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With rising tensions between the United States on one side, and China and Russia on the other, the three countries have grown mutually accusatory about some testing activities they conduct to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, with allegations made by the United States focusing on very low-yield fission experiments. In a world where trust in the nonproliferation regime is weakening and most bilateral arms control measures have been suspended, many experts fear that recriminations over very low-yield tests could spark a new escalation spiral to full-scale nuclear tests. Transparency measures could diffuse the suspicions around these tests and strengthen the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which is largely being complied with but still not legally in force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia is a strong supporter of global nuclear (and conventional) arms control and non-proliferation measures and has contributed significantly to their development; but it sees the world, strategically, through the eyes of a nuclear weapon state which, it believes, applies its nuclear deterrence doctrine also to the defence of Australia. It is thus effectively locked into what is essentially a nuclear weapon state’s view of the future that pays lip-service to nuclear disarmament as a distant ideal. Australian defence strategists routinely emphasise the importance of the US nuclear guarantee. Australia is though only likely to be attacked with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear war in which the United States is already engaged. The concept of extended nuclear deterrence thus assumes an essentially circular character by purporting to protect Australia from the nuclear threat that Australia’s alliance with its provider invites. Meanwhile, Australia is one of the few countries in its own region that have yet to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This paper argues that—US hostility to the Treaty notwithstanding—Australian membership of the TPNW would be consistent with its generally positive disarmament record and compatible with its alliance commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America's potential strategic disengagement from Europe is leading key European powers – in particular, France, the United Kingdom and Germany – to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in European security in the absence of extended US nuclear deterrence. Here leading French, British and German analysts offer anticipatory assessments of their countries' national perceptions, policies and preferences with respect to formulating a common European approach. They discuss, respectively, France's tentative overture to its European allies, Britain's willingness against broad constraints, and the tension between Germany's entrenched caution and its rising threat perceptions. While there are options that could produce a viable European nuclear deterrent, they would require a degree of national flexibility and European financial support that is currently difficult to imagine. This reality check should give European nuclear hawks pause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States has urged Washington to adopt new measures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against Russia and China in a deteriorating security environment. Any effort by the United States to match its two nuclear peers warhead for warhead, delivery system for delivery system, would be costly folly, potentially reprising the Cold War arms race. A qualitative rather than quantitative response may well be more effective. Developing nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, though challenging, would improve Washington's ability to shape an opponent's decision calculus and reduce its capacity to pursue deterrence by denial. These systems would also enhance the United States' ability to hold at risk multiple high-value, well-defended targets and reinforce planners' confidence in retaliatory strikes. Finally, a qualitative focus would enable the US to argue more credibly for quantitative limitations at levels similar to or lower than those existing today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Would it be possible to monitor new missile arms limits in Europe in an environment of deep mistrust? We argue that so-called "active tags," attached to dual-capable missiles, could help states to monitor remotely defined geographical arms limits without having to rely on resource-intensive human inspections. Such a novel approach could build on already existing technologies. We clarify what technologies are available, which options states could choose from for setting up a remote monitoring scheme, and what the technical and political implications are. Verifying geographical arms limits through remote monitoring could not only help to avert a new arms race with Russia; the approach could also be applicable to other conflict regions and different weapon types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. This edition features unique contributions from FAS Impact Fellow and international lawyer Jessica Rogers. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the topic of strategic arms control after the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026. We explore potential avenues for constructive engagement between the United States and Russia and consider how to optimally balance arms control options that are legally possible and politically feasible. