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The article discusses the history surrounding the 1858 petition from the governors and chiefs of Raiatea, French Polynesia and Tahaa, French Polynesia requesting to be an American protectorate. An overview of the French and British involvement in the Society Islands, including Tahiti becoming a French protectorate in 1842 and Great Britain and France's recognition of the autonomy of the Leeward Islands, West Indies, is provided. The relationship between the political disputes among native rulers in the Society Islands and the foreign intervention of the U.S., Great Britain and France is discussed.

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo-French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960-1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's - Macmillan, Wilson and Heath - attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the "special nuclear relationship" with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'échec du projet britannique de pacte tripartite franco–anglo–soviétique révèle quelques traits majeurs des relations entre la France et le Royaume-Uni au XXème siècle. Le premier est l'existence de divergences qui concernent davantage l'accessoire que l'essentiel. Si les deux pays sont d'accord pour considérer qu'une alliance entre Paris, Londres et Moscou est essentielle à l'équilibre européen, ils divergent sur la forme à lui donner, les Français préférant un système de pactes bilatéraux à la formule tripartite proposée par les Britanniques. En outre cet épisode se caractérise par une absence de consultation entre les deux diplomaties. Les incidents qui en découlent pourraient prêter à sourire s'ils n'étaient pas le signe d'un climat de suspicion réciproque. Celui-ci est d'ailleurs plus marqué à Paris qu'à Londres. Tous ces éléments participent aux difficiles relations franco–britanniques et expliquent qu'il ait fallu attendre le 4 mars 1947 pour voir l'alliance franco–britannique se matérialiser par le traité de Dunkerque. Abstract: The failure of the British project of a tripartite pact between France, Britain and the USSR exemplifies some of the main features of the Franco–British relationship in the twentieth century. The first is the existence of divergences, which concern more incidental details than essential matters. If the two countries agreed to consider that an alliance between Paris, London and Moscow was essential for European balance, they differed on the form it should take. The French preferred a bilateral pact system to the tripartite pact formula proposed by the British. Moreover, this episode was distinguished by an absence of consultation between the two diplomacies. The incidents that followed could be risible if there were not signs of a climate of mutual suspicion which was, incidentally, more distinct in Paris than in London. All these elements contributed to the difficult Franco–British relationship and explain why one had to wait until 4 March 1947 to see a Franco–British alliance realized by the Dunkirk Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Franco-British relations have always been central to the fortunes both of the transatlantic partnership and of the European security and defence project (ESDP). Although fraught with ambivalence in the years after the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, the Franco-British partnership pushed ESDP forward. In 2003, however, France and the UK defined two extremes in their approaches both to war in Iraq and to relations with the US. Neither approach makes strategic sense. France's apparent principled opposition will only serve to divide the EU into largely artificial pro- and anti- American camps. The UK's apparent unconditional alignment will only serve to confine it to the margins of European 15olicymaking in an area -- diplomacy and security -- where Britain can and must play a leading role. Only if both countries agree to adopt, along with all their partners, a new and more subtle policy of quiet, unified and critical dialogue with Washington can the EU have the kind of transatlantic impact that both profess to seek. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Great Britain's ambiguous stand over Algeria and the uncomforts it brought to the British embassy in France. For the first four years of the Algerian War, British ministers and officials reciprocated that while supporting the French position in North Africa they will not support their policies. But with successive conservative governments, there was a shift in the policy as they sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defense. Concerned about the prospective decline of Western influence in North Africa that could open the way for the communism and further add humiliation for France coming on the heels of Indochina, the whole scenario could lead to a "neutralist" government in Paris, which was unfavorable to Western alliance. Besides this, Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of UN Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb particularly difficult.

Evaluates the triple alliance negotiations between Britain and France that provided Molotov's formal introduction to the diplomatic world. How the two sides approached the negotiations; Stages of the negotiations; Conclusion.

Focuses on the role of engineers as military spies in Great Britain. Visits of the French engineers in the British Isles; Disclosure of report on the foreign relations between France and England; Participation of both countries in the American War of Independence.

Focuses on the competition between Great Britain and France to sell small arms to Latvia, and how the competition affected the Cordon Sanitaire, a security system established by France and Britain. Studies on political and military affairs in the Baltic region; Passage of the Latvian Naval Defense Law in 1924; Details on the competition between the two countries.

The article assesses the impact of three distinct types of pressure for regulatory change on the two contrasting sectors of legal and medical service provision. These have been driven by both regional and global integration processes. The article focuses on the distinctive forms of regulatory competition which have developed at the European level, within the framework of a highly managed system of mutual recognition, and on the very different strategies for managing regulatory reform at the national level which have developed in two of the larger member states of the European Union (EU): France and Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]