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The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guanxi is the Chinese manifestation of a universal phenomenon – the relationship between gift-givers and gift-takers – extended to include its antagonistic but symbiotic relationship with the state. As China's market has been increasingly integrated into the global economic system, guanxi has been adapted, so that similar practices can now be seen in areas such as international business and trade, and industrial relations. In this article, I investigate how guanxi has played a part in the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan. Even though the ECFA has served more as an ongoing framework for negotiations than a final agreement, it was highly controversial in Taiwan right from the opening of negotiations in 2008. Taiwan's reactions to the ECFA reflect how the Chinese government leveraged a guanxi strategy to facilitate the talks. This guanxi strategy shows that the ECFA not only represents economic cooperation, but also works to promote political integration. News reports and official documents in Taiwan highlighted two different reactions to the ECFA there. While one strand approved of the framework and accepted the implied obligations, the other, especially within civil society, saw guanxi as an external threat that needed to be counterbalanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Lin was largely unknown prior to the phenomenon known as ‘Linsanity’ in February 2012. This piece compares and contrasts the ways in which Lin's story – and in particular his cultural, political and national identity – has played out in the USA, Taiwan and China, and also shows how the identities created for Lin in each of these three places constitute his ‘three bodies’. The USA, China and Taiwan all lay some claim on Lin's identity. Answers to basic questions about Lin diverge in each place. The US story focuses on issues of race and overlooked ability. In China, much attention is given to Lin's intellectual and athletic abilities, as well as his ‘Chineseness’. In Taiwan, broadcasters and politicians alike highlight his Taiwanese identity, and emphasise how Lin's success shows the value of non-academic training. Writers in all three countries have focused on lessons to be learned from Lin, with humility, team spirit, hard work and family values taking prominent place. In cross-strait relations, the long-time Cold War enemies remain diplomatically isolated yet economically and culturally intertwined. The Lin story displays the curious moment in People's Republic of China–Republic of China relations in which celebrities can treat the divide between the countries as permeable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]