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The study calls for greater scholarly engagement with the generational experiences of the socialist working class in China. Through an analysis of collective actions in response to the reform of state-owned enterprises at the turn of the century, the paper divides the Chinese socialist working class into the Revolution Generation and the Transition Generation. Amid the restructuring of the state sector, workers from the Revolution Generation exhibited a proclivity for civic activism and petitions, while the Transition Generation, though grappling with unemployment, largely refrained from public dissent, instead expressing sentiments of bewilderment and resignation. The study illustrates how the differing lived experiences of two working-class generations played a pivotal role in shaping their interpretation of grievances and contention repertoire. The article underscores the significance of generational perspectives in gaining insight into the destiny of the Chinese working class, advocating for the integration of such perspectives into the broader fields of deindustrialization and labor studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper unpacks the multi-level efforts to establish, promote and implement China standards in overseas contexts through an examination of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa. Drawing upon document analysis of government policies, institutional guidelines and corporate reports from four case companies, as well as field research in Ethiopia, it identifies ways that Chinese corporate actors interpret, incorporate and initiate CSR standards through strategic planning and during overseas business activities. Analysis of both first-hand and secondary data shows the development of Chinese CSR standards is a co-production of international, national and local standards, which involves diverse actors and institutions and is driven by multiple considerations to fulfill commercial, political, social and diplomatic objectives for overseas companies and Chinese government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the effect of a place-based policy in China, the Northeastern Revitalization Program. In 2003 the State Council of the People's Republic of China initiated the program in northeastern China by removing an agricultural tax, enhancing the urban social security system, facilitating foreign investment, and restructuring state-owned enterprises in the region. Using the synthetic control method, we find that the program had no significant effect on GDP per capita in all three regions. Liaoning had slightly worse GDP per capita post-treatment, as did Heilongjiang (albeit to a lesser extent). While the multiple synthetic control analysis shows that economic outcomes were worse post-treatment, the impact of this program was heterogeneous across the three regions. We argue the lackluster performance likely comes from the continuing dominance of inefficient state-owned enterprises in the provinces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been a pervasive phenomenon that a firm constructs multiple collaborations with universities and research institutes from diverse geographic regions. This study examines whether and under what conditions university-industry (UI) collaboration portfolio concentration, the geographical concentration of UI collaboration partners, influence focal firms' innovation performance. The results suggest that UI collaboration portfolio concentration is negatively associated with focal firms' innovation performance. Besides, the negative relationship between UI collaboration portfolio concentration and firm innovation performance is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than non-SOEs. Moreover, the negative relationship between UI collaboration portfolio concentration and firm innovation performance is stronger for politically connected firms than non-politically connected firms. This study contributes to previous research on alliance portfolios and UI collaborations, and provides some meaningful inspiration for practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of tightening resource and environmental constraints globally, it is urgent to promote enterprise's green technological innovation through environmental regulation. This paper uses the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 to empirically test the relationship between environmental regulation and green technological innovation, and it also explores the transmission mechanism of executive compensation between these two. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) environmental regulation can promote enterprise green technological innovation. (2) Environmental regulation negatively influences the enterprise green technological innovation by reducing executive compensation. (3) The effect of environmental regulation on the promotion of green technological innovation of enterprise is higher in coastal areas than inland areas of China; while the effect of environmental regulation on the promotion of green technological innovation of enterprise is higher in state-owned enterprises than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital misallocation is a main obstacle to China's economic development. This paper deploys a quasi-natural experiment formed by the 'Revitalization Plan for Ten Industries' (RPTI) and examines the impacts that selective industrial policies have on capital misallocation. It is found that the RPTI significantly exacerbates capital misallocation and that the effect does not disappear when the RPTI ends. Mechanism analysis indicates that the RPTI significantly increases the capital productivity of firm groups with high capital productivity but significantly reduces the capital productivity of firm groups with low capital productivity. This can be further interpreted by a decrease or an increase of inefficient investment and financial constraints faced by the corresponding firm groups. The documented relationship is stronger in state-owned enterprises and in firms located in areas of high marketization. Our findings advance the understanding of governmental policy intervention in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines continuity and change in the lives of rural migrant gay men working in China's state-owned enterprises (SOE) from an everyday life perspective. By examining their sexuality, migration histories, and heterosexual marriage experiences, this study contributes to sexuality and migration literature by exploring how rural-to-urban migrant gay men maintain their everyday homosexual intimacies in post-socialist China. It adds to the perspective that gay men's perceptions, interpretations, and reactions to marriage and sexuality vary, due to their personal migration experiences. These