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine's decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia's use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear arsenals, known as New START, expires in less than four years, which is not much time to put into place a replacement arms control arrangement. With bilateral tensions soaring, particularly given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Washington and Moscow must hold formal negotiations on a New START follow-on arrangement sooner rather than later, so as to prevent miscalculation or escalation – and ensure strategic stability between the world's two largest owners of nuclear weapons. The negotiations rely on strong political will from both sides, who will each bring to the table a different agenda requiring some concessions from the other. Divisive though the talks will inevitably be, the United States and Russia can reach agreement on crucial issues of concern, such as Russia's new nuclear weapon delivery systems unveiled in 2018 and 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly fifty years ago on 22 June 1973, US President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. This bilateral instrument established concrete rules of the road for reducing the risk of nuclear use by means of mutual restraint and dialogue. However, despite being the product of more than a year of intense negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, one of the Agreement's primary architects, Henry Kissinger, later dismissed it as having 'achieved little that was positive'. This article examines why Nixon and Kissinger pursued this Agreement in the first place and the extent to which they accomplished their goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should states balance the benefits and risks of employing artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning in nuclear command and control systems? I will argue that it is only by placing developments in AI against the larger backdrop of the increasing prominence of a much wider set of strategic non-nuclear capabilities that this question can be adequately addressed. In order to do so, I will make the case for disaggregating the different risks that AI poses to stability as well as examine the specific ways in which it may instead be harnessed to restabilise nuclear-armed relationships. I will also identify a number of policy areas that ought to be prioritised by way of mitigating the risks and harnessing the opportunities identified in the article, including discussing the possibilities of both formal and informal arms control arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role did conventional arms control (CAC) agreements failures play in Russia's decision to invade Ukraine? Using a process tracing and counterfactual mixed methodology analyzing Russia's invasion motivations, this article attempts to answer the question by assessing Russian strategic policies, proposals, and arms control agreements. These demonstrate that Russia, seeing its sense of "indivisible security" being violated, sought to adjust or establish new CAC agreements to address a growing conventional military imbalance between NATO and Russia. Having failed to establish a fixed and stable conventional military balance through CAC, and as Ukraine edged closer to NATO membership, Russia resorted to the use of force shortly after their December 2021 proposals were not accepted. The article concludes by suggesting that this case supports arms racing and arms-control related causes of war theories, and that dissonant perceptions of the actual or ideal military balance can lead to conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses Russia's approach to strategic arms control with a particular focus on two central yet largely paradoxical principles: strategic stability and asymmetry. A rise in asymmetries in the capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation, global shifts in power, and a proceeding deterioration of U.S.–Russia relations have marked the post-Cold War era, challenging traditional arms control regimes based on strategic stability understood in terms of parity in the nuclear arsenals of the two most potent nuclear powers. Somewhat counterintuitively, the developments in the military-technological sphere that undermine the very principle of parity concurrently incentivise Russia to invest in asymmetric solutions to counterbalance these tendencies and maintain strategic stability. By analysing the views of Russian military experts, the article takes a look at the INF Treaty, New START and hypersonic weapons to examine the past, present and future challenges to the U.S.–Russian arms control architecture. It arrives at the conclusion that Russia's home-grown solution to its security conundrum is a perplexing mix of a desire for strategic stability-cum-parity in strategic arms control and a pragmatic emphasis on asymmetries while it tries to preserve its position, which is symptomatic of the paradoxical nature of strategy itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The next generation of arms control agreements may require verification technology with enhanced specificity to achieve new, ambitious objectives. A short list of these goals includes further reductions of strategic weapons, the inclusion of all nuclear weapons – whether they be deployed or non-deployed, strategic or non-strategic – and nuclear warhead dismantlement, among others. Further, depending on the political dynamics, less intrusive on-site inspections may also be an objective. In some cases, verification measures employed for decades may be sufficient. In others, physics can play a key role in overcoming verification concerns, as well as allay some of the international and domestic political concerns involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on recently declassified documents on both sides of the Atlantic to reveal the depth of the disagreements between Britain and the United States over adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty during the 1980s. In the context of the radical Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Thatcher government feared that the dismissive attitude of the Reagan administration towards the ABM Treaty would undermine the role of arms control in providing mutual security and would have harmful consequences for the viability of Britain's nuclear deterrent. Some British officials also suspected that the Reagan administration was manipulating alleged Soviet non-compliance with the Treaty as a pretext for abandoning it. The tensions between London and Washington on this issue were fundamental, as the Reagan administration perceived it as an obstacle which constrained the progress of SDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States still deploys about 100 nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO's nuclear sharing policy. Two of the hosting states, Germany and the Netherlands, are now debating the prospective withdrawal of these weapons from their territory. This article presents the findings of a recent public opinion poll in the two countries, where German and the Dutch citizens expressed their views on the US withdrawal. Given