets certain of its constituent terms. I argue that these variations correspond to extant disagreements between cognitive scientists. This correspondence is evidence that the proposed analysis models the contemporary understanding of cognition among scientists, without artificially resolving questions that are currently considered open. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional view of hell as eternal conscious torment is challenged by proponents of universalism and conditional immortality. However, they need to explain why the church has been misled in adopting the traditional view. This paper draws from cognitive and evolutionary science of religion to provide an "error theory" of why eternal hell became the dominant view. Early Christianity grew rapidly despite persecution and marginalization. The fear of hell probably helped Christian communities to maintain cooperation by weeding out free riding even in times of crisis. Here the traditional view proved to be more effective than its competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The target paper of Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) provides a valuable contribution to the literature on implicit bias (IB). Although it is thus understandable that current examples of BIM are relatively poor lab models of IB in the real world, in principle, more useful lab models of IB could be developed in the future. A second potential reason to cherish BIM as instances of IB in the laboratory is that BIM can provide a lab model of IB. Just like different instances of IB outside of the laboratory can differ with regard to the way in which conditions are suboptimal, also different instances of IB in the laboratory (e.g., BIM) can differ with regard to how conditions are suboptimal. [Extracted from the article]

The debate about scientific realism is concerned with the relation between our scientific theories and the world. Scientific realists argue that our best theories or components of those theories correspond to the world. Anti-realists deny such a correspondence. Traditionally, this central issue in the philosophy of science has been approached by focusing on the theories themselves (e.g., by looking at theory change or the underlying experimental context). I propose a relatively unexplored way to approach this old debate. In addition to focusing on the theory, we should focus on the theorizer. More precisely, in order to determine on which component of a theory we should hinge a realist commitment, we should analyze the cognitive processes underlying scientific theorizing. In this paper I do just that. Drawing from recent developments in the cognitive sciences and evolutionary epistemology, I formulate some tentative conclusions. The aim of this paper is not so much to defend a particular position in the debate on scientific realism but to showcase the value of taking a cognitive perspective in the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Augmentative and Alternative Communication Technology [AAC Tech] is a relatively young, multidisciplinary field aimed at developing technologies for people who are unable to use their natural speaking voice due to congenital or acquired disability. In this paper, we take a look at the role of AAC Tech in promoting an 'empathic turn' in the perception of non-speaking autistic persons. By the empathic turn we mean the turn towards a recognition of non-speaking autistic people as persons whose ways of engaging the world and expressing themselves are indicative of psychologically rich and intrinsically meaningful experiential lives. We first identify two ways in which AAC Tech contributes positively to this development. We then discuss how AAC Tech can simultaneously undermine genuine empathic communication between autistic persons and typically developed communicators (or neurotypicals). To mitigate this concern, we suggest the AAC field should incorporate philosophical insights from Design for Emotions and enactive embodied cognitive science into its R&D practices. To make our proposal concrete, we home in on stimming as an autistic form of bodily expressivity that can play an important role in empathic communicative exchanges between autistic persons and neurotypicals and that could be facilitated in AAC Tech designed for autistic people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we talk to Angry Uncle, or attempt to persuade any very ignorant audience? This paper discusses several strategies, including fact dumping, consistency checking, pandering, and just being friendly. It defends the continued value of fact dumping and consistency checking despite skeptical doubts rooted in recent cognitive science literature about their strategic efficacy. Pandering and friendliness often fail to confront our audience with epistemic resistance and so face serious limitations as means of responding to ignorance. Any reasonable view of how to talk to Angry Uncles must also consider how to meet relevant moral standards, such as showing respect for ourselves, our audience, and important social causes. Without some fact dumping and consistency checking, pandering and friendliness often fail to meet these standards. All in all, the various modes work best together, and it would be a mistake to conclude from unfavorable cognitive science research that we should avoid fact dumping and consistency checking in Angry Uncle exchanges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To realize autonomous collaborative robots, it is important to increase the trust that users have in them. Toward this goal, this paper proposes an algorithm that endows an autonomous agent with the ability to explain the transition from the current state to the target state in a Markov decision process (MDP). According to cognitive science, to generate an explanation that is acceptable to humans, it is important to present the minimum information necessary to sufficiently