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The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is generally analysed as a Sino-Japanese competition over material and strategic interests, regional preponderance, and nationalistic symbolism. Yet, such explanations cannot fully explain the endurance of the conflict and overlook its origin in the period leading up to the UN's derecognition of Taiwan's sovereignty in 1971. Drawing on the concept of ontological security, defined as 'security of the self', we contend that it was the looming loss of its sovereign self that prompted Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) to assert itself as the true defender of Chinese interests by laying claim to the islands. This caused anxiety in China (People's Republic of China, PRC), which had to follow suit in order to secure its own sovereign self. China thus inherited the conflict with Japan when it took over the 'true China' mantle upon its entry to the UN in 1971. Extant explanations overlook the important factor of inter-Chinese competition over sovereign selfhood. In developing this argument, the article makes two contributions. First, it draws attention to a much-overlooked early phase of the dispute, and shows how the same dynamics of ROC–PRC status competition continue to inform the dispute between China and Japan today. Second, it contributes to the literature on ontological security by conceptualising the 'self' as sovereign state personhood, thereby further clarifying the distinction between self and identity, and highlighting the relational effects of ontological security-seeking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

But at the same time, Japan would neither explicitly include nor explicitly exclude the possibility of Japan providing at least rear-area support for US military operations during a Taiwan contingency, as well as permitting US use of its military assets in Japan for the defense of Taiwan. Since the PRC did not exist at the time of the Cairo Declaration and since Japan recognized the PRC government as the sole legal Government of China in 1972, Japan appeared to obliquely accept that Taiwan was part of China. In response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese missile firings, with some landing in Japan's claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), vividly confirmed for many Japanese the notion that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.". [Extracted from the article]

The East China Sea remains a Sino–U.S. hotspot. The welcome diminishment of the possibility of an East China Sea conflict over Taiwan has been offset by the emergence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between Japan and China as the new Sino–U.S. flashpoint. The United States could become militarily involved if China and Japan come to blows over sovereignty. Washington officially takes no position on the disputed sovereignty claim but, because the uninhabited islands are under Japanese administrative control, the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan would apply. There is no obvious road to resolution since Tokyo argues that its claim is “indisputable” and, as a result, does not want to discuss the sovereignty question, while China does everything short of actually seizing the islands to demonstrate that sovereignty is, indeed, in dispute. The possibility of an accident between the two countries’ coast guards or air forces is real. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This is a translation of an article that reconsiders the controversy surrounding the Satō Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972. Previous studies have not focused sufficiently on how top officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed China policy during this era. Based on recently declassified but still fragmentary Japanese diplomatic documents, this article, by carefully organizing these fragments and then comparing them with previously published secondary sources and declassified US diplomatic documents, uncovers historical facts of central importance for understanding Japan's postwar foreign policy. In particular, this article finds that the Foreign Ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s, thereby indicating that discord within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was not the only reason for Japan's delayed and reactive response. It also finds that the Ministry decided to establish diplomatic relations with China and severe relations with Taiwan as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. in October 1971, even though Japan waited for nearly another year before acting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) was vexing for China-Japan relations. As such, the five years since Koizumi left office, particularly the change in Japan's ruling party, were initially expected, and sometimes perceived, to realize a half-decade of recovery and reconciliation in Sino-Japanese ties. While tensions did decrease, “icebergs” blocking improvement in relations have not completely thawed, and may harden again. Competition for political and economic influences and interests in the same region, concern over one another's future security posture and relations with Taiwan, territorial disputes, misunderstanding about the other's historical sensitivities and feelings of distrust, occasionally manipulated by nationalists, still pervade the relationship. Therefore, though there is mutual desire, indeed a necessity, for cooperation on many issues affecting both countries, this typically couples with a disconcerting or anxious feeling towards the other's intentions that results in competitiveness. There are deep roots to this need/fear complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent naval ship visits and exchanges of goodwill between China and Japan suggest an improvement in the two countries' bilateral relationship, which had been steadily deteriorating since the late 1990s. In the longer term, however, Sino-Japanese relations will likely be tested or constrained by five key sets of issues: (1) territorial and resource disputes, (2) nationalism and issues of mutual antipathy, (3) Taiwan's political status, (4) the rapid rise of China's military power, and (5) the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The manner in which these issues are managed or resolved will likely play a major role in shaping the Sino-Japanese relationship and thus the overall geopolitical environment in East Asia. A key complicating factor in the relationship, however, is the persistence of divergent worldviews: Chinese leaders appear to be more consistently persuaded by realist notions of international politics, whereas Japanese leaders tend to favor liberal-institutionalist values. The two countries may use these different lenses to view the same incident or issue, potentially creating misunderstanding and miscalculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]