the changing political landscape in these two countries, public support for these policies is a pertinent aspect of the political decisions over the future of US nuclear weapons in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the shift from a bipolar nuclear world to a tripolar nuclear world, with China emerging as a nuclear peer to the United States and Russia. It discusses three destabilizing developments, including the dismantling of arms control agreements and the suspension of the New START Treaty. The article also examines the risks of conflict escalation and the challenges of maintaining strategic stability in this new era of competition. It concludes by suggesting practical steps to promote stability and manage the dangers of unconstrained competition. The author emphasizes the importance of comprehensive deterrence, arms control agreements, open communication, and managing complex linkages to prevent a return to the dangers of the Cold War era. [Extracted from the article]

Albert Wohlstetter's seminal essay of the early Cold War years, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," calls for revisiting in the current climate of geopolitics and military technology. The possible emergence of China as a near peer competitor with the United States and Russia in strategic nuclear forces changes the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic stability in Asia and globally. In addition, future deterrence stability will also be challenged by changes in technology, including hypersonic weapons, improved missile defense capabilities, competition in the cyber and space domains, and the uncertain impacts of game changers such as artificial intelligence and nanotechnology. As well, containment of nuclear weapons spread cannot be guaranteed, given the dissatisfaction of some existing and aspiring nuclear weapons states with the present international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union implemented multiple arms control treaties that depended on National Technical Means (NTM) for verification. Since NTM included covert satellite reconnaissance systems that gathered a sizeable portion of American intelligence on the USSR, the US government kept the details about its NTM ambiguous. Consequently, US diplomats had to negotiate a verification framework dependant on NTM without compromising sensitive space-based intelligence capabilities. This article uses newly declassified documents to explore how Washington and Moscow navigated the boundaries of secrecy concerning space reconnaissance to create a robust arms control verification regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing number of Earth observation satellites are introducing a revolution in overhead transparency and making ground activity more visible than ever before. In the near future, swarms of satellites will provide imagery which is persistent, high-resolution, delivered in real-time and widely accessible. This data will be instantly and autonomously analyzed by artificial intelligence, and insights provided to users. In the global security environment defined by rising great power competition, increased transparency could have a significant impact on nuclear stability by breaking the secrecy nuclear weapon states rely on. This could stimulate a dangerous nuclear arms race. If political conditions align and states make that choice, new technological capabilities could also help create an environment of trust and predictability and facilitate the next generation of arms control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An exceedingly challenging agenda of urgent, important, and diverse arms control issues awaits the incoming Biden administration. To address it, the administration should consider the creation of a new agency to focus on cooperative threat reduction; alternatively, deft reorganization of key elements of the executive branch could be pursued swiftly, without requiring legislation. An examination of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's impressive record of accomplishments (and some failures) between 1961 and 1999, when it was disestablished, can help identify some ideas and options for its potential successor today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The administration of President Donald J. Trump has consistently used fear of China to undermine nearly five decades of bipartisan consensus on US–Russian nuclear arms control. The negative consequences of these actions may last far beyond the Trump presidency. If generations of agreement between Democrats and Republicans on bilateral nuclear treaties with Russia erode, it will pose a significant setback to US national security and global stability. Future leaders may ultimately need to consider new approaches to nuclear risk reduction that preserve the benefits of the arms control regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The onset of a crisis in US-Russian and global arms control has generated manifold proposals on ways to rejuvenate productive negotiations on weapons cuts and confidence building measures. Yet most of these plans are focused on technical details while failing to capture the central role of politics – both domestic and international – in enabling arms control. More important, many observers overlook the fact that, historically, US-Russian arms control negotiations only yielded concrete results when the sides were clear about their mutual intentions. Those intentions did not need to be cooperative; they could well be adversarial (as was the case during much of the Cold War). But for arms control to work, they had to remain at a stable, tested, and predictable level, which was clearly not the case in the late-2010s. To expect US-Russian arms control to regain its lost momentum by itself and salvage the political relationship would be to misunderstand the sources and context of past achievements in bilateral arms control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The next president will have to deal with many pressing questions, but few are as consequential as this one: Do we want to live in a world in which the number of nuclear weapons is going up or going down? Once the next president is elected, he or she will have to make many choices about US internal nuclear policy: Should we use nuclear weapons first in a crisis? Should there be more than one person involved