Search

This paper firstly puts forward to employ investor attention obtained from Google trends to explain and forecast carbon futures return in the European Union-Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). Our empirical results show that investor attention is a granger cause to changes in carbon return. Furthermore, investor attention generates both linear and non-linear effects on carbon return. The results demonstrate that investor attention shows excellent explanatory power on carbon return. Moreover, we conduct several out-of-sample forecasts to explore the predictive power of investor attention. The results indicate that incorporating investor attention indeed improve the accuracy of out-of-sample forecasts both in short and long horizons and can generate significant economic values. All results demonstrate that investor attention is a non-negligible pricing factor in carbon market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current emissions trading debates in the EU and the USA were examined and the prospects for creating a transatlantic carbon market were analysed. A future US Emissions Trading Scheme (US ETS) may be designed very differently from the EU ETS, raising questions of compatibility. Crucial differences relate to the stringency of targets, the recognition of offsets, and price control mechanisms. These differences flow directly from the different policy and economic perspectives on emissions trading and climate policy in the USA and the EU. The two sides should therefore seek a way forward that reconciles potentially different climate policies. For example, the USA and the EU should consider an effort to harmonize carbon prices, and US legislation could phase out cost-containment mechanisms after some time period. Finally, both US and EU policies should have mechanisms that allow periodic recalibration, which would allow each to adjust to new technology, react to developing-country climate policies, and learn from each other. In the longer term, this would allow both sides to strive for greater policy convergence, either through linked trading systems, harmonized prices, or a transition from harmonized prices to linkage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A framework was devised for policy-makers to assess direct bilateral cap-and-trade linkages. A systematic analysis of the economic, political and regulatory implications indicates potential benefits along with a number of potentially negative side effects. Theoretically, economic benefits are expected from quasi-static short-term and dynamic efficiency gains. However, a careful review of these arguments indicates that, due to the presence of market distortions or terms-of-trade effects, international emissions trading may not be welfare-enhancing for all countries. Political benefits are derived from the reinforced commitment to international climate policy and the elimination of competitiveness concerns among linking partners, but this must be weighed against the possible incentive to adjust national caps in anticipation of linking. Regulatory disadvantages may arise from the linked system's inconsistency with original domestic policy objectives, and from the partial de facto cession of discretionary control over the domestic emissions trading system. Finally, as an illustration, a link between the EU ETS and a prospective US trading system is assessed, and the major trade-offs identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]