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In a previous edition of this journal, an argument concerning the demonization of politicians and the changing nature of democracy was raised. This, in turn, raised previously unconsidered questions about (inter alia): the discourse, language and symbolism surrounding politicians; the limits of democratic politics; the politics of public expectations; and whether political scientists have a professional duty to the public in terms of promoting the public understanding of politics. The aim of making this provocative argument – framed as it was around a reinterpretation of the MPs expenses scandal in the UK – was to provoke a debate about the existence of certain ‘self-evident’ truths, the fragility of democratic politics and the future of political science as an academic discipline. Phrased in these terms the initial article was successful as six respondents – Domonic Bearfield, Alastair Campbell, Martin Gainsborough, Peter Riddell, Klaus Segbers and Gerry Stoker – immediately entered the fray and sought to either finesse and develop my arguments or to offer a considered critique. This article discusses ‘debating demonization’ in the form of a reply to each respondent and a focus on (in turn): the politics of demonization; the politics of the media; the politics of social class; the politics of monitory mechanisms; the politics of performance; and the politics of political science. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the management of public expectations represents an underdeveloped field of political analysis, the global financial crisis and increasing evidence of public disengagement from conventional politics is likely to focus attention on the capacity of the state and the behaviour of politicians. As such, this article seeks to develop our understanding of public expectations by arguing that the dominant incentives and sanctions framework within competitive political systems facilitates the public's capacity to make demands of politicians while at the same time making it very hard for politicians to impose their expectations of public behaviour vis-a-vis the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role, powers and future of independent European agencies as an aspect of the current debate surrounding European governance. It argues that the design and implementation of independent agencies in the EU should not be seen as a construct of apolitical administrative engineering or integration but should be interpreted as a central component of political debates regarding the future constitutional structure of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, the article reflects upon five themes (growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power) which have arisen as central issues in relation to delegated governance at the national level. These themes are analysed in order to assess the main lessons that could usefully be considered during this critical period of constitutional reflection and design for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]