Search

Before the Fukushima disaster unfolded in 2011, Japanese government and energy company officials were aware of the warning signs and risks of a potential crisis at the reactor site. They failed to use safety mechanisms or update regulations over time to address the vulnerabilities of the power plants. Because interest groups had led the public to believe the power plants were completely safe, the plants were run with little accountability. Following this disaster, Japan established a new nuclear regulatory commission and nuclear regulatory authority in and implemented new regulatory mechanisms. These efforts have been limited, however, and have shifted the issue from regulation to implementation. The enormous cost of meeting new safety protocols has created new barriers for restarting the power plants under updated regulations, but the energy demands of the country will remain. The tension between managing operational risks and meeting public energy needs will test the public and private sectors' ability to sufficiently revamp the nuclear industry and prevent crises in years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is strengthening the station blackout (SBO) mitigation capabilities by enhancing defense in depth for all existing and new NPPs. One of the possible remedies is diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). The objective of this study is to address the benefits of FLEX in various accident scenarios in terms of both risk and cost. FLEX was originally devised against SBO accidents. In this research, we investigate the fundamental plant responses against accidents considering two fundamentally different cases: accidents that lead to high pressure on the primary side and accidents that lead to low pressure on the primary side. Several uncertainties are associated with the characteristics of the FLEX portable equipment. Specifically, the time for FLEX deployment may depend on several factors such as type of accident, point of injection, availability of safety systems, battery backup timings, and human actions. This study utilizes a dynamic risk assessment framework to analyze accident scenarios and suggests a novel importance measure, which is a cumulative distribution function–based importance metric that characterizes the influence of input distribution on complete output distribution. The importance of the existing and newly developed FLEX strategy based on risk significance is illustrated with examples. The suggested measure provides clear insight into how FLEX affects risk of the whole system and additional risk margins thanks to new safety systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey. Its thesis is that its construction marks a turning point in the history, character, dynamics and risk profile of both Turkey and the Greater Middle East. The construction of the Plant reflects a number of emerging phenomena with unmistakable geopolitical implications. These encompass the nuclearization of Turkey, the nuclearization of the Greater Middle East and what appears to be an increasingly intimate Russo-Turkish bilateral relationship at odds with Turkey's membership of NATO. Against this background, the article pinpoints several causes for concern. Among these is the detachment of Turkey from a string of international conventions that seek to promote nuclear safety or to protect the sea, the wider environment, workers or other people. Other causes for concern include the absence in Turkey of a deep-rooted culture steeped in transparency, press freedom, whistleblowing and other potential facilitators of nuclear safety. The article ends with five sets of recommendations directed towards the Government of Turkey plus the Governments and inhabitants of other states in the Greater Middle East and the EU, two of whose member states, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, are situated in relatively close proximity to the Plant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radionuclide contamination in foods has been a public concern in Japan after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) accident. To estimate time and regional trends of daily intake and annual committed effective dose of strontium-90 (90Sr) after the accident, we analysed Market basket samples using a low background 2π gas-flow counter. Samples were collected from six regions, once a year from 2013 to 2018. There appeared to be little variation in estimated daily intake and annual committed effective dose of 90Sr across the time periods and regions. The estimated maximum annual committed effective dose of 90Sr was 0.00076 mSv/year, a value sufficiently lower than the intervention exemption level, 1 mSv/year, in foods in Japan. There was no noticeable difference between the range of estimated daily intake of 90Sr in this study compared with daily intake measured before the FDNPP accident. These results suggested that no obvious increase in dietary intake of 90Sr was observed after the FDNPP accident, and that the effects on commercial foods from 90Sr due to the FDNPP accident were negligible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, the Angela Merkel government in Germany officially announced its decision to permanently shut down all of its seventeen nuclear reactors. In closer proximity to Fukushima, the Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea expanded its nuclear energy program with specific plans to construct more nuclear reactors in various locations and pursued more export opportunities. It was only in 2017 that the South Korean government, under President Moon Jae-in, announced a gradual phase-out of nuclear power plants in South Korea. What explains the contrasting paths of the German and South Korean nuclear energy programs in the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster? Why did the same external shock prompt sudden policy reversal in Germany while it took six more years for South Korea to turn its course? While existing studies are helpful in accounting for the rise of particular energy policies, they are insufficient for explaining the causes and specific timing of major policy reversals in the face of external