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This article examines the captivity narratives of two British men who were captured by republican rebels in Grenada in 1795. It provides insights into the republican regime in Guadeloupe and the experiences of captivity. The article also discusses the tensions between American sailors, British sailors, and French whites in the region, as well as the complex challenge to nationalism during the revolution. The French revolutionary conflict in the Caribbean, particularly in Guadeloupe and Grenada, is explored, highlighting the role of Victor Hugues in the revolution. The text includes two narratives by prisoners, John Hay and Francis MacMahon, which shed light on the actions of Victor Hugues, the overextension of the republican war effort, and the contestations of nationalism and identity in the region. The article also provides a list of references and sources for further research on the topic. [Extracted from the article]

By calling attention to how Meiji-era Japanese thinkers "were already drawing on rich intellectual traditions of local and Chinese mercantilism that were different from their European counterparts in both origins and content" (p. 209), Helleiner wants to recover the richness and diversity of political economy as it developed in different parts of the world. Strategic trade policy and tariff wars have been back on the agenda of political economy in the early decades of the 21 SP st sp century. In Part III, Helleiner chronicles the emergence of an indigenous neomercantilist political economy in East Asia. [Extracted from the article]

MoMA goes to Paris in 1938: building and politicizing American Art: by Caroline M. Riley, Oakland, CA, University of California Press, 2023, ix + 345 pp., £50, ISBN: 978-0-520-38691-4 Overall, Riley offers an impressively thorough account of MoMA's "voyage as ambassadors of goodwill", as Goodyear himself framed the exhibition-in-progress in 1936 (56). Caroline M. Riley's I MoMA Goes to Paris in 1938: Building and Politicizing American Art i carefully excavates and tracks the history of the Museum of Modern Art's 1938 exhibition I Three Centuries of American Art i (' I Three Centuries i ') from its initial conception in 1930 through multiple rounds of international negotiations and planning, its eventual staging and its afterlives up to the present - what Riley terms the "exhibitionary life cycle". [Extracted from the article]

Transatlantic cooperation on security has a long history. In Africa, transatlantic cooperation on security is basically between France and the United States. This paper asks why the two former competitors in Africa started to cooperate and also why they are so willing to engage militarily. The central argument in this paper poses that France and the US cooperate because it is indispensable to both parties. To France, the cooperation is indispensable because the US is the only power with sufficient financial means and with sufficient air-lift capacity to transport French and African troops into conflict-ridden countries. To Washington, cooperation with Paris is indispensable because the French authorities have unique access to intelligence and knowledge about large parts of Africa. By applying a foreign policy analysis framework, the paper analyses how perceptions of decision-makers, the role of personality and leadership, the role of government institutions and political systems have impacted the relevant decisions. It is emphasised that the two different decision-making systems - the French “state dominated” and the American “society dominated” - produce the same result, namely collaboration. It suggests that the perception of a serious threat from terrorism and Islamist radicalisation overrules differences in decision-making systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether or not American policy after the 2013 Syrian chemical-weapons attack was wise, its execution was bungled, causing unnecessary harm to the US– France relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Vietnam War exacerbated the already tense relationship between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon B. Johnson; and Franco–American relations reached a nadir in winter 1966–1967 when de Gaulle vetoed a proposed visit to Hanoi by Jean Sainteny, a former colonial official, who Washington had desired to probe North Vietnam’s position. This analysis adds a new wrinkle to the story. Building on research for Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (2012), the author reveals that French knowledge of only the Polish version of that peace initiative’s failure, fully blaming the Americans, further soured de Gaulle’s view of Johnson’s handling of the war and American sincerity in seeking peace. The analysis also unveils a new dimension of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in Vietnam diplomacy—prior to the Nixon White House—missing from earlier accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The failed expedition of Suez in 1956 and France’s subsequent strategic ‘divorce’ from the United Kingdom and the United States lies at the heart of a policy paradigm that has dictated France’s defence posture from de Gaulle’s presidency to the end of the Cold War. Some crucial features of the Gaullist posture remain today enduring references for French presidents in the definition of France’s exceptionalism. While it is so, there have been significant changes since the 1990s when it comes to France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. This article demonstrates the extent and mechanisms of this rapprochement by analysing it through three dimensions of policy change: modes of action, institutional commitments and discourses. The article demonstrates the dimensions’ mutually reinforcing effects and argues that France’s exceptional posture has de facto been reversed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 20 July 1924, the American Committee for Devastated France (ACDF) formally transferred its property in the Aisne province to French authorities. The three-hour ceremony precipitated French and American commemorations of ACDF activities, and public and private expressions of French gratitude for the humanitarian aid 328 American ACDF volunteers had provided to the Aisne's inhabitants for seven years. Yet the gifts, performances and speeches by local residents and international luminaries failed to catalyse what US Ambassador Myron T. Herrick hoped would become a greater ‘international partnership’ between France and the USA. This paper contends that this failure stemmed not from insignificant acts of remembrance towards the American Committee on the part of the Aisne's beneficiaries and French and American statesmen. Instead, the ephemeral recollection of the ACDF's legacy in both nations derived from the cognitive dissonance between the transnational goodwill the American organization and French citizens expressed towards each other, and the international antipathy with which each nation state generally regarded the other's world view in the interwar era. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The goal of this article is to examine the role of the media in the international fashion business between the wars. New York switched from a position of first importer of French fashions, to a contender of Paris hegemony. But despite a dramatic raise in tariffs and dwindling fashion exports, Paris managed to remain the main originator of women's fashions until the Second World War. In studying this situation, I will first examine the mechanisms of the diffusion of design innovation and set out the international fashion press networks of the interwar period. I will then examine the complex relationship that developed between fashion designers and the media, with a focus on the press, showing how during the 1920s the couturiers imposed an increasing number of restrictions to the shows' spectators, to photographers, and to the press, due to a growing concern for industrial espionage. Finally, I will examine specific cases of relationships of couturiers with the press, including the advertisement of tie-in products, the endorsement of couture by French and American celebrities, and the first attempts at professionalized public relations strategies in the fashion business. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the relationship between geopolitical change and the evolution of French grand strategy from Iraq to Libya. While the European Union (EU) and the bilateral relationship with Germany continue to feature high in French grand strategy, France has in the space of just a few years substantially strengthened its Atlantic connection (with the US, Britain and NATO) and upgraded its relationship with other European powers – particularly Russia. It is argued that the driving reason behind this diversifying trend is the weakening of the US-led West, both globally and in Europe. If US military power laid the foundations of order in and around Europe, America's shift of geostrategic attention eastwards is underpinning a political destructuring of Europe and its broader neighbourhood. For one thing, Europe is moving towards a more multipolar balance, as evidenced by Russia's resurgence in the east and southeast, Turkey's drifting from the EU and growing influence in the continent's southeast and, crucially, Germany's increasing influence over the direction of the EU. For another, France's so-called axis of strategic priority (Northern Africa, the Sahel, Levant, Horn of Africa/Red Sea and the Gulf) is characterised by mounting instability and increasing penetration by external powers. Against this backdrop, the special relationship with Germany and the EU are insufficient to guarantee French influence in Europe, the stability of Europe's broader neighbourhood or France's aspirations to global power. In an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment, France is seeking to reconcile a deeper politico-military relationship with Britain (and the United States), a special relationship with Germany in the politico-economic sphere and strong ties with Russia, thereby positioning itself as a sort of spider in an increasingly multipolar European geopolitical web. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We investigate the impact of historically rooted domestic constructions of purpose and ambition on the patterns of discord and collaboration in the Franco-American relationship over the course of the postwar and post-cold war periods. We stress the importance and tenacity of domestic historical constructions for explaining and understanding the foreign policy strategies that would otherwise confound a power-based analysis. The Franco-American bilateral relationship, in particular, illustrates the persistence and tenacity of each nation's historically constructed foreign policy conception during the bipolar distribution of power during the cold war and the contested unipolarity of the post-cold war era. We conclude with an assessment of the salience and relevance of domestic elements of foreign policy role and purpose for explaining and understanding how their bilateral relationship has affected the European security order into the second decade of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over 98,000 American military personnel were stationed in France by the mid-1950s. Most studies of these US forces in France have taken an intercultural perspective, assessing how the two communities related to each other 'on the ground'. This article seeks to explore how American deployment was received and represented within the increasingly polarised context of French national politics. It examines the role played by the American military presence in the creation of Cold War narratives in France, in the very initial phases of US deployment (1950-52), with particular reference to cultural representations developed in these two years by the French Communist Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By examining France's post-war transformation from an imperial into a nuclear and cultural power, this article explores how the triangular relationships between France, Algeria and the USA cause the traditional self-image of the nation as hexagon to break. Two arguments are made: first, that the French cultural and nuclear projects are not only intertwined but also conflictual, promoting both conciliation and friction in international relations; and second, that the metaphorical use of nuclear terminology in post-war French theory echoes this dissonance by using technological imagery to criticise a technocratic Gaullism. French cultural and nuclear policy work alternately in conjunction and at cross-purposes, while theoretical interventions critical of the Gaullist state adopt a discourse that mimics that of the nuclear establishment. The article concludes with a discussion of a single building situated at ground zero of these debates. In its iconographic conflation of heart, grotto, bunker and broken hexagon, the church of Sainte-Bernadette-du-Banlay by Claude Parent and Paul Virilio renders the double paradox of: first, a national self-image that is simultaneously held together and split apart by alternately converging and diverging policies; and second, a critique that assumes the form of its object. En traçant la transformation de la France impériale en pouvoir nucléaire et culturel pendant l'après-guerre, cet article interroge les rapports triangulaires entre la France, l'Algérie et les États-Unis et la pression destructrice qu'ils exercent sur le symbole traditionnel de la nation française, l'hexagone. L'article avance un double argument: en premier lieu, les projets culturels et nucléaires entrepris par la France dans l'après-guerre ont tendance à se contredire, de façon à produire dans les rapports franco-américains un rapprochement culturel accompagné d'un éloignement diplomatique; en deuxième lieu, l'emploi métaphorique de la terminologie de la recherche nucléaire dans la sociologie et la philosophie fait écho à cette dissonance en se servant d'un langage technologique pour avancer une critique du gaullisme technocratique. En conclusion, l'article commente un exemple architectural qui se trouve au cœur de ces débats. Conçue par Claude Parent et Paul Virilio, l'église de Sainte-Bernadette-du-Banlay se caractérise par une iconographie complexe (cœur sacré, grotte, bunker, hexagone fracturé) qui met en scène un double paradoxe: d'un côté, celui d'un symbole national unifié et déchiré à la fois par des initiatives politiques et culturelles qui tantôt se renforcent tantôt se contredisent; et de l'autre, celui d'une critique qui emprunte la forme de ce qu'elle rejette. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's title, invoking as it does the optimism of Franklin D. Roosevelt's theme song during his 1932 presidential campaign, speaks to a growing expectation that a profound change for the better is in store for the Franco-American relationship. That bilateral relationship has long been billed as one between the world's two 'oldest allies', with the unstated assumption being that because they have been such longstanding 'partners' in international security, they must typically interact in a constructive fashion, advancing in the process not only their own respective national interests but also the interests of the greater community (the 'West') to which they belong. The reality of their interaction since they initially became allies (in 1778) is, of course, quite different, and is best characterised by long periods of strategic ennui disrupted by occasional moments of bliss and just as occasional bouts of vehement animosity. Although alliance dynamics have not been the only, or even the chief, source of upset in the Franco-American security relationship, there is no denying that at times the two states have differed bitterly over matters precisely because they have been allies. The Western alliance, for each state though for different reasons, has served as a symbolic referent of the first order of importance. Therefore, the nature of their involvement with NATO could be said to serve as a shorthand means of assessing the nature of their involvement with each other. If this is so, then France's reintegration into NATO's military side might reasonably be taken as a harbinger of long-term improvement in the quality of the France-US strategic relationship. This seems to be what many analysts believe, at least. It is the aim of this article to examine critically this supposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks whether France's return to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s integrated military command could translate into a bigger role on nuclear issues within NATO. As NATO prepares its new strategic concept, its nuclear doctrine is bound to change as several allies have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The presence of American theater nuclear weapons in five NATO countries remains controversial. First, I argue that the removal of NATO's nuclear weapons does not mean the end of extended nuclear deterrence, by making a distinction between extended deterrence and collective-actor deterrence. Second, I compare the nuclear postures of NATO, France and the USA to show that harmonization is possible. Finally, I outline several options for a new nuclear doctrine under NATO and formulate some policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many observers of contemporary French politics would find it difficult to resist the temptation to conclude that France, alone among the European allies of the United States, has consistently had the greatest difficulty in adjusting to the reality of America's power. When that power occasions, as it frequently does, debates about “American empire,” French opposition to American influence seems to become even more pronounced. In fact, there has in recent decades been a distinctive French negative assessment of the merits of American empire, but it would be a mistake, or so this paper argues, to assume that French interests have invariably been at odds either with American power or with American empire. Using four eponymous figures to illustrate the French perspective on American empire in the past 100 years, this essay highlights how and why that assessment has evolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the evolution of shipping and trade between the United States and France from the end of the American War of Independence to the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1783–1815). It argues that commercial relations followed their own, internal dynamic and had scarce connections to statist commercial policies. These relations were, however, deeply responsive to the international context and to warfare in particular. American shipping to France experienced an extraordinary boom after the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain in 1793. The paper explores the nature of this trade and demonstrates that its full understanding requires a global approach to trade flows in the Atlantic World rather than the bilateral approaches which dominate contemporary as well as most historical analyses. A broader analysis must integrate merchant strategies and networks into the Atlantic history. The last part of the paper analyses the specific case of Bordeaux, the major French port for US shipping during the French Wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the Franco-American antagonism of the 1960s, which culminated with France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, stems from French president Charles de Gaulle's decision in the aftermath of the failed May 1960 Paris Summit to radically redirect French foreign policy away from its post-World War Two Atlantic orientation to a more European one. By linking the failed summit to de Gaulle's new perception of the Cold War, this article moves de Gaulle scholarship away from interpretations of his foreign policy as the product of anti-Americanism or an anachronistic vision of French power to an understanding rooted in his recognition that the changing dynamics of the Cold War required the Western Europeans to reduce their military dependence on the United States. Since American leaders would never willingly relinquish their dominant position in European security affairs, de Gaulle's new design almost ensured a rising Franco-American tension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the relationship between France and the United States. Comparison between unilateralism and isolationism; Outline of the unilateral US policies; Role of US on the removal of nazism and communism.