in the authorization of a nuclear strike? Should we make unilateral changes to our forces? And should we be deploying new low-yield nuclear capabilities? External policy choices on arms control and nonproliferation efforts will also have to be made, many of them all but immediately. The American public should be aware of the candidates' various nuclear weapons plans before they vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the release of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States (US) in 2022, which is part of the National Defense Review (NDR) and The Missile Defense Review (MDR). The NPR highlights the US response to the changing nuclear strategic environment, particularly in relation to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. It emphasizes the need for the US to address nuclear coercion by Russia in a responsible manner and calls for a sense of urgency for a nuclear disarmament security environment. The NPR also discusses the challenges posed by China's nuclear capabilities and the importance of extended deterrence for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. It rules out Iran as a nuclear threat to the US but acknowledges the possibility of nuclear terrorism. The NPR recommends a comprehensive approach that includes arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction measures to address nuclear dangers. [Extracted from the article]

Why do decision makers undertake bold conciliatory gestures? It is puzzling why leaders accommodate their rivals in such a way when smaller, less risky avenues exist to initiate conciliation. To shed light on this question, I examine Mikhail Gorbachev's decision to present an unprecedented package of arms control proposals at the Reykjavik summit. In one stroke, he made concessions to the United States on missile defense and strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believed he needed to reassure the Americans, particularly President Ronald Reagan, of the Soviet Union's benign intentions and therefore made concessions that addressed US fears and security concerns. I argue that these concessions constitute empathic signals designed to communicate Gorbachev's sincerity in reducing nuclear weapons. In the event his offer was rebuffed, Gorbachev would reveal his proposals to mobilize public opinion against Reagan. These strategies may seem contradictory but fit Gorbachev's overall plan to challenge the Soviet Union's threatening image and, in doing so, either persuade or pressure Reagan into reciprocating Soviet concessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As John Kennedy prepared to enter the White House, the Middle East was on the verge of making a leap into the nuclear age. This article examines a secret and extended dialogue between Nasser and Kennedy on nuclear proliferation that took place under the shadow of the Israeli reactor in Dimona. Through relying on primary sources from the United States and Egypt, it traces the historical origins of the unresolved tensions between both countries on how to address Israel's nuclear capabilities and the impact of that on their bilateral relations. In doing so, it presents a less familiar side of Nasser's leadership, his perceptions of regional security and his approach to the nuclear question, both regionally and internationally. It also brings into focus the limits of Kennedy's non-proliferation policy and proactive diplomacy in the Middle East, particularly in addressing Dimona. To this day, US toleration of Israel's nuclear regional monopoly has exposed the US to accusations of double standards. The article traces how both Nasser and Kennedy were constrained in dealing with the nuclear question in the region during a key and foundational period of the Middle East's nuclear history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of new US-Russia and US-China political confrontation and the comprehensive crisis surrounding nuclear arms control treaties, there may be little immediate hope for successful talks on the non-weaponization of space. Even so, if and when political preconditions change and serious arms control negotiations resume, the non-militarization of outer space will inevitably return to the disarmament agenda. The United States and Russia, as a minimum, have an obvious common security interest in space – limiting as much as possible the dedicated anti-satellite (ASAT) systems that threaten the satellites that are designed to warn each nation of a ballistic missile attack by any state. A focus on the verifiable ban on the testing of such anti-satellite systems would give the United States and Russia a practical starting point for further negotiations on the non-militarization of space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current US nuclear modernization program departs in several major ways from longstanding US nuclear policy: It elevates the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, includes plans for developing several new nuclear weapon capabilities, and resurrects former nuclear capabilities that past US presidents had wisely eliminated. Of all the Trump administration's nuclear modernization plans, however, the most destabilizing are probably the new, low-yield nuclear options and dual-capable systems that may be ambiguously nuclear or conventional. But the United States can still return to a smarter path - one that eliminates these specific nuclear weapons plans, and adopts a more measured nuclear rhetoric to match. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Biden administration can take two pragmatic, achievable steps upon entering office to enhance US and allied security through arms control policy. First is to extend New START, the treaty limiting US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Second is to begin dialogues with Russia and China on potential future arms control measures to preserve stable deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discuses the need to shift from pursuing complete denuclearisation of North Korea to a policy of deterrence and arms control. It argues that the U.S. and its East Asian allies need to accept the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and adjust their policies accordingly. It also highlights the importance of arms control measures to mitigate arms racing and reduce the potential risks and consequences of deterrence failure.