crises. Building upon the literature on political opportunity structures, this article argues that the emergence of new political opportunities and the shift in political framing with respect to nuclear energy caused nuclear phase-out in both countries. A closer look at the two national cases offers an opportunity to delineate the domestic political process of nuclear energy policymaking and evaluate the role of exogenous shocks, such as a major nuclear disaster, in shifting political opportunity structure and reshaping the perceptions of energy security and political risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 16 March 2021, the Teach311 + COVID-19 Collective () hosted a virtual roundtable discussion entitled "Sources of Disaster: New Epistemic Perspectives in Post-3.11 Japan." The event brought together scholars and students researching the history and anthropology of Japan to explore how the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster of 11 March 2011 (3.11) changed our ways of knowing the world. The roundtable focused on the idea of the "source" to get at these epistemic shifts in lived experience and practical knowledge as well as historiography, and to investigate ideas that range from what we can know about acceptable risk and safety to notions of home and belonging. "Source" is a way to think about origins, but also the materials—texts, media, or testimony—that we collect and analyze to give rise to new or better knowledge. Building upon previous Teach311 activities that explored the roots of 3.11 and genba, participants in this roundtable expanded upon the significance and meanings of the notion of a "source" relative to the politics of epistemology in their research and studies in order to examine what reconstruction means in history when it is conducted alongside recovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Fukushima disaster, the authors analyzed all past core-melt accidents and estimated a failure rate of 1 per 3704 reactor years. This rate indicates that more than one such accident could occur somewhere in the world within the next decade. The authors also analyzed the role that learning from past accidents can play over time. This analysis showed few or no learning effects occurring, depending on the database used. Because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has no publicly available list of nuclear accidents, the authors used data compiled by the Guardian newspaper and the energy researcher Benjamin Sovacool. The results suggest that there are likely to be more severe nuclear accidents than have been expected and support Charles Perrow's "normal accidents" theory that nuclear power reactors cannot be operated without major accidents. However, a more detailed analysis of nuclear accident probabilities needs more transparency from the IAEA. Public support for nuclear power cannot currently be based on full knowledge simply because important information is not available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At approximately 6:24 AM CET on the morning of 22 March 2020, a 5.3 Mw or 5.5 ML earthquake hit Zagreb, Croatia, with an epicentre 7 kilometres north of the city centre. Over 1900 buildings are reported to have been made uninhabitable by earthquake damage. While the earthquake was felt also in the neighbouring Slovenia, the nuclear power plant Krško – which is situated in Slovenia, but roughly 50 kilometres north-west of Zagreb – remained unaffected. However, the event triggered the question of applicability of the existing international nuclear liability conventions to cases of nuclear incidents, occurring as a consequence of a natural disaster. This article aims to analyse various nuclear liability regimes, established under existing international conventions, with respect to those nuclear damages occurring as a consequence of an earthquake. Attention is paid to the question of which subject is to be held liable under these various liability regimes and what would be the nature of such liability. Further, the article addresses the question of how the states concerned could strengthen the existing liability regime in such circumstances, in particular with respect to the region of Central Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Switzerland has long met a good portion of its energy needs by using nuclear power. But in the wake of the accident at Fukushima, the country will have to turn elsewhere—while still remaining true to its history of self-sufficiency and energy independence. This effort is made more complicated by fears that one of its traditional energy sources, hydropower, may no longer be as reliable as in the past. But with a combination of energy conservation, greater efficiencies, alternative energy sources, the “smart grid,” and the introduction of new technologies currently on the drawing board, the country may readily be able to replace the energy lost by the closing of its existing nuclear power plants. And the loss of the snowpack and glaciers (due to climate change) may not be as dire for Switzerland’s hydropower as first anticipated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unpredicted nuclear accident by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (F1NPP) is a global concern for human health and ecosystems. In the present study, five-year fluctuations and accumulations of Cs, 134Cs and 137Cs in the Japanese eel were examined in Northeast Japan. The eel is one of the most important research subjects in fishery resources in Asia. The total radioactive Cs, 134Cs and 137Cs levels in the fish gradually decreased throughout the five-year study period after the F1NPP accident. A faster decay rate was found for 134Cs (10–15%) for five years after the F1NPP accident, and the decay of 137Cs (30–90%) was slower during the five years. The difference of decay rates between radiocaesiums might be explained by their different half-lives. The F1NPP derived 134Cs contamination might cease unless fresh input may be detected, and 137Cs might still be distributed and remain in the natural environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study determined whether consumers informed about