findings also contribute to scholarly discussions of everyday life by providing a nuanced analysis of how spatial tactics are employed as forms of everyday resistance by gay men for maintaining their sexualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that China is the supreme overseas capital accumulator is part of a discourse of China as colonialist or neocolonialist. The discourse exists not because Chinese behaviour aligns with scholarly understandings of colonialism or neocolonialism, but as a rhetorical device to discredit China as the US's 'strategic rival'. In this paper we show that China does not practice colonialism or neocolonialism and examine the question of how China's activities fit into modes of globalised capital accumulation abroad. We argue that China's mode overlaps, but is also distinct from, the East Asian developmental states' approach. It is even more dissimilar to the US's archetypal neoliberalism. Two areas in which China most diverges are its deployment of state-owned enterprises and Communist Party of China leadership, and the concomitant alignment of Chinese firms overseas with home and host-state policies. In analysing Chinese capital accumulation abroad, we adumbrate a Chinese mode that reflects 'two semis': China's semi-peripheral status and its semi-neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on an analysis of 2671 outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) deals completed by Chinese enterprises from 2009 to 2018, this study evaluated the role of the OFDI regulatory policies on Chinese heterogeneity enterprises' OFDI. The difference-in-differences model is applied with the OFDI data to control the influence of endogeneity resulting from missing variables. The results show that the regulatory policies' effect on Chinese enterprises' OFDI varies with the ownership structure of the home country's enterprises. The implementation of OFDI regulatory policies significantly reduces the OFDI of state-owned enterprises but does not significantly impact that of privately owned enterprises. Interestingly, the policies significantly reduce the OFDI of central state-owned enterprises but do not significantly impact that of local ones. The former benefit from central government institutional support, and their main purpose is to comply with national strategy. By contrast, local governments administer the local state-owned enterprises, whose main purpose is to promote local economic development. In terms of seeking profits, their investment choices are similar to those of privately owned enterprises. This study also examines China's OFDI policy responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I turn my attention to two hydropower plants, HPP Dabar and HPP Nevesinje, part of the massive Upper Horizons scheme, which is currently the largest infrastructural project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Built by the China Energy Gezhouba and financed through a large loan from the Export–Import Bank of China, the enterprise forms a part of China's Belt and Road Initiative, an unprecedented global development programme that involves nearly half of the world's countries. The project is being built on the Zalomka, one of the largest sinking rivers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world, and its potential impacts are hotly debated and may be extremely far reaching. As Rob Nixon has argued, the mega-dam projects in many postcolonial nations have 'depended' on both physical structure and metaphorical discourse on 'submergence': of 'disposable people and ecosystems, but also on the submerged structures of dependence that lay beneath the flamboyant engineering miracles' (2011: 167). Drawing on these reflections and insights from the energy humanities, blue humanities and infrastructure studies, I consider dams as concretizations that 'harness, produce, materialise, and symbolise' (neo)colonial power relations (Max Haiven (2013) 'The dammed of the Earth: Reading the mega-dam for the political unconscious of globalization', in Cecilia Chen, Janine MacLeod and Astrida Neimanis (eds) Thinking with Water, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press). Thus, from this perspective, this infrastructural project could be seen not only as 'Chinese invasion' through the Belt and Road Initiative, but also an invasion of nature by the nation state, often constituted as the necessary means to pursue a view of national and regional integration towards globalized modernity. Finally, I discuss an invasion of the dominant narrative by resistance, turning attention to the anti-damming intersectional and coalitional work in the Balkans, which includes protests, marches, forums, artistic interventions, and legal pressure aimed at stopping both local and the Chinese state-owned companies from dredging and blocking the rivers. Intervening in the normalized view of the extractive zone – the article argues – these acts of resistance form part of a broad struggle against what the anthropologist Anne Spice calls 'invasive infrastructures' (2018) that numerous communities are fighting against in the region ('Fighting invasive infrastructures', Environment and Society 9: 40–56). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: This article investigates the interaction effects among government subsidies, research and development (R&D) input and innovation performance of the Chinese energy industry. This article establishes a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model and uses the impulse response function (IRF) tool and variance decomposition of all variables to reveal the evolution process of variables' relationship in different time periods based on the data of 95 listed energy companies in China from 2010 to 2018. : The results show that R&D input and innovation performance promote government subsidies; government subsidies and innovation performance promote R&D input; R&D input substantially promote innovation performance; and the dynamic interaction of the three variables differs for state-owned and non-state-owned companies. : This article focuses on the Chinese energy industry and considers the ownership of companies. The PVAR model is used to establish a dynamic interactive system of variables, which considers the dynamic interaction relationship among government subsidies, R&D input and innovation performance in this specific industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a detailed analysis of the policy design of the current fourth round of state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate restructuring in China. This time, the state's efforts to improve SOE performance hinged on attracting private capital to take ownership shares in state firms—or so-called mixed-ownership reforms. The article relies on an analysis of policy