understand an event. To meet this requirement, we propose a framework for identifying important elements in the decision-making process using a prediction model for the world and generating explanations based on these elements. To verify the ability of the proposed method, we conducted an experiment using a grid environment. It was inferred from the result of a simulation experiment that the explanation generated using the proposed method was composed of the minimum elements important for understanding the transition from the current state to the target state. Furthermore, subject experiments showed that the generated explanation was a good summary of the process of state transition, and that a high evaluation was obtained for the explanation of the reason for an action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in the literature suggest cognitive representation can be conceived of as a kind of mechanism that meets the functional profile set out by the S-representation account. However, this approach is threatened by worries that the S-representation account cannot tell a satisfactory story about content determination at the subpersonal level. One solution is to complement the S-representation account with a traditional etiological theory of content determination. This paper argues such a move is unwarranted and threatens the broader project of understanding representation in mechanism-friendly terms. Once properly situated within a mechanistic framework, the S-representation account can address the issue of content determination without supplementing it with an etiological theory. In turn, this strengthens the notion that combing a mechanistic framework with the S-representation account provides a robust and comprehensive defense of representation's positive role in cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Syntactic priming effects have been investigated for several decades in psycholinguistics and the cognitive sciences to understand the cognitive mechanisms that support language production and comprehension. The question of whether speakers prime themselves is central to adjudicating between two theories of syntactic priming, activation-based theories and expectation-based theories. However, there is a lack of a statistical model to investigate the two different theories when nominal repeated measures are obtained from multiple participants and items. This paper presents a Markov mixed-effect multinomial logistic regression model in which there are fixed and random effects for own-category lags and cross-category lags in a multivariate structure and there are category-specific crossed random effects (random person and item effects). The model is illustrated with experimental data that investigates the average and participant-specific deviations in syntactic self-priming effects. Results of the model suggest that evidence of self-priming is consistent with the predictions of activation-based theories. Accuracy of parameter estimates and precision is evaluated via a simulation study using Bayesian analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or 'know-how' is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions and anti-intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: Its proponents assume that findings from cognitive science provide evidence about the nature of mental states. We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this naturalistic metaphysics, and they even rely on it to claim that cognitive science supports intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific findings can have metaphysical import. We argue that this situation is preventing productive debate about intellectualism, which would benefit from both sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of extended cognition have increasingly engaged with the empirical and methodological practices of cognitive science and psychology. One topic that has received increased attention from those interested in the extended mind is music cognition. A number of authors have argued that music not only shapes emotional and cognitive processes, but also that it extends those processes beyond the bodily envelope. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the case for extended music cognition. Two accounts are examined in detail: Joel Krueger’s “musically extended emotional mind” and Tom Cochrane’s “expression and extended cognition.” Each account is evaluated using three “anti-extension” arguments. I argue that Krueger and Cochrane’s accounts offer important steps toward extended music cognition, but that each account remains underdeveloped in various ways. To supplement existing approaches, I propose a complementaryextended computational approach to music cognition(ECMC). The claim is that music cognition forms part of an extended system in virtue of involving computational processes that range across environmental and in-the-head elements. The paper concludes by showing how the ECMC deals with each of the three anti-extension challenges and responds to objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores possible influences that some developments in the field of branches of AI, called automated discovery and machine learning systems, might have upon some aspects of the old debate between Francis Bacon’s inductivism and Karl Popper’s falsificationism. Donald Gillies facetiously calls this controversy ‘the duel of two English knights’, and claims, after some analysis of historical cases of discovery, that Baconian induction had been used in science very rarely, or not at all, although he argues that the situation has changed with the advent of machine learning systems. (Some clarification of termsmachine learningandautomated discoveryis required here. The key idea ofmachine learningis that, given data with associated outcomes, software can be trained to make those associations in future cases which typically amounts to inducing some