Russia's war against Ukraine has thrown US–Russian nuclear arms control into a deep crisis. Against this background, the questions of what drives Russia's interest in nuclear arms control with the United States and what influences Moscow's preferences regarding the institutional design of arms-control agreements deserve renewed scrutiny. This article argues that it is important to look beyond Russia's material pressures and security concerns to understand when and in which form it is willing to pursue bilateral nuclear arms control. In particular, political elites' notions of national identity and status aspirations are central to Russia's arms-control policy. The article develops this argument by testing two theoretical frameworks—defensive neorealism and social-identity theory—that help to conceptualize material motives on the one hand and status motives on the other. It empirically investigates the importance of these motives for Russia's arms-control policy by assessing two case studies: the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–92 and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uncertainties about the size of fissile-material stockpiles are large; states routinely observe differences between measured physical inventories and "book inventories." Nuclear archaeology can reduce these uncertainties. A new, integrated approach would make use of data-analysis techniques that take into account direct fissile-material measurements, a variety of forensic measurements for shut-down facilities and radioactive wastes, and fuel-cycle operational records with related simulations. This article describes that approach and includes a hypothetical case illustrating its potential to probe declared histories and detect falsifications. The article reviews past efforts to fully capture fissile-material stockpiles. Future scenarios in which methods of nuclear archaeology could be used or will be required are also discussed, including improving nuclear safety and security through better knowledge of fissile materials and radioactive waste. International exercises for transparency purposes could be carried out in either nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states. During any disarmament process, baseline declarations of fissile materials will need to be verified to assess the potential for a warhead buildup during arsenal reductions and eventually to verify the disposal of all weapons-related fissile materials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs on an uncertain and rapidly changing strategic landscape is calling for a more flexible approach to arms control in the crisis of Russian invasion of Ukraine. It mentions that the U.S. Department of Defense released its National Defense Strategy, including a Nuclear Posture Review which essentially portrays the current security environment as an arms-control hiatus in which the U.S. will prepare for engagement and realistic outcomes in dialogues with both governments.

In this interview, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins talks about her work on arms control and nuclear security and discusses differences between the Obama and Trump administrations on issues including nuclear weapons modernization and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. She highlights the scarcity of women and people of color in national security, explains why that matters, and describes how the organization she founded last year - Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation - is working to diversify the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today's international political environment is not favorable for establishing new arms control agreements, but history demonstrates that arms control opportunities can arise quickly. When opportunities arise, however, they will be accompanied by verification challenges for which nuclear and non-nuclear states alike must prepare now. In particular, new approaches must be developed to verify the dismantlement of nuclear warheads -- a task never before undertaken. In order to identify technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification, as well as procedures and technologies that might address those challenges, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the US State Department -- through a project known as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) --- are engaging collaboratively with more than 25 countries to build global verification expertise. The IPNDV has completed a first phase of work, which focused on monitoring and verification objectives, on-site inspections, and technical challenges and solutions. It has now embarked on a second phase of work, which will seek to deepen understanding of the verification options identified in the first phase, begin to test some of those options, and extend the partnership's work beyond the core of nuclear weapon dismantlement. At a highly contentious moment for global security, the IPNDV stands out as a model of effective international collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the ongoing Russia-West confrontation manifested mainly in the armed conflict in Ukraine, the world's largest war of sanctions, a growing confrontation in cyberspace and politics, the erosion of the system of arms control treaties and a sharp reduction of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. Russia and the West are fighting not only for influence in Ukraine but also over the future of international relations on a global scale in the coming decades. The most plausible development seems to be a war of attrition, which, however, does not rule out the risk of escalation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons is said to be an effective declaratory policy for advancing nuclear disarmament. In Japan, which suffered two atomic bombings, there are many voices that expect the US to declare the NFU, hoping to promote nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, Japan faces a tough security environment with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and, above all, China's more assertive actions along with the expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Japanese strategic community thinks that it is essential to maintain the credibility of the US extended deterrence and to further develop strike capabilities to counter China's medium-range strike capabilities in the region. In this context, there is a concern that a possible US declaration of NFU, while it may reduce the nuclear risk between the US and China, may signal to China