documents, interviews with policy experts in China, and a case study of local mixed-ownership reform implementation in the city of Nanjing. It discusses implications of mixed ownership for corporate governance amid changing state–Party–business relations in China. It concludes that the reform agenda consolidates a hybrid political-economic system that organically blends planning and market modes of economic coordination, as well as public and private modes of ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China is the world's largest investor in renewable energy, its overseas energy investments are primarily in fossil fuels. This is a cause of major concern as countries across the globe need to transition toward low-carbon development trajectories to meet the 1.5-degree warming target of the Paris Agreement. In this paper, we present data up until and including 2019 showing that power generation investment in renewables domestically (excluding medium and large hydro) is 77% while only 22% overseas. We add to the literature on the institutional environment surrounding Chinese overseas investment by finding that in addition to general barriers to renewables, such as higher up-front costs and different income cycles, Chinese renewable firms face significant structural financing disadvantages vis-à-vis conventional energy firms. We find that the underlying reason is that Chinese fossil fuel companies are largely state-owned while renewable companies are largely private-owned. The disadvantage then materializes through the Chinese financial system's preference for state-owned enterprises. Lastly, we identify concrete policy options to overcome the disadvantage by addressing five types of actors: 1) policy banks that can emphasize their development focused mandate, 2) state-owned commercial banks currently financing the majority of Chinese overseas energy projects, 3) smaller financial institutions currently not involved in this type of financing overseas, 4) Sinosure, currently focusing on insuring fossil fuel projects, and 5) Chinese energy, utility, and construction companies that would benefit from further diversifying into renewables. Key policy insights The proportion of renewables in Chinese power generation investment is 77% domestically while only 22% overseas. Chinese fossil fuel companies are largely state-owned, while renewable companies are largely private-owned. The key barrier for Chinese renewable energy companies going overseas is their lack of access to finance. Chinese financial institutions favor state-owned over privately-owned organizations, both domestically and overseas. Consequently, a key reason for renewable/fossil disproportions is that Chinese renewable energy companies are largely private-owned. The favoritism can be overcome through policies targeting 1) policy banks, 2) state-owned commercial banks, 3) smaller financial institutions, 4) Sinosure, or 5) Chinese energy, utility, and construction companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's rapid post-war economic growth prompted Chinese leaders to look to their neighbour as they initiated market reforms from the late 1970s. How did movements of people and ideas between China and Japan occur, and what were their effects on Chinese enterprise policies? From the 1970s through the 1990s, Chinese officials, scholars, and enterprise representatives invited Japanese advisors to China, conducted myriad exchanges through associations like the Sino-Japanese Economic Knowledge Exchange and the Japan-China Economic Association, and actively studied Japan's economy and companies. Chinese policy-makers gained insights from Japan about market-responsive forms of corporate structure, organisational solutions to state ownership dilemmas, evidence that consolidation could aid economic performance and technological upgrading, and strategic commitment to building large state-owned enterprise groups. However, this episode of intense engagement between China and Japan generated neither unilateral 'diffusion' nor unitary influence. Instead, it reveals how China has developed its own path of economic development through what I term 'policy collaging': seeking, selecting, and creatively combining policy ideas and practices from international sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that increasing centralisation of decision-making in China will undermine the country's future economic growth. It highlights the declining role of private enterprises and the increasing role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, and the extension of Communist Party influence in both SOEs and the private sector through the Party's Organization Department and United Front Work Department. It argues that the increasing role of the state in the economy over the past decade has stifled growth through a decline in 'total factor productivity' because of increasing misallocation of resources. Centralisation, with associated losses in efficiency, objectivity, agility, speed and finesse regarding allocations of risks and investment, has debilitated decentralised decision-making and reduced the incentives for undertaking risks and innovation. The article argues that increasing Party control over the SOEs and the private sector will negatively impact the corporate structure and management decisions, exacerbate the fundamental problems of corporate governance and limit or hamper innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study argues that the current Chinese administration has attempted to institutionalize center-local relations by reforming key party-state entities, with the aim of mitigating the centralization-decentralization cycle driven by ad hoc political mobilization. On the fiscal front, these reforms aim to consolidate budget management, merging national and local tax agencies, limiting local government borrowing, and centralizing expenditure planning. On the rule-enforcement front, the reforms try to empower the judiciary and the disciplinary inspection systems by isolating them from local influences. These changes have systematically strengthened the center's fiscal control and enhanced local compliance with national policies and rules. However, it remains to be seen whether the new structure will eventually be weighed down by local resistance, incentive issues, or changes in the center's factional dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the relationship between China's Communist Party (CCP) and its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has tightened. However, the impact this has had on SOE international subsidiaries remains unclear, especially vis-à-vis human resource management (HRM). This article examines recruitment and selection in Western subsidiaries of China's largest SOEs: national oil companies (NOCs). It does so with particular