radiation have a higher willingness to buy (WTB) bottled water from regions near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima Daiichi). The study also investigated what types of radiation knowledge are effective in mitigating negative images about bottled water from these regions. We found that consumers with radiation knowledge have a higher WTB than those uninformed about radiation, and some types of radiation knowledge have a positive effect on WTB. Our study indicates the importance of enhancing radiation knowledge to improve WTB bottled water from regions near the Fukushima Daiichi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments and the nuclear power industry have a strong interest in playing down the harmful effects of radiation from atomic weapons and nuclear power plants. Over the years, some scientists have supported the view that low levels of radiation are not harmful, while other scientists have held that all radiation is harmful. The author examines the radiation effects of nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945; nuclear weapons testing; plutonium plant accidents at Windscale in England and Chelyabinsk in the Soviet Union; nuclear power plant emissions during normal operations; and the power plant accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States, Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, and Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. In each case, he finds a pattern of minimizing the damage to humans and attributing evidence of shortened life spans mostly to stress and social dislocation rather than to radiation. While low-level radiation is now generally accepted as harmful, its effects are deemed to be so small that they cannot be distinguished from the much greater effects of stress and social dislocation. Thus, some scientists declare that there is no point in even studying the populations exposed to the radioactive elements released into the atmosphere during the 2011 accident at Fukushima. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is tempting to attribute variations in support for nuclear power to prominent accidents such as Three Mile Island in the United States or Fukushima in Japan. To illuminate how such attribution can be problematic, the authors discuss the historical context of the Three Mile Island accident in the United States. They point out that the US nuclear industry faced major challenges even before the 1979 accident: Forty percent of all US reactor cancellations between 1960 and 2010, they write, occurred before the accident in Pennsylvania. While safety concerns were undoubtedly a driver of public aversion to new nuclear construction in the United States, the nuclear industry already faced substantial economic and competitiveness obstacles, much like the nuclear industry worldwide before Fukushima. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nuclear industry has claimed that a Fukushima-type event is unlikely to happen in the United States, because few US nuclear power plants are vulnerable to tsunamis. But to some degree, every nuclear plant is vulnerable to natural disaster or deliberate attack, and no nuclear plant can be assumed to withstand an event more severe than the “design-basis accidents” it was engineered to withstand. Many US nuclear plants appear to be subject to greater risks than they were designed to handle, particularly in regard to earthquakes. The author suggests that the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission should expand the universe of events that new and existing nuclear plants must be designed to survive and require reactors to be upgraded accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that Japan should meet its energy needs without nuclear power plants. But his statement may have little relevance in the next administration. There is a complex power struggle underway over the future of nuclear energy in Japan involving political, governmental, industry, and union groups. Despite the seriousness of the Fukushima crisis, Japan’s historical commitment to nuclear power—and a fuel cycle that includes reprocessing and breeder reactors—still has powerful supporters. Even with a scale-down of nuclear power, there is a possibility that the policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel will continue as a matter of political inertia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2010, South Korea’s nuclear power reactors generated 31.4 percent of the country’s total electricity—by 2030 the government plans to have 19 more reactors online, increasing even more the country’s total nuclear generating capacity. But with this increased capacity comes increased spent nuclear fuel. The author writes that as the existing reactor-based storage pools fill up, spent fuel management is becoming a hot political issue. South Korea’s nuclear utility reports that over the next 10 years, the country will face a crisis in terms of on-site storage at all four of its nuclear power plant sites. As revealed in the nuclear disaster at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plants in March 2011, the vulnerability of spent-fuel storage pools is a matter of serious concern. The author explores ways in which South Korea can move forward. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Social movement studies have constantly focused on research relating to movement strategy, without reaching a consensus on the most viable strategies for realising a movement's goal. Instead of conceptualising movement strategy as merely a product of movement leaders' rational calculations, this article analyses a case of strategy shift attributable to leadership replacement and unexpected events. This article examines the significant breakthroughs achieved by Taiwan's anti-nuclear movement following Japan's Fukushima Incident in 2011, as well as the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. It argues that a militant citizen movement came into being because a new wave of activism employed non- partisan leadership and demonstrated a willingness to employ disruptive tactics. Mounting protests generated a split among members of the traditionally pro-nuclear Kuomintang political party, which was forced to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in 2014. With the regime change in 2016 that brought the more environment-friendly Democratic Progressive Party to power, Taiwan is now on course to phase out nuclear energy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the statistical analysis of the impact of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster on the German program of Energy Transition. It argues that the spectacular growth of renewable energy production in recent years was triggered not only by the increasing subsidies but also by the decision to phase out the nuclear power plants. However, the results seem to be far from what was desired by the architects of the Energy Transition. Except for 2014, the share of high-emission combustible fossils in the energy mix was growing. Meanwhile, the role of the two “transition fuels” (natural gas and nuclear energy) significantly decreased. The article also shows how the media, news, and communication in the modern world can seriously impact the economic policy of a state. It concludes that the decision made by the German government was largely irrational (except for electoral considerations) and it resulted in significant financial consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an accident occurs, operators in nuclear power plants (NPPs) must follow emergency operating procedures (EOPs) or severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs). However, EOPs and SAMGs are symptom-based procedures and guidelines to cope with severe transients and accidents. Operators depend on real-time operating parameters of NPPs to perform each action in EOPs or SAMGs. When a beyond-design-basis accident like the Fukushima Daiichi accident of 2011 occurs, EOPs or SAMGs cannot be performed effectively without adequate information. One lesson learned from the Fukushima accident is that such a situation requires advance preparation regarding the key indicators, the water supply, reactor pressure vessel (RPV) depressurization, and containment venting strategies so actions can be performed with limited manpower and time. After the Fukushima accident, Taiwan Power Company established ultimate response guidelines (URGs) and has implemented them in three operating NPPs. An URG is an event-based guideline developed to manage accidents caused by a compound disaster beyond the design basis. The purpose of this study is to find out the differences of RPV depressurization strategies between EOPs and URGs and to discuss the effect of different RPV depressurization strategies on fuel integrity. The plant responses and accident physical phenomena are simulated using MAAP5. The results show that the RPV water level should be maintained as high as possible and the RPV pressure should be controlled sufficiently low at the beginning of RPV emergency depressurization to avoid core uncovery and assure fuel integrity. The URG provides the better RPV depressurization strategy to respond to a beyond-design-basis accident and mitigate an anticipated severe accident consequence as early as possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012 Bangladesh, against strong public opinion, decided to build the country's first nuclear power plant in the western region of Rooppur. The government argued that the project is necessary to diversify the country's energy mix in order to improve its electricity generation capacity. This commentary explores the Rooppur nuclear power plant project and argues that there are serious concerns about the project that should be taken into account by the government and that there are other options available to diversify the energy mix. The author concludes that a developing country such as Bangladesh is not yet ready for nuclear power as sufficient technical and regulatory expertise and improvement of infrastructure are required before the country can go nuclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the high-magnitude earthquake and consequent tsunami that struck the east coast of Japan on March 11, 2011, at 14:46, Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant experienced station blackout (SBO) resulting in a nuclear accident unprecedented in time and extent. Simulation of such an accident by means of computer codes is largely dependent on the applied boundary conditions and physical models. However, still-unknown boundary conditions and unclear phenomena result in uncertain computed quantities. In this study, first, the boundary conditions of emergency systems are theoretically derived, starting from a discussion of the reactor available measured quantities and related uncertainties. Then, newly implemented physical models (e.g., wetwell condensation mechanism), which were not accounted for in historical studies of long-term SBOs, are explained. As an early method for accident clarification and explanation regarding effective boundary conditions, results from the SAMPSON severe accident code were compared with theoretical values. The results of SAMPSON compared with the measured quantities available have shown that despite successful safety operations performed by the plant operators in Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3, the eventual lack of batteries (for systems operation and measurement reading) led to plant conditions of low core water level at high pressure, nullifying the attempt of the subsequent alternative water injection to prevent core degradation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the nuclear safety in China as of July 2013 following the aftermath of the nuclear accident at Fukushima, Japan in 2011. Due to this nuclear accident, several countries including Germany, Switzerland and Italy abandoned their plans to extend their nuclear capacity but China is among the countries that will continue to build nuclear plants. The author states that China should exploit all usable possibilities to meet their growing electricity demand. As of the said date, there are eight East Asian countries, including Malaysia, South and North Korea and Thailand, who are having plans for civil nuclear energy.