that the US would allow China's assertive activities at the regional level. Measures must be taken to dispel concerns about such regional instability, and stakeholders should pursue stability at both strategic and regional levels so that declaratory policies such as NFU can effectively contribute to reducing nuclear threats and risks. To this end, it would be beneficial to discuss arms control and build confidence through a multi-layered strategic and arms control dialogues among primary players, namely one between the US and China, one among the US, Japan, and China, and another that add other regional players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes an identity-based analysis of the Russian position in the global debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Based on an interpretation of Russian written and verbal statements submitted to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meetings from 2014 to 2022, I find that two key integral elements of Russian great power identity—the promotion of multipolarity and the recognition of Russia's equal participation in global affairs—guide its evolving position on the potential regulation of AWS. The analysis makes an empirical contribution by examining one of the most active participants in the CCW discussion, an opponent to any new regulations of so-called "killer robots," and a developer of autonomy in weapons systems. It highlights the value of a more thorough understanding of the ideas guiding the Russian position, assisting actors who seek a ban on AWS in crafting their responses and strategies in the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

However, negotiations would prove difficult as the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate as NATO deployed its new forces, and as three successive Soviet leaders died in Reagan's first five years in office. Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO: by Colburn, S. (2022). However, along with modernisation of NATO's "theatre nuclear forces", an arms control offer to the Soviets that could restore the European balance was essential because of allies' domestic political concerns. [Extracted from the article]

The Trump administration has no shortage of new approaches to old problems, but the impatience exhibited by the US commander-in-chief appears to make it difficult for the administration as a whole to follow through on policies that do not yield immediate results. The Trump administration’s ability to think through the longer-range implications of broad policy choices it makes now about the US nuclear arsenal, arms control, and efforts to deter nuclear proliferation will affect world strategic stability far into the future. In all these issue areas, the Trump administration is hampered by a deficit of expertise, of patience in the White House, and of deference for the normal workings of government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

With tensions running high between the United States and Russia, North Korea conducting nuclear tests, and every nuclear-armed nation modernizing its arsenal, the world seems headed toward greater nuclear instability. Changing course will not be easy, and progress must begin with serious bilateral confidence-building, arms control, and disarmament efforts by Russia and the United States. But the two sides have expressed clearly divergent nuclear priorities in recent years, even as the danger of military escalation has increased. Meanwhile, the multilateral nonproliferation regime seems to be splitting into polarized camps, characterized by starkly differing views on the value, role, and risks of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, leaders can demonstrate prudence and restraint by working toward a universal no-first-use norm, conducting dialogue on de-alerting nuclear weapons, and developing effective verification procedures for decommissioning and destroying nuclear warheads. In the long run, the United States and Russia can still aim for a grand bargain on arsenal reductions. In the meantime, they and the other recognized nuclear weapon states can explore whether strategic stability can someday be maintained through means other than nuclear weapons – for example, through frameworks of cooperative alliances or weapons systems of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the latter part of the Cold War, many strategists thought of nuclear deterrence and arms control as two of the most essential stabilizing elements of the same strategy in managing an adversarial relationship. The renewed crisis between the West (the United States and NATO member states) and Russia demonstrates how critical these elements are to the strategic nuclear relationship. As a result of recent setbacks between Washington and Moscow in the past few years, arms control has taken a back seat, and the risk of conflict due to miscalculation is the highest it has been since the 1980s. If the United States and Russia want to rebuild trust and continue reducing the risk of nuclear use, a meaningful dialogue is needed to reconcile nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control. How can the world’s two largest nuclear superpowers re-establish the harmony that once existed between deterrence and arms control? What should a stable framework look like for managing that nuclear relationship, taking into account other regional security challenges? The answer to these questions lies in establishing a new, common interpretation of US–Russian strategic stability. Both parties need to find mutually acceptable solutions to the challenges of reconciling nuclear deterrence and arms control. In general, the most important issues include disputes surrounding strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, global ballistic missile defense capabilities, and the problems of conventional precision-guided munitions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As long as the relationship between Russia and the West continues to be confrontational, the urgent task will be to stabilize and manage the confrontation. For NATO, this primarily means balancing deterrence and assurance measures to its easternmost allies without entering a new arms race. NATO should step up its efforts to foster talks with Russia on current military threats and on arms control, possibly by seeking reconstitution of the NATO-Russia Council as a crisis management forum and mechanism for dialog, dealing with dangerous military incidents and better communicating each side’s intentions. As