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The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for 'positive' emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as 'irrational' or born of 'ignorance' seems 'irrational' and 'ignorant'. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two separate, but inter-linked, dilemmas have highlighted the importance of design-led thinking. First, the crumbling physical fabric of the Palace of Westminster has prompted a multi-billion rebuilding project, which will require the parliamentary studies specialism to engage with questions of design, space, and architecture. Separately, political science more generally has been challenged to utilize the insights of design-thinking and design-practice: a challenge to which it is culturally and methodological ill-equipped. This article considers what a design-led approach to political science looks like in theory, and in practice, in the case study of the Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster. This represents a first attempt at how such a fusion could be beneficial for both politics as theory and politics as practice. The main conclusion is that although design-orientated political science is not a panacea for the challenges of modern democratic governance – in intellectual or practical terms – it does appear to offer significant potential in terms of theoretically-informed but solution focused research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses A. H. Birch’sRepresentative and Responsible Government (1964)as an analytical lens through which to not only understand the evolution of representative democracy in the intervening fifty years, but also to trace and reflect upon the evolution (and future) ofthe studyof representative democracy. This is demonstrated by highlighting how ideational and empirical challenges have resulted in claims that representativeandresponsible government has now been displaced by representativeversusresponsible government, or in more extreme interpretations that suggest contemporary electoral processes and institutions now provide forneitherrepresentativenorresponsible government. This reveals how political analysis has built upon and evolved away from Birch’s initial focus in significant ways, while possibly suggesting that a neo-Birch’ian might profitably refocus on the linkage or nexusbetweenmodes of representation and manifestations of responsible government. Recognising the importance of this nexus in the context of ‘declinist’ narratives concerning the ‘death’, ‘suicide’ or ‘end’ of democracy remains the lasting legacy bequeathed by Birch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although declining political engagement has been identified as a key problem for advanced liberal democracies, this article suggests that a more profound tension needs to be addressed. Specifically, it identifies interdependences between growing political pressures on national governments, and the tendency to delegate decisions away from control by elected politicians. These processes of “hyper-democracy” and “hyper-depoliticization” arguably create and re-enforce political tensions, magnifying a risk of central government “overload.” Through analyzing the arguments of prominent scholars of democracy, the article picks apart these interdependencies and argues for a more balanced approach to democratic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In a previous edition of this journal, an argument concerning the demonization of politicians and the changing nature of democracy was raised. This, in turn, raised previously unconsidered questions about (inter alia): the discourse, language and symbolism surrounding politicians; the limits of democratic politics; the politics of public expectations; and whether political scientists have a professional duty to the public in terms of promoting the public understanding of politics. The aim of making this provocative argument – framed as it was around a reinterpretation of the MPs expenses scandal in the UK – was to provoke a debate about the existence of certain ‘self-evident’ truths, the fragility of democratic politics and the future of political science as an academic discipline. Phrased in these terms the initial article was successful as six respondents – Domonic Bearfield, Alastair Campbell, Martin Gainsborough, Peter Riddell, Klaus Segbers and Gerry Stoker – immediately entered the fray and sought to either finesse and develop my arguments or to offer a considered critique. This article discusses ‘debating demonization’ in the form of a reply to each respondent and a focus on (in turn): the politics of demonization; the politics of the media; the politics of social class; the politics of monitory mechanisms; the politics of performance; and the politics of political science. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The delegation of functions to a range of quasi-autonomous bodies has formed a major challenge to the operation of representative democracy, in both administrative and democratic terms, since the formation of the modern state. These challenges have been more pronounced within Westminster-style democracies that are founded on the logic of ministerial departments and the convention of individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Towards the end of the twentieth century, these challenges became more pronounced as the centrifugal dynamics of New Public Management led to what has been termed the 'unravelling' or 'unbundling' of the state. In many countries around the world concerns regarding a 'democratic deficit' and patronage stimulated reform campaigns demanding territorial devolution in the belief that new regional democratic structures could increase accountability and transparency. This was particularly true in the UK where proponents of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland claimed that such a reform would lead to a 'bonfire of quangos'. This article draws upon theories derived in relation to multi-level governance in order to frame an analysis of how devolution has altered the sphere of delegated governance. This reveals a complex pattern of resource dependencies, motivations and incentives that have led to markedly different reform trajectories but certainly not the 'end of the quango state'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many advanced liberal democracies exhibit 'democracy deserts' in which high levels of social exclusion among large sections of the population are compounded by low levels of democratic engagement. How to reverse declining levels of electoral participation and widespread public disenchantment with politics therefore forms a defining element of contemporary comparative politics. It is in this context that the processes and methods associated with 'deliberative democracy' have become significant. Whereas most research in this field has focused on experiments at the local or community level, this article utilises a comparative case-study approach to examine the recent use of deliberative mechanisms in relation to constitutional issues. By comparing the establishment of citizen's assemblies with varying powers to review and make recommendations on electoral reform in the Canadian province of British Columbia and in the Netherlands and then contrasting this with a polity where a highly-majoritarian elite has reneged on pre-election commitments to review the electoral system (the United Kingdom), this article contributes a distinctive perspective to broader debates on public disengagement, deliberative democracy, political geography, majoritarian modification and electoral reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Delegated governance refers to the wide range of quasi-autonomous organizations – ‘fringe bodies, quangos and all that’ – to which an increasing proportion of state activity is now delegated. Recent reports by the OECD have emphasized the growing role of these bodies in relation to policy-making, regulation and administration within advanced industrial countries. However, the existence of delegated forms of governance enjoying an arm's length relationship to elected politicians raises fundamental questions regarding the operation and nature of representative democracy. Political devolution to regions within nation states has long been advocated as a potential solution to concerns regarding the control, accountability and patronage in relation to these bodies. This article presents the findings of a research project that examined the degree to which devolution to Scotland since 1998 has impacted upon the structure of delegated governance and the possible policy implications this may have for other European states. The research suggests that although the sphere of delegated governance in Scotland post-devolution has grown it has led to the creation of a new governance framework, which may assuage concerns regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ that is commonly associated with quasi-autonomous public bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into office after 18 years of Conservative administration. This government has subsequently enacted a large number of constitutional reforms. However, a debate exists in relation to the degree to which, taken together, these reforms amount to a fundamental shift in the nature of British democracy. This article utilises Arend Lijphart's work on patterns of democracy in order to provide a conceptual lens through which New Labour's constitutional reforms can be analysed in terms of representing either a minor or major shift from a traditionally majoritarian to more consensus-orientated system. The article concludes that, although significant, the actual degree of reform in Britain is less radical than is commonly assumed: although New Labour is committed to far-reaching constitutional reform in principle it has been far less committed in practice . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]