attention to the experience of Chinese and Western talent. Such issues are important as scholarship increasingly suggests government involvement in SOEs serves to enhance their meritocratic, market-led conduct. However, this article argues tightening CCP-SOE subsidiary relations have neither delivered nor pursued such an end. Instead, they have carried a more opportunistic-political impetus that is: undervaluing competencies outside Party loyalty, prioritizing CCP-loyal SOE cadre development, and favoring Party or SOE-insiders. Consequently, this has weakened the subsidiaries' business orientations and HRM practices. These insights, then, help advance understandings of political over-embeddedness within the present Chinese SOE context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using executive resume data of China's listed companies between 2006 and 2016, we investigated the relationship between pay disparities within top management teams (TMT) and firms' innovation performance. Specifically, we assessed two dimensions of pay disparities: vertical pay disparity between CEOs and non-CEO managers, and horizontal pay disparity among non-CEO managers. Considering the difference in regional marketization progress, we also explored the moderating effect of marketization degree on this relation. It is found that: with vertical pay disparity increasing by 1%, firms' innovation performance is improved by 2.3%; with horizontal pay disparity increasing, firms' innovation performance is promoted first and then restrained; higher marketization degree strengthens the incentive effects of both vertical and horizontal pay disparity. But the grouped regression results show that, in state-owned enterprises, horizontal pay disparity is only negatively associated with innovation. The theoretical and practical significance of the research is discussed at the end of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergent literature on 'new state capitalism' has offered little in terms of class analysis so far. This stands in contrast with prior twentieth-century writings which had sought to retool Marxist class theory to highlight the ambivalent position of the 'state class' in settings where the state owned large concentrations of productive capital. This article sets out a novel conceptual framework for analyzing the class situation of officials and executives embedded in government and state-owned enterprises. Overseers and managers of state-owned capital should be understood as Janus-faced actors, participating simultaneously in political and economic fields, articulating political hierarchy with power over capital. Furthermore, fractions inside the state can be identified in so far as the authority to operate, and to allocate, capital is distributed unevenly within the state's ruling stratum. As an illustration, an examination of the class ramifications of central-level SOEs in China is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historic villages in China have dramatically changed in recent years, particularly those in poor areas where local culture and a lagging economy constitute the socio-economic framework. The critical relationship between preservation and commodification has become the focus of debate, but little attention has been paid to how different historic villages have been changed through heritage-led development processes and different patterns of stakeholders involved. In this paper, a case study is presented, which focuses on three historic villages in Tongren, China. The findings confirm the idea that heritage preservation as a governance technique is vulnerable to changing socio-economic circumstances. Three transformational approaches with different patterns of stakeholder engagement are identified. In addition, the coalition between the government and real-estate development enterprises played a dominant role in the government-led approach. In the case where the government and enterprises are not strongly present, village elites and village cadres are the power holders in leading to the heritage-led development despite their dual position in heritage preservation and profit-making. This paper suggests that the rigorous, scientific investigation in the planning and project-making involving a shared platform of stakeholders should be developed to address a shared future for the historic villages in China. Abbreviations: VRP: Village Rectification Plan; VEMC: Villages with Ethnic Minority Characteristics; HCTVs: Historical and Cultural Towns and Villages; CTVs: Chinese Traditional Villages; COEs: County-owned enterprises; ESMV: Ethnic Solidarity Model Village. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the power source of Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) leaders by sorting out the unique selection and appointment mechanism of SOE cadres in China and the organizational structure behind this mechanism. Empirical research finds when local core officials are investigated for corruption, it has a major impact on the top leaders of local SOEs due to 'top to bottom' personnel changes, which would in turn have a strong impact on corporate investment behavior. However, the magnitude of such impact would differ between local versus central SOEs, as well as among commercial competition versus public welfare SOEs. This study provides an analytical framework for Western scholars to study corporate governance of SOEs in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does foreign direct investment increase cooperation among states? This study uses new data on Chinese investment as well as measures of political relations based on United Nations voting data to estimate the international political effect of the Chinese overseas investment boom. Contrary to predictions based on previous "commercial peace" literature, our results show that Chinese overseas investment has a negative effect on bilateral relationships in developed countries, and its influence on those with developing ones is statistically insignificant. We complemented our empirical tests by investigating the mechanisms based on the heterogeneity of ownership status of investors and sectors. The results indicate that the effect is mainly driven by state-owned enterprise investors and investment in natural resource sectors. Our findings offer valuable insights into whether and how economic interdependence affects political relations with a rising power in the current era. In so doing, this paper contributes to the existing literature, bringing a broader perspective to bear on the foreign policy consequences of China's economic rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sought to answer questions concerning the aspects that are changing and those that remains unchanged regarding football in China during Xi's authoritarian era by comparing the governance