for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty crisis and the interlinked issue of the European missile defense, US officials should consider face-saving options to reassure Russia that Western missile defense installations have no offensive capabilities – provided that Russia convinces the new US administration that it has returned to compliance with the INF Treaty. Over the mid- to long-term, NATO and Russia must initiate a serious and open dialogue about the two core issues at stake – the freedom and sovereignty of states to seek alliance membership and the (contradicting) Russian interest of maintaining a sphere of influence over its “near abroad.” A well-prepared conference – akin to the 1975 Helsinki Summit, with various preceding rounds of consultations at ambassadorial level, and including the nonaligned states in Europe – might be a way to kick-start the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The US long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon program is clearly a major factor in the worldwide trend toward fielding nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Public information shows that it will likely have new abilities beyond its predecessor air-launched cruise missile, and these potential properties, and the fact that the Air Force intends to field it on its new stealth bomber, may raise new concerns among potential adversaries and alter strategic calculations. The US nuclear modernization plan, as of this writing, includes replacing the existing stock of 575 air-launched cruise missiles with around 1000 LRSO weapons. The concerns surrounding the LRSO are feeding the emergence of a serious debate in the United States over its future, and whether a move to end the program could help tilt other countries away from nuclear-armed cruise missiles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Much of the public debate about space militarization has involved organizational structures: Should the United States create a separate (i.e. sixth) military service, or elevate the mission now carried out by the US Air Force Space Command, making it into another unified combatant command? Proponents of the first idea want to use a Marine Corps model – the Marines are a separate service, even though under the administrative umbrella of the US Navy – while supporters of the second vision support the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) model. But this structural discussion obscures a more important question: How can the United States best protect its interests in outer space without creating a space arms race that could actually jeopardize US long-term economic and national security? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on space security and the prospect of outer space remaining free from human-devised threats. Topics discussed include the global space policy outlined in a resolution adopted annually at the United Nations General Assembly entitled ‘The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space' (PAROS); the need to avoid an arms race in space and to prevent its weaponisation; and consolidating and reinforcing the existing legal regime for outer space to enhance its effectiveness.

The article focuses on the aims of arms control and a national military strategy in the context of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, which was signed at a summit meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, limiting the number of ABM launchers to 200 for each side. Topics include Ballistic-missile defense (BMD) as a threat to strategic stability; and stabilizing the arms race by confirming the dominance of offensive systems.

The United States and the Soviet Union concluded two sets of strategic arms limitation talks – SALT I and II – during the 1970s. Drawing on recent revisionist scholarship, this analysis assesses the success of SALT I and SALT II's relative failure and I by framing Soviet-American strategic arms control in the 1970s as an exercise in co-operative competition, the pursuit of competitive strategies through nominally co-operative means. Whilst SALT I achieved a temporary balance between the co-operative and competitive elements of arms control, SALT II's demise was in large part due to the fundamental contradictions at the heart of both superpowers' use of strategic arms limitation as an instrument of co-operative competition. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of this analysis for strategic arms control in a new era of great-power rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, Moscow and Washington had established a satellite verification regime to monitor arms control treaty compliance. Satellites had become a primary source of transparency and stability in superpower relations. Yet by the end of the 1970s, both the United States and the USSR were developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that could destroy observation satellites. This article uses recently declassified archival documents to show that Jimmy Carter pushed for ASAT limits due to his broader arms control agenda, whereas Ronald Reagan rejected ASAT arms control primarily because of its potential impact on the Strategic Defense Initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of treaty verification, hindering progress on treaty aims. The study described in this article was designed to facilitate dialogue on verification-related issues outside the context of those positions, using the term "assurance" to represent the degree of certainty that states parties are meeting their treaty obligations. From August 2020 to July 2021, the researchers conducted 36 interviews—16 with state-party delegations and 20 with independent experts, representing 20 countries. They performed mixed-methods analysis on the interviews, including quantitative metrics on qualitative interview content. Interviewees' views on verification, compliance, and related concepts varied widely. Future efforts by states parties to achieve common understanding on these topics could facilitate concrete progress. While no single mechanism is sufficient to achieve verification or assess compliance, packages of mechanisms could increase assurance. Interviewees expressed general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even in the absence of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among states parties for which that is the primary goal. Avenues to increase assurance among BWC stakeholders merit further discussion in the current intersessional program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]