This essay was written under the impact of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear catastrophe to locate the nuclear power issue in a context broader than energy and environment. “Peaceful use of nuclear energy” was brought in by the US in the mid-1950s as part of its “psy” warfare to cleanse atomic power of the horrifying image of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki massacre. “Peaceful use” as such was accepted as a symbol of progress even by left-wing intellectuals. However, the Japanese ruling groups situated such use in their long-term military context. In the ensuing decades, the government carried out huge national nuclear programs and said they were genuinely for energy supply. But in 1965–72, the government undertook serious studies on Japan's nuclear arms, concluding that although Japan would stay non-nuclear “for the time being,” it would keep its techno-economic capacity ready to produce nuclear bombs any time they were needed. This essay examines Japan's nuclear power in reference to the major defining factors of the postwar Japanese statehood—the US–Japan security alliance(Anpo), Okinawa as the pivot ofAnpo, the rightists' ambition to revive the glory of the prewar Empire, and Japan's position in the US–China relationship. TheFukushimadisaster and Okinawa's resistance to military colony status rocked this whole structure, bankrupting the postwar statehood. People are now urged to define what comes next. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany's current efforts to decarbonize its electricity system are analysed. As nuclear power and fossil power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage were ruled out in 2011, renewable electricity generation (RES) together with electricity savings are the primary focus for achieving decarbonization. Germany aims to have RES account for at least 80% of its electricity by 2050. Achieving renewable generation needs strong political support and regulatory provisions for its market integration. Four main technical and regulatory challenges are the maintenance of a steady and efficient expansion of RES, the provision of balancing capacities, the realization of the targeted electricity savings, and the smart adaptation of the transport and distribution grid. An overview of the existing and planned regulatory provisions for decarbonization are described, and some gaps identified, particularly with regard to the overall management of the process, the inclusion of electricity savings and the interference of Germany's decarbonization strategies with neighbouring countries. Policies that both accelerate grid expansion and direct RES expansion should immediately be put in place and can be supported by a targeted mobilization of balancing capacities. Electricity savings are a significant and cost-efficient strategy for low-carbon electricity. Policy relevance Germany is actively converting its national electricity system towards a fully renewable one. As renewable electricity has reached about a quarter of total consumption, a number of technical and regulatory challenges arise. Current discussions and plans are described for the four main challenges: maintaining and optimizing high investment rates into RES generation technologies, providing balancing capacities, reducing demand, and adapting the grid to the changing needs. Policy recommendations for these four tasks highlight the need to intensify electricity demand reduction and also consider the potential interactions between the German electricity system and its neighbouring countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over a single April day in 1986, a little-known place called Chernobyl became infamous. Twenty-five years later, a similar fate befell Japan’s Fukushima Prefecture. The Fukushima disaster was better contained than Chernobyl, but if an emergency hits another nuclear power facility, it may well do so in an unanticipated way and present unforeseeable challenges. Are nations adequately prepared for an unpredictable “next one?” Here,Sonja Schmidof Austria,Augustin Simoof Cameroon, andManpreet Sethiof India assess improvements over the last 30 years in preparedness for a nuclear power disaster – and debate how preparedness should be further improved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]