rules from individual cases classified by the experts.Automated discovery(also calledmachine discovery) deals with uncovering new knowledge that is valuable for human beings, and its key idea is that discovery is like other intellectual tasks and that the general idea of heuristic search in problem spaces applies also to discovery tasks. However, since machine learning systemsdiscover(very low-level) regularities in data, throughout this paper I use the generic termautomated discoveryfor both kinds of systems. I will elaborate on this later on). Gillies’s line of argument can be generalised: thanks to automated discovery systems, philosophers of science have at their disposal a new tool for empirically testing their philosophical hypotheses. Accordingly, in the paper, I will address the question, which of the two philosophical conceptions of scientific method is better vindicated in view of the successes and failures of systems developed within three major research programmes in the field: machine learning systems in the Turing tradition, normative theory of scientific discovery formulated by Herbert Simon’s group and the programme called HHNT, proposed by J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Analysing ancient art offers views into the visual worlds of its makers. The cusps and swirls typical of European Celtic Art have been interpreted as abstractions of faces and creatures inspired by earlier, more naturalistic art. Yet as 21st-century visual communicators used to 'reading' abstract emoji, we may be over-interpreting this aspect at the cost of other, still hidden dimensions. While humans share inalienable universals across space and culture, such as recognizing friendly or hostile faces, persons who lack facial recognition are diagnosed with autistic spectrum condition. However, their condition enables them to recognize embedded figures easily within crowded images or to focus on pattern instead of faces. My initial assessment indicates that some imagery of European Celtic Art would be compatible with an autistic idiom, similar as suggested for Palaeolithic art. This paper investigates these different ways of seeing European Celtic Art and opens new pathways for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to contribute to research on the media's role in naming and framing the debate about teacher education using Sweden as a case study. This is done by analysing how articles published in four major Swedish newspapers from 2016–2017 define: a) the challenges/strengths of current teacher education and b) the kind of teacher professionalism that the descriptions give rise to. Using content analysis, the study shows that the media mainly emphasises the negative aspects of teacher education and, in particular, scepticism of the scientific basis where postmodernism is regarded as problematic and needing to be replaced by cognitive science due to the insufficient knowledge of teachers and student teachers, the shortage of teachers in the country as a whole and disciplinary problems in the classroom. The debate is primarily fuelled by those outside the field of educational research, who argue that psychology and neuroscience scholars should have the power to define the content of education, which indicates a view of professionalism as inside-out-professionalism. There are more nuanced approaches to teacher education as well, but these are marginalised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shelley's Heart is a locative learning tool geo-linked to the churchyard where Mary Shelley is buried along with the heart of her husband, poet Percy Shelley. To commemorate the 200th anniversary of the publication of Frankenstein, this interactive multi-media project debuted on Halloween night, 2018. Featuring biographical facts, quotes and fictional narratives related to the Shelleys and their friends, John Keats and Lord Byron, it provides an active learning experience that is freely available to the general public. Locative projects often feature either factual information (museum audio guides), or fictional stories (ambient literature), but Shelley's Heart combines fact and fiction in order to promote critical thinking. Refining this approach required extensive trial and error experimentation, collaborative brainstorming, user testing, and several phases of production. Insights garnered from this process led to the development of strategies that simultaneously promote implicit and explicit cognition. Cognitive science refers to this interplay as, the 'dual process model' [Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux]. This paper explores how the creation of Shelley's Heart led to the development of three key dual process design strategies: 'Match,' 'Affect' and 'Prime', collectively known as 'MAP'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its 'pick up' in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be "RECtified" so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified. Abbreviations: EP = Ecological Psychology REC = Radical Enactivism [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to our understanding of EU-Ukraine relations by examining intersemiotic communication – how words and images, or verbal and photographic semiotic layers and their interaction, combine in the representation of international affairs. The analysis focuses on Ukraine's perspectives of Self, the EU and Russia as presented in Ukrainian media discourse, namely, in leading Ukrainian social and political newspapers (January-June, 2016). The article presents the results of applying the cognitive theory of perspectives to research the intersemiotic and mental image of Self and Other in four aspects: a vantage point, direction of scanning, perspectival distance, and perspectival mode. Based on that, I explain the main strategic narrative of the Ukrainian press about the EU, how it is sustained, and how the image of the EU becomes