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This paper examines U.S. policy toward Taiwan and explores several proposals for change that an American administration may wish to consider. The author suggests that, while the United States should not overhaul its current relationship with Taiwan, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a dejure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the presence of new presidents in Taiwan and the US, the basic dynamics of the US–China–Taiwan triangle and the dilemmas faced by leaders on all three sides have remained largely intact. This paper looks at how Chen Shui-bian and George W. Bush have tried to change the policies and practices they inherited from their predecessors. Chen has shown himself to be a less provocative president, and Bush has adopted more supportive and sympathetic policies toward Taiwan. Despite their personal inclinations, they have been able to make only marginal changes in their relations with the other, and with China. Domestic political conflicts and competing strategic interests prevent a fundamental change in relations between the US, China, and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 which governs the relationship of the United States (US) and Taiwan, and its effects on US relations with China. What the act says; Development of the act; Chinese warning that the Taiwan Relations Act would be an obstacle to US-Sino relations; Democratization of Taiwan; Chinese-Taiwan relations; US relations with China and Taiwan under different administrations since the 1980s.

The article discusses several issues regarding the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China. It explores the factors that contribute to the increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, including the scheduled dual national elections in Taiwan and its decision to join the United Nations which evokes condemnation from Beijing, China and the U.S. for trying to change Taiwan's international status. It is argued that understanding the reason on the change in Taiwan's mood can enable Beijing and the U.S. to act wisely in order to make use of the opportunity to put triangular Taiwan Strait relationship on a declining tension.

This study analyzes several of the major challenges that the Taiwanese government will confront during President Chen Shui-bian's second term of office. These include serious strains in relations with the US, a continued deterioration in ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and increased political polarization, ethnic division and gridlock at home. The author suggests that, while these problems are certainly formidable, they should not he exaggerated. Nor should they be attributed solely to one politician or political camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream Opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A policy of strategic ambiguity is the fundamental policy of the US toward cross-Strait relations. The US takes very ambiguous positions on its commitment to Taiwan's security, arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan's future status, which are hoped to facilitate peace keeping and stability maintenance in the Taiwan Strait. However, a policy of strategic ambiguity cannot avoid three main troubles in dealing with the Taiwan issue: the dilemma of deterrence; a cross-Strait arms race; and possible military involvement in potential cross-Strait conflict. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis has demonstrated the bankruptcy of this ambiguous strategy. US policy regarding the Taiwan question has been forced to a crossroads. It is high time the US abandoned its strategic ambiguity policy. Clarifying Taiwan policy should be the Bush Administration's top, if not the first, priority. But neither clear commitment to Taiwan's defense, either conditional or unconditional, nor letting Taiwan defend itself are correct directions for US policy clarification. Only supporting peaceful reunification of both sides across the Taiwan Strait is the best alternative, which would serve America's national interest in the Asia-Pacific region better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the need for the United States to maintain a high degree of superiority over regional countries to maintain the area's stability and deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. commitment to transfer defensive capabilities to Taiwan and intervene on the latter's behalf; Political reassurances that the U.S. does not plan to use its superiority to harm China's core security interests; Distinction between status quo and revisionist countries.

Discusses how historical circumstances shaped the relationship of the U.S. with Taiwan and China. Changing attitudes of U.S. presidents towards China; Lobby efforts of Taiwan in the U.S.; Shape of post-Cold War alliances in the 21st century in light of the war on terrorism.

Discusses the U.S. policy regarding Taiwan and its implications for American security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Plan of the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush to use the Taiwan issue to contain China; Impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. security policy regarding the region.

Discusses issues on the political mistrust between China, Taiwan and the U.S. Examination of the Communist Party of China's grand strategy; Analysis of the Chinese dilemma on whether to reveal its grand strategy to the U.S. and Taiwan; Speculations on the global hegemony sought by China.

China's 1.2 billion people, combined with a record-breaking twenty years of rapid growth, make it likely that the Middle Kingdom will become the second economic superpower sometime during the twenty-first century. A warning also sums up challenges that face Americans in dealing with that fascinating national array of strengths and weaknesses. When viewed separately, each of the many aspects off policy involving China is difficult — economic, political, military and environmental. However, when one considers the many interrelationships and then add the third part of the triangle — Taiwan — the policy challenges become increasingly complicated. Anyway that one looks at it, China is becoming an important economic power, once again. Using a form of comparing national economies known as purchasing power parity the Chinese economy is now more than half as large as that of the U.S. and larger than Japan's. More conventional measures show China in seventh place, but coming up rapidly. China is now the ninth largest trading nation in the world. It is a major trading partner of the U.S. More than $70 billion of commerce flows each year between two nations.

The pace and direction of diplomacy in Asia reflects increasingly sophisticated hedging strategies being pursued by all the major actors as they anticipate a new structure of relations. The region is reaching a stage, however, where probable events and policy choices may soon begin to foreclose options. There are three such fateful decision points just over the horizon: decisions made in the process of Korean reunification; over the future of Taiwan; and in regard to deployment of missile defence-systems by the US and its allies. The goal of statecraft should be to recognise and operate within the parameters of necessary ambiguity, while seeking to reduce the risk that events will force premature choices and establish antagonistic geopolitical alignments throughout the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]