of Chinese professional football during this era and during a previously examined former era to provide a point of departure for empirical studies concerning the recent ascent of football in China. At the league-governance level, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) has prioritized the salience of professional football clubs (PFCs). At the club-governance level, the CFA has adopted a gradualist approach to institutional reform by proceeding through a process of introducing private or state-owned enterprises. The actual goal setting remains unchanged, and underachievement of the national football team persists. Comprehensive document analysis that included international peer-reviewed journal articles, books or book chapters, academic reports, policy documents, and influential media in China was performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A salient characteristic of China's public–pgrivate partnerships (PPPs) is the deep involvement of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those administered by the central/national government (CSOEs). In this research social network analysis (SNA) was used to examine the role of different actors in transport and environmental protection PPPs in China in the period 2012–17. The results largely confirm the resource-based view and resource-dependency theory, showing that while CSOEs are dominant in both sectors, their dominance and control is greatest in transport sector projects that are more dependent on their accumulated experience, expertise, human capital assets and managemgent skills, that their dominance has increased over time, and that it is aligned with the provincial distribution of Chinese CSOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the existing business and management research on how 'state capitalism' influences industry outcomes focuses on the state as 1) the owner of companies, 2) a provider of key resources, such as financial support, to favoured companies and/or 3) a unitary actor. Whilst some of this literature highlights links between politicians and officials, on the one hand, and individual companies, on the other, it downplays how other political-economic factors, such as the relative importance of existing industries in terms of employment and links between state banks and state-owned companies impact developments within those emerging sectors that the state wishes to promote. Drawing on the 'state-permeated model' of capitalism, we undertake a comparative institutional analysis of the development of the solar photovoltaic (PV) industry in China and India. Both states prioritised domestic solar PV manufacturing and innovation; however, China's industry is much stronger than India's, reflecting, we argue, 1) the greater ability of China's central state to co-ordinate other actors and 2) the greater importance of India's coal industry compared to China's. We discuss the implications of our work for policy makers and for research, highlighting the need to assess whether state-permeated capitalism is functional or dysfunctional in nuanced ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research seeks to reconceptualise the process of marketizing central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in the Chinese petroleum industry by interpreting their institutional establishment and reconstruction, and the change in their institutional context. The enterprise reform of state-owned oil companies, and the partial market liberalization initiated in the 1980s, have not pushed the petroleum sector toward the trajectory of the neoliberal free market. On the contrary, the state's ascendency has been reconsolidated, and the institutional practice adhered to has made market-shaping possible. The state's role is not fixed; rather, it has varied following the marketization process of the CSOEs. The state has reconstructed its role to strengthen its authority in the market, using market mechanisms to effectively improve its power to construct a flexible economic governance structure. In such a structure, where the state and market have mutually shaped each other, the combination of the two seemingly conflicting concepts of marketization and economic security has, to some degree, fostered the development of state-owned oil companies and expanded the scale of their asset-holding. The paper contributes to the broader discussion of state-market relationships and the institutionalization of energy governance with regard to China's integration into the global capitalist economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government subsidies play a vital role in enhancing firms' investment in research and development (R&D). The study's aim is to investigate the relationship between government subsidies (including government R&D and non-R&D subsidies), R&D investment and innovation performance of Chinese pharmaceutical listed companies over the period 2009–2015. The results show that government R&D subsidies can stimulate corporate R&D investment; government subsidies have no significant impact on innovation performance while R&D investment has a positive impact. In addition, we examine whether company ownership and executives' technological experience affect this relationship. We also find that there is a positive relationship between government R&D subsidies and R&D investment only in private-owned companies; R&D investment positively influences innovation performance in state-owned companies or in companies with R&D executives. This study provides some insights for managers and policymakers in making effective innovation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's pilot carbon trading policy is expected to be both efficient and flexible in reducing carbon emissions through incentivising low-carbon innovation. This paper analyses the effects of this pilot policy on low-carbon innovation using a difference-in-difference model, based on a sample of selected enterprises and carrying out a series of robustness tests to corroborate the results. The analysis shows that the pilot carbon trading policy is predicted to have a significantly positive effect on the low-carbon innovation of enterprises that fall under its scope, notably by alleviating obstacles to the financing of low-carbon innovation. Furthermore, a heterogeneity analysis of enterprises' characteristics and carbon allowance allocation methods in different pilots indicates that the effect of the pilot carbon trading policy on enterprises' low-carbon innovation will be reflected mainly in enterprises in China's eastern provinces, and in state-owned enterprises. Compared with the grandfathering and historical intensity allocation methods, the findings of this study suggest that the extent of low-carbon innovation is significantly greater when the benchmarking method is used. The