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Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 8 March 2009, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in close proximity to the US Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable. This paper seeks to explain the incident and its aftermath in the context of Chinese coercive diplomacy. China's strategy, designed to motivate the US to cease surveillance operations near its militarily sensitive areas in the South China Sea, included three components: (1) the use of military provocation, (2) a coordinated media campaign, and (3) a challenge to US interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). This study goes beyond traditional research on Chinese use of force to explain why China's coercive diplomatic campaign took the form it did. Only by understanding the nature and factors affecting Chinese coercive diplomacy can the US design the effective counter strategy needed to protect US regional and global interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origins and role of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and active defense in Chinese foreign policy are investigated and applied to China’s policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The dominant moderate conceptual strategic thinking encourages Beijing to aim for the establishment of amodus vivendiwith Washington and Tokyo that involves ade factopresence of China alongside both the US and Japan. However, Beijing’s signaling is complicated by radical voices that undercut coexistence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Does China have a strategy toward the South China Sea? I test three hypotheses about Chinese strategy—regional hegemony, gray-zone coercion, and bureaucratic politics—against seven major developments in Chinese policy between 2009 and 2016. None of these hypotheses offers an accurate or complete explanation of Chinese strategy. I argue that China has a dialectic and arduous strategy of balancing the goals of safeguarding rights and maintaining stability. But such a balance is inherently dynamic and frequently elusive. It was not until after 2016 that Beijing began to master the art of strategic balance and achieve an upper hand in the long struggle over the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the current discourses on China's diplomacy in the South China Sea disputes by asking: What does China want to achieve in the various negotiations? By comparing different versions of the multilateral Code of Conduct negotiations between 1992 and 2016, the authors find that the sovereignty issue has been shelved throughout the negotiations. We identify three factors that may account for this finding: the inconsistency of China's official claims over time, China's increased bargaining power, and the importance of the shelved sovereignty axiom since the era of Deng Xiaoping. The authors conclude that the normative game continues in the shadows of international norms represented by invalid sovereignty over the contested waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can we explain China's paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way to explain China's policy in the South China Sea is to understand the character of dualism in China's strategic culture. Following constructivist theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing elements that are mutually embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many international legal experts believe that thePhilippinesv.Chinaarbitration award of 12 July 2016 represents a game changer for South China Sea dispute settlements because the award has brought a breathtaking legal clarity to the complex disputes. This article argues that the sweeping nature of the award had a very paradoxical effect on Chinese policy. The arbitration ruling has led to the hardening of China’s claims, but it has also raised a new readiness among Chinese policymakers to renew negotiations. The sweepingness of the award makes it hard for the Philippines to reach a negotiated compromise with China on the basis of the award, but it also presents a surprising political opportunity in regional politics for the major actors involved to lower tensions and recalibrate policies. Although China’s new readiness to negotiate is welcome, the overall impact of the three-and-a-half-year-long arbitration is likely to create a deadlock in negotiations in the near future. Paradoxically, this may raise the importance of political and power-centred approaches to regional dispute settlements, as the legal approach embodied by arbitration continues to meet Chinese defiance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at the South China Sea dispute and its impact in international relations. It analyses why the Southeast Asian states are highly sovereignty sensitive, and how such sensitivity has made non-intervention the bedrock of managing their foreign policies. China has long viewed the near seas as regions of geostrategic interest, and thus the SCS is not an exception. On the one hand it brings hope and prosperity, and on the other uncertainty and threat. At the end, the article argues whether China’s assertive position regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic might undermine its own position in contested areas like the SCS, and suggests that China will at least have to learn how toshare and bear(term coined by the author) as a member of the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article sheds light on developing a hybrid analytical construct by combining Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory and modifications tailored to the case of China. It employs the bureaucratic politics model to China’s decision making during the China–Vietnam standoff in 2014 and adjusts the traditional model with intervening variable – the party ranking system and Democratic Centralism doctrine. I argue that the bargaining game among different actors who have diverse agendas led to the shift in China’s strategy. It would concurrently advance FPA studies while developing a future avenue for research on foreign policy formulation of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses China's growing assertiveness and its strategic interest in the South China Sea as well as focuses on its strained relationships with the U.S. as well as other Asian states such as Japan and India.

The Philippines Arbitration Tribunal separately dealing with the jurisdiction over the South China Sea dispute is the continuance of the set practice by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's Annex VII arbitral tribunals of bifurcation of proceedings, and was the best option for it to deal with China's objections to its jurisdiction in the circumstance of China's non-acceptance of and non-participation in the arbitral proceedings. Such a measure has potentially important implications for the tribunal itself and for China. The tribunal's decision to have jurisdiction over some parts of the Philippines’ submissions resumed the merits proceedings of the dispute. This development of the proceedings would force China to reconsider its current policy of non-participation. Participation in the subsequent merits proceedings might be the right choice for China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the role of fisheries in the East China Sea and the South China Sea as an aspect of China's food security policy. Topics include the notion of wild fish as a strategic natural resource in light of fishery depletion, a 1974 conflict between China and South Vietnam regarding fishing rights in the Paracel Islands area, and maritime boundary disputes with the Philippines, Japan, and Indonesia. Also addressed are problems with Chinese maritime security interagency cooperation, possible international cooperation in resolving fisheries disputes, and efforts to avoid international conflict over fisheries.

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China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea has arisen from the growth of its military power, its ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the Western financial crisis and its heightened nationalism. The other littoral states of the South China Sea have been troubled by the opacity of Chinese politics and of the process of military decision-making amid a proliferation of apparently separately controlled maritime forces. The more active role being played by the United States in the region, in part as a response to Chinese activism, has troubled Beijing. While most of the ASEAN states have welcomed America as a hedge against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly dependent upon China and they don't want to be a party to any potential conflict between these two giants. The problem is that there is no apparent resolution to what the Chinese call, in effect, these ‘indisputable disputes’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses the arbitral proceeding filed by the Philippines against China under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) challenging the validity of the latter's claims in the South China Sea. It discusses the Notification and Statement of Claim (Notification) by the Philippines, which challenges the nine-dash line claim of China.

The author offers perspective on the challenges facing India in staging a presence in the South China Sea. He explains Milan Vego's concepts of interior and exterior lines to the sea. He suggests that India should remain mindful of the dynamics of naval suasion. He compares India and China in terms of material indices, military and economic. He suggests that India can augment its influence by building a fleet crewed by skilled mariners or courting strategic partners in South East Asia.

The article focuses on dispute over ownership of an area in the South China Sea that is claimed by China, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Information is provided on how China's aggressive maneuvers to claim the islands and surrounding area has angered the surrounding nations and demonstrated China's commitment to assertive diplomacy in 2011. Details are provided on how China has committed to improving the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), evidenced in the construction of a naval base in the island of Hainan in the Malacca Strait, giving it valuable naval access to the Indian Ocean.