pronounced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using iconic images created by students in Belfast and Sarajevo of their respective cities, this paper will explore how emerging ideas in the field of cognitive science (e.g. Gallagher, S. 2005.How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press) can help explain the making and understanding of Augusto Boal’s ‘Image Theatre’. There has been growing interest in the intersection between performance and cognitive science (McConachie, B., and H. E. Hart, eds. 2006.Performance and Cognition: Theatre Studies after the Cognitive Turn. Routledge), particularly in terms of kinaesthetic empathy (Reynolds, D., and M. Reason, eds. 2012.Kinaesthetic Empathy in Creative and Cultural Practices.Intellect), which can enhance our understanding of the embodied practices associated with Augusto Boal’s Image Theatre. This paper will analyse the ambiguities inherent in stage images of contested cities to explore how these may reveal unconscious insights into the image-makers’ perception of their home environments. An image of Sarajevo, for instance, ostensibly about the Winter Olympics, prompts consideration of the city’s internal divisions. An image of Belfast, ostensibly about the Titanic, suggests the limitations of the city’s Peace Process. Taking Boal’s idea that stage images should befeltrather than read, this article explores the fine line between feeling and meaning in the understanding of Image Theatre and suggests that alongside literacy and orality we now also need to include ‘imageracy’, the ability to interpret and understand images, as a key competency for the modern world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people’s behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people’s behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is a consensus among philosophers that some “I”-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. In some recent papers, this property has been formulated in the following deflationist way: an “I”-thought is immune to error through misidentification when it can misrepresent the mental or bodily property self-ascribed but cannot misrepresent the subject (if any) possessing that property. However, it has been put forward that the range of mental and bodily states that are immune in that limited sense cannot include nonconceptual forms of self-representation. In this paper, I claim the opposite. I argue in favor of a theoretical framework inspired by semantic relativism that solves the problem ofimmune nonconceptual self-representations. In order to do so, I refute an argument against the relativist account which is based on the existence of shared representations. This argument, I contend, rests on a confusion between two conditions to which a relativist may appeal when considering whether a certain mental content is relative to the self: a strong invariance condition and a weak invariance condition. I then argue that even if we acknowledge the existence of shared representations, the weak invariance condition is still satisfied, and consequently the relativist framework can make sense of INSRs. I argue that this weak invariance condition is satisfied by a representational function that self-relativizes certain representations. I then provide an empirical instance of such a function by discussing some of the recent literature on motor representations and the sense of agency. In the last part of the paper, I answer several potential objections. These potential objections lead me to distinguish two fundamental kinds of error relative to the self: error through misidentification and error through misapplication. This distinction allows me to answer a fundamental question raised by the very idea of de facto immunity to error through misidentification. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper will discuss how the conceptualization of embodied, abstract notions such as pain, which is multi-modal, non-visual and subjective, has the potential to be communicated visually using model making, as it is traditionally understood in the fields of architecture and design. We propose a new methodological approach to research where Gadamer’s [2004.Truth and Method. Continuum International Publishing Group] understanding of intersubjective interpretation used in conjunction with Simulation theory [Gallese, V., and A. Goldman. 1998. “Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading.”Trends in Cognitive Sciences2 (12): 493–501] in embodied cognitive science, provides a strong framework in which to formulate a palette of materials and forms to visualize subjective experience. This novel approach to design research is currently being undertaken within the field of Health Sciences to produce metaphorically provocative, descriptive models of the lived experience of people with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) to help bridge the gap in understanding between the sufferer and the public. This paper seeks to engage briefly with two questions integral to the research being undertaken: how does one understand another’s pain, and how can one conceptualize and communicate abstract notions such as pain visually using material and form as language? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The idea that there can be only one cognitive system within any single given cognitive organism is an established albeit implicit one within cognitive science and related studies of the mind. The firm foothold of this notion is due largely to the immense corpus of empirical evidence for the correlation of a high level of cognitive sophistication with a centralized nervous system. However, it must be pointed out that these findings are sourced in large part from studies on vertebrates. This paper presents a potential counterexample to the notion that only one cognitive system can be realized within any single genuine cognitive organism. This counterexample is the octopus, an invertebrate with what initially appears to be a paradoxical combination of vertebrate-like cognitive and behavioral capacities and a functionally decentralized nervous system. The extensive relegation of sensorimotor processing and control responsibilities to the peripheral nervous system which controls the arms of the octopus raises principled reasons to believe that the octopus is an organism that may house multiple independent cognitive systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research at the intersection of cognitive science and education has major benefits for both researchers and education practitioners. Yet, a number of logistical and communication challenges must be carefully negotiated to maximize the benefits of these collaborations. In this article, we trace the investments and major publications that have sought to bridge cognitive science and education over the past 40 years to provide context for the papers in a special issue of the Journal of Cognition and Development "Found in Translation: Cognitive Development Meets Education. We use the Institute of Education Sciences' investments in research at the intersection of cognitive science and education as a case study for what the field has primarily focused on over the past two decades and, finally, we offer a broad overview of the themes that this special issue touches on and a commentary on how we believe the field can improve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the field of developmental science, there is a general agreement of the need to work together across academic disciplinary boundaries in order to advance the understandings of how to optimize child development and learning. However, experience also shows that such collaborations may be challenging. This paper reports on the experiences of bidirectional collaboration between researchers in a multidisciplinary research team and between researchers and stakeholders, in the first randomized controlled trial in Swedish preschool. The objective of the trial was to investigate the effects of two pedagogical learning strategies evaluating language, communication, attention, executive functions and early math. The interdisciplinary team includes researchers from early childhood education, linguistics, developmental psychology and cognitive neuro science. Educational researchers and theorists within the field of early childhood education in Sweden have during the last two decades mainly undertaken small-scale qualitative praxis-oriented and participative research. There is a widespread skepticism with regards to some of the core principles in controlled intervention methodologies, including a strong resistance towards individual testing of children. Consequently unanticipated disagreements and conflicts arose within the research team, as RCT methodology requires the measurement of effects pre and post the intervention. The aim of this article is to discuss the conditions for bidirectional collaboration both between researchers and stakeholders and between researchers in the research team. The findings illustrate strategies and negotiations that emerged in order to address ontological and epistemological controversies and disagreements. These include (a) the negotiation of research ethics, (b) making divergences visible and learning from each other, (c) using a multi-epistemological and methodological approach as a complement to the RCT design and (d) the negotiation of research problems that are shared between educators and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models - ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all - in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. By asserting, we share knowledge, coordinate behavior, and advance collective inquiry. Accordingly, assertion is of considerable interest to cognitive scientists, social scientists, and philosophers. This paper advances our understanding of the norm of assertion. Prior evidence suggests that knowledge is the norm of assertion, a view known as “the knowledge account.” In its strongest form, the knowledge account says that knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for assertability: you should make an assertion if and only if you know that it is true. The knowledge account has been rejected on the grounds that it conflicts with our ordinary practice of evaluating assertions. This paper reports four experiments that address an important objection of this sort, which focuses on a class of examples known as “Gettier cases.” The results undermine the objection and, in the process, provide further evidence for the knowledge account. The findings also teach some important general lessons about intuitional methodology and the curation of genres of thought experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This multidisciplinary work presents synopsis of theories in the search for common field-like fundamental principles of self-organisation and communication existing on quantum, cellular, and even social levels. Based on these fundamental principles, we formulate conceptually novel social neuroscience paradigm (OSIMAS), which envisages social systems emerging from the coherent neurodynamical processes taking place in the individual mind-fields. In this way, societies are understood as global processes emerging from the superposition of the conscious and subconscious mind-fields of individual members of society. For the experimental validation of the biologically inspired OSIMAS paradigm, we have designed a framework of EEG-based experiments. Initial baseline individual tests of spectral cross-correlations of EEG-recorded brainwave patterns for some mental states have been provided in this paper. Preliminary experimental results do not refute the main OSIMAS postulates. This paper also provides some insights for the construction of OSIMAS-based simulation models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]