results of this paper offer some key insights into improving the policy design of a nationwide carbon trading market in China, as well as a reference point for other countries and regions, especially developing countries, in establishing a carbon trading market. Key policy insights China's pilot carbon trading policy can promote low-carbon innovation. Easing the financing constraints of enterprises can promote low-carbon innovation. Compared with the grandfathering and historical intensity allocation methods, using the benchmarking method significantly improves the enterprises' low-carbon innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the threat posed by the growth of the Chinese economy to global capitalism. This threat has been attributed to China's integration into global financial markets and the government's decision to allow wholly-owned foreign financial firms to operate in the Chinese securities and futures markets. The increasing volume of transnational investments in Chinese government and corporate bonds is discussed, as well as the growing market role of state-owned enterprises (SEOs).

China's effectiveness in quickly solving the health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic and in softening its economic impact is rooted in the structural characteristics of its development model, in which state-owned enterprises remain crucial. This article holds that a strong public presence within the industrial and banking sectors has provided Chinese government with the opportunity to rapidly reactivate domestic production and, potentially, to maximise the effectiveness of the recently launched monetary and fiscal policy measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing emphasis of the government on the importance of Party organisations in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we need to pay more attention to its role in the operation of enterprises. As the research on board of directors emphasises the central position of the chairman, this paper focuses on the top leader of the Party organisation, namely the Party Committee Secretary. Based on upper echelon theory, this paper proposes the relationship between the technology background of a Party Committee Secretary and firm's innovation efficiency, and how this relationship is moderated by position duality and environment dynamism. Using the data of China's listed SOEs which issue A-shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2014 to 2016 and operate in the manufacturing industry, the main effect and moderating effects are tested. We find that the existence of a Party Committee Secretary with technology background positively affects the SOE's innovation efficiency. In addition, this relationship is strengthened by environment dynamism. Our conclusions not only enrich literature about upper echelon theory and determinants of firm's innovation, but also are helpful for improving corporate governance in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have administrative reforms failed to improve the governance of China's energy sector? This article argues that, in the context of China's partial reforms, strategies for revamping China's energy sector have oscillated between centralization and decentralization, creating a diverse array of stakeholders without providing any institutional coordination among them. In addition, corporatized state-owned enterprises have their own commercial interests, giving them incentives to capture industrial regulators. As a result, regulatory capture has become a serious threat to the governance of China's energy sector. The findings of this study carry implications for our understanding of regulatory development in transitional economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low-carbon development is an essential measure to combat climate change, and the establishment of low-carbon standards is an important means to achieve low-carbon development. Due to the differences in size and development level among counties of China, the applicability and fairness of county-level low-carbon standards are very important in this country. This study analyzed the trends of county-level carbon emissions in China, defined the peak value of carbon emissions per capita, summarized the characteristics of existing low-carbon standards, and proposed a fair county-level low-carbon standard based on carbon emissions per capita. The results of our analysis suggest that, under the constraints of carbon emissions reduction policies, China's carbon emissions per capita will tend towards a stable range. Additionally, by referring to predictions results of the peak value of China's carbon emissions per capita, it was determined that, in low-carbon development targets, China's county-level carbon emissions per capita should be set within the range of 2–4 tons. Besides setting low-carbon standards, the Chinese government and private enterprises should develop low-carbon technologies as soon as possible and innovate management models to achieve the win–win situation of simultaneous economic growth and carbon emissions reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have shown that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) raise firms' productivity. Few researches investigate whether exporters can enhance export performance after M&A through higher levels of efficiency. Based on detailed information on M&A activities of Chinese firms, China's customs trade data and National Bureau of Statistics surveys, we investigate the causal effect of M&A on trade performance. In particular, the value and the volume of firm exports, product quality, product scope and the number of export destinations have been examined. We find positive and significant effects of M&A on all the examined indicators of export performance. These findings are generally robust to a variety of robustness checks. We further observe that state-owned firms are the least likely to benefit from M&A. We also obtain evidence that firms benefit more from M&A deals if they are targets or merge with foreign firms. Overall, this paper is to our knowledge the first study that uses micro-level data in multiple industries to examine the relationship between M&A and exports of heterogeneous firms. Our results deepen our understanding of the consequences of M&A by suggesting another potential benefit, and hence provide policy implications for merger regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prestigious financial centres have attracted a number of Chinese companies seeking liquidity and international exposure (an example being the recordbreaking IPO of Alibaba in the US). This article seeks to explore how the regulatory cooperation of securities commissions can be a solution to the concerns arising from the regulation of these companies, given the perceived weaknesses in the governance of Chinese companies and the difficulties of cross-border enforcement. One notable example of regulatory cooperation can be seen in how the regulators in Hong Kong and China have worked closely together. Meanwhile, other overseas exchanges have started to pay more attention to the regulatory issues arising from Chinese listings. In the literature on cross-listing, this paper is the first to present a holistic approach, taking into account both the importance and the popularity of cross-listing as well as the most recent regulatory challenges and solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms have typically been considered the result of bargaining under China’s fragmented bureaucratic structure. This study uses the case of the CNR–CSR merger to investigate the latent changes that have recently occurred in the policy-making structure of SOE reforms. This study will demonstrate that ‘top-level design’—in the context of a strengthened political authority and centralised political power—dominates SOE reforms and changes the pattern of fragmented interest bargaining among government departments and SOEs. In this context, the national strategy can be implemented with little resistance, contradicting scholarly predictions of fragmented authoritarianism. However, the top-level design does not appear to be based on a rational decision-making process; rather, its goals are vague, and the methods for achieving them have not been debated rationally. The policy-making process in this case study involved figuring out the top-level leaders’ intentions and rationalising the decisions afterwards. A top-level design with weak rationality may have risky consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China’s ‘rise’ to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs’ role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ‘grand strategy’? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state’s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the magnitude, motivations, and mechanisms of the globalization of Chinese finance for energy. Like the national development banks and export-import banks of industrialized countries before them, China's policy banks have provided large amounts of financing to Chinese energy companies to enter global energy markets. What is more, China's two global policy banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, now provide as much energy finance to foreign governments as do all the multilateral development banks combined. This paper outlines the extent to which Chinese energy finance has become globalized and examines the state priorities and institutional pathways that drive the globalization of Chinese energy finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how the Chinese Communist Party has relied in part on making global financial markets and institutions a source of external pressure to help pass domestic economic and financial reform. We explore two case studies of external financial liberalization: the listing of Chinese state-owned enterprises on foreign stock exchanges and the financial reform aspects of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. These studies show that external liberalization policies are interlinked with both micro- and macro-level reforms in the domestic economy. We conclude that, after 2005, this strategy of applying external pressure, in fact, did not lead to more comprehensive economic restructuring because the agents of external pressure--in this instance, foreign banks and accounting firms--were themselves party to the reinforcement of state control and ultimately did not (or could not) promote further external liberalization. Domestic agents that supported external liberalization were also quick to abandon it when external pressure conflicted with other domestic policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article outlines opinions of several authorities in China for further advancement of the proportional employment of disabled people in the country including the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Organization Department, State Administration of Civil Service and China Disabled Persons' Federation. Topics covered include advancing disabled persons' employment led by party and government organs and state-owned enterprises; and increase in subsidies for employer work units.

The article focuses on the subject of capitalism and its connection with China, discussing the Communist Party of China's (CPC) denial on having any relation with capitalism. It informs on the China's history dealing with the late 1970s post-Maoist reform, State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reform, and market reform. Chinese development is claimed to be based on the fact of socialism by the CPC resulting into rural reform, and household responsibility system efficiency.

Even with sizable economic inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late 1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local design, development, and manufacture of advanced conventional weapons. Not surprisingly, therefore, reforming the local defense industry in order to upgrade its technology base and manufacturing capabilities and to make armaments production more efficient and cost-effective has long preoccupied the Chinese leadership. The fact that most of these efforts had little positive impact on the country’s military technological and industrial capabilities only encouraged Beijing to experiment with additional reforms in the hopes of finally getting it right. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article assesses debates on state recentralization and economic rebalancing through a study of the photovoltaic (PV) industry. Based on empirical data and interviews, the authors examine different means and incentives of state support in this sector. First, in the context of the rise of PV firms (2001–2008), local government acquired a dominant role in supporting the sector. Second, against the backdrop of an industry downturn (2009–2013), this article demonstrates an advancing role of the central state in the industry. The authors thereby develop a nuanced perspective on the notions of recentralization and sectoral rebalancing. On the one hand, the government indeed utilizes its power to facilitate a rebalancing of the industry towards the domestic market. On the other, both recentralization and rebalancing efforts remain limited. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What is the relationship between ownership type and environmental performance in Chinese firms? Using a survey of over 1,000 industrial firms in 12 Chinese cities in 2006, this article tests a number of competing hypotheses linking ownership type to environmental performance. The results show that small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average spend less on pollution abatement technologies and are less likely to meet national emissions standards, compared to privately owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). However, the environmental performance of the largest SOEs matches that of their private and foreign counterparts. These findings are complemented by qualitative interviews and archival research conducted in 2012. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipline is too fragile to function effectively. The question now is how the central leadership reinforces party supervision over leading cadres in both government and state firms. The Chinese leadership, after some period of experimentation, has introduced new institutions, named zhongyang xunshizu (central inspection groups), to complement the existing discipline system. This article examines how these central inspection groups complement the existing groups institutionally and normatively, and explores the Chinese Communist Party’s institutional engineering efforts to maintain legitimacy, organizational integrity and sustainability. This article considers these initiatives from the view of institutional complementarity and compensation. Theoretically, the application of institutional complementarity to China’s party discipline inspection should expand the scope of analysis into China’s institutional reform of party discipline. Empirically, the central inspection groups are the least known, but perhaps most significant, direct channel for central supervision of leaders in both local government and key state-owned enterprises. By comparing the rationale and operation of disciplinary inspection commissions (DICs), this article attempts to explain how the central inspection groups complement the supervision of local DICs in terms of scope, structure and methods of control. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The railway sector in China has undergone several major rounds of reform and institutional restructuring since 1986. These reform initiatives have largely been unsuccessful due to strong resistance from vested interest groups. The development of China's railway sector has raised some challenging issues that include the centralization of power in the Ministry of Railways (MOR), state monopoly control, rampant corruption and the accumulation of a huge debt burden. The 2013 railway reform initiatives have provided very little in the way of concrete measures to deal with these thorny issues but have instead created more controversy and problems in an already crisis-ridden sector. For the railway industry, the transformation from the mixed-function MOR to a monopolistic China Railway Corporation (CRC) will not necessarily lead to better railway management. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China has become a fast-growing economy with an unbalanced economic structure. Economic policies, especially fiscal and financial policies, contribute to the current growth model by depressing household disposable income and reducing the social services provided by the government. Laws that have been used by the government to subsidise investment and production by distorting factor markets are also to blame. Finally, rebalancing China’s growth pattern has proven to be extremely difficult due to political obstacles, including pressure from interest groups, gridlock caused by factional politics, and ideological discrimination against private entrepreneurs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When Keynesianism received renewed interest in the global financial crisis, some economists regarded China’s response as exemplary of effective Keynesian counter-cyclical strategy or even a non-crisis development strategy. At the same time, there have been critical voices against China’s Keynesian measures. This article therefore asks: To what extent was China’s response to the global financial crisis Keynesian? What factors determined the Chinese characteristics of Keynesian policy both in design and in implementation? It points out that China did follow a Keynesian formula in its crisis response, boosted infrastructure construction, GDP growth and created some employment. However, Chinese Keynesianism is a vulgarised version that is merged with its developmental state model. It simply boasted a big state and massive deficit spending, and socialised investment without really benefiting consumers or the private sector. This article also provides an analysis of how ideational and institutional politics in China vulgarised Keynesianism and exacerbated socio-economic problems. Ideational politics included the dominance of Keynesian discourse at the beginning of the crisis and an obsession with short-term results. Institutional factors included ‘firework’ local government politics, the state being captured by state-owned enterprises and a concentration of central distributive power without proper monitoring over implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have gradually localized their workforce since they began operating in Ghana in the 1980s. Examining their workforce localization patterns, the Chinese SOEs in Ghana appear to be diverse in their business practices and highly autonomous from the Chinese state. Our hypothesis on the substantial autonomy of Chinese SOE overseas subsidiaries, which is consequent to the lack of management control from the Chinese central authority since the Chinese economic reform, contrasts the dominant assumption in the China–Africa debate, in which Chinese SOEs are depicted as closely linked to the Chinese state and/or as the arms of the new Chinese policy in Africa. The workforce localization process of Chinese SOEs in Ghana is largely determined by factors like profit maximization objective, market competition and political pressure. The localization experience is similar to those of Western companies in Africa where complete workforce localization takes a long time to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports and analyzes China's presence in Africa with an emphasis on how that has been perceived by the Africans. Based on the findings from surveys and field research conducted in eight sub-Saharan African countries and interviews with scholars and practitioners from other African countries as well as Chinese and Americans in Africa, we outline the diverse, complicated and evolving African perceptions about China's explosive presence in general and the booming Chinese business activities in particular that now range from love to suspicion. Our findings about how China is perceived in Africa suggest that Beijing has acquired substantial goodwill in Africa yet is developing deep issues and facing uncertain challenges and growing obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]