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This paper explores the theory of 'interaction ritual chains' proposed by the sociologist Randall Collins in understanding popular religion in China today. It contributes to ongoing conceptual debates over approaching Chinese religions and draws conclusions for general socio-economic theory. We concentrate on the specific phenomenon of the resurgence of ancestor worship and lineage rituals which we have explored in fieldwork done in Shenzhen metropolis. We study two empirical cases, the re-emergence of ritual spaces that project the ritual infrastructure of the traditional village onto the modern urban infrastructure, and the role of the internet in mediating ritual activities between the local and the global. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The firm is the central institution of modern capitalism, predominantly in the shape of the "corporation" in which entrepreneurs and investors cooperate under certain legal forms, especially limited liability. Although in modern capitalism, the emergence of these legal and organizational forms was intimately tied to technological innovation and the ongoing deployment of technologies, most economic theories about the corporation tend to neglect its material dimension, mediating between user practices, technologies and production via the mobilization of symbolic media, such as industrial design. We advance a semiotic theory of the corporation, which we relate to recent developments in sociology, especially organizational ecology. In this view, corporations embody technologies in semiosis, which is a complex multi-level process combining different dimensions that relate to various audiences, such as users or the financial community. In this process, products are embedded in diverse functional and symbolic hierarchies, defining industries and patterns of usages. We illustrate our argument in sketching the case of Tesla corporation and its potential in disrupting the automotive industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dual systems theories play an important role in the conceptual foundations of behavioural economics, such as distinguishing between 'fast' and 'slow' responses to stimuli. After critically reflecting their empirical validity in the light of recent research in psychology and the neurosciences, I argue that their major flaw is the inadequate treatment of reflection. I introduce the distinction between 'reflectivity' and 'reflexivity', showing that human action involves complex brain connectivities that integrate the two systems, as understood traditionally. G. H. Mead's distinction between 'I' and 'me' as modes of the self is a promising alternative to existing dualities, which combines with a selectionist model of action generation. Whereas all standard approaches in behavioural economics and neuroeconomics remain internalist, Mead's theory establishes a paradigm for behavioural economics that centres on the pivotal role of language and symbolic systems in mediating human action, and which can integrate behavioural economics with other cross-disciplinary strands of research in economics, such as on identity and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So far, the methodological debate about neuroeconomics rarely refers to original methodological positions in the neurosciences. I confront one of the most influential ones, the constitutive explanations or mechanism approach, with methodological claims that directly relate the economic model of choice with neuronal embodiments, represented by Glimcher’s influential work. Constitutive explanations are composite and non-reductionist, therefore allow for recognizing complex causal interactions between basal neuronal phenomena and cognitive structures, also involving external symbolic media. I demonstrate the power of this methodology in discussing the example of money, which Glimcher posits as one of the most important research tasks in further developing neuroeconomics. Whereas Glimcher justifies neuroscientific reductionism by presenting an evolutionary rationale for deploying formal economic models on particular modules enabling choice, the case of money reveals the need for mechanistic explanations that include a substantial role for cultural evolution, though recognizing causal interactions with basal neuronal mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In hisIdea of Justice, Amartya Sen compares the two basic approaches to evaluating institutions,transcendental institutionalismandrealization-focused comparisons. Referring to Adam Smith'sImpartial Spectator, he argues in favor of the latter and proposes the principle of open impartiality. However, this cannot solve the tension between universalism and contextualization of values that Sen has inherited from Smith. Based on recent Hegel scholarship, we argue that some of the difficulties can be resolved, considering the role Smith played in the development of Hegel's thinking. Hegel's concept of recognition plays an essential role in establishing the possibility of impartiality both on the level of consciousness and on the level of institutional intersubjectivity. Hegel's critique of Kant's formalist ethics (also considered as transcendental institutionalism by Sen) and his analysis of the civil society in thePhilosophy of Right, especially his focus on associations and Estates, can serve as a model for making Sen's focus on public discourse theoretically more concise and pragmatically feasible. Hegel shows that universalistic attitudes can only emerge in specific institutional contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes to ground the taxonomy of economic systems on the identification of strongly performative institutions as distinctive features. I analyse performativity on the basis of the Aoki model of institutions, enriched by current approaches to performativity, which I combine with Searle's notion of a status function. Performativity is conceived as resulting from the conjunction of public representations (sign systems) and behavioural dispositions which channel strategic interactions among actors such that certain sets of institutions are reproduced recurrently. I apply this approach to the case of ‘financial capitalism’ and analyse three strongly performative institutions, the accounting standards (International Financial Reporting Standards), managerial incentive systems and intellectual property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aoki recently proposed the concept of substantive institutions, a concept that relates the outcomes of strategic interaction with public representations of the equilibrium states of games. I argue that the Aoki model can be grounded in theories of distributed cognition and performativity, which I put into the context of Searle's philosophical account of institutions. Substantive institutions build on regularized causal interactions between internal neuronal mechanisms and external facts, shared in a population of agents. Following Searle's proposal of conceiving rule-following as a neuronally anchored behavioral disposition, I show that his corresponding notion of collective intentionality can be grounded in recent neuroscience theories of imitation as the primordial process in human learning. I relate this to Searle's concept of status function and the neuronal theory of metaphors. This results in a precise definition of rule-following as performative action. I present two empirical examples of this: (1) the institution of money, and (2) status hierarchies in markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What makes institutions 'real'? One central notion has been emerging recently in sociology, which is 'performativity', a term borrowed from the philosophy of language. I propose a neurolinguistic approach to performativity that is based on John Searle's theory of institutions, especially his concept of a 'status function' and his explanation of rule-following as a neurophysiological disposition. Positing a status function is a performative act. I proceed in two steps to establish the neurolinguistic framework. First, I apply the concept of 'conceptual blending' borrowed from cognitive science on the status function, and give empirical applications from the research on performativity in financial markets. Second, I sketch the underlying neuroscience framework following the neural theory of metaphor, which I illustrate empirically with examples from behavioral finance and neuroeconomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is the odd man out in the research on social capital and economic performance. A brief survey of recent World Values Survey data shows China to be a high-trust, achievement-oriented society, which does not fit into popular pictures of rampant corruption and abuses of power. I argue that one difficulty results from methodological issues in research on social capital, where a universally accepted theory of social capital is lacking, including theoretically grounded methods of measurement. These resulting applications often generalize a Western notion of civil society as a benchmark, implicitly. I propose that social capital has to be conceived as a context-bound intermediate level theoretical term, putting methodological arguments by Durlauf (economics) and Little (Chinese studies) together. The resulting empirical method is that of triangulation across different disciplines, combining emic and etic approaches. I present an application on the notorious phenomenon of guanxi in China, which results in its re-conceptualization as ego-centric networking and relational collectivism, based on a culturally specific framing of affectual aspects of social relations. With this notion of culturally specific social capital, we can better understand the relation between institutions and economic performance in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroeconomics and behavioral economics (NEBE) is one of the most dynamic fields in contemporary economics. However, from the viewpoint of economic methodology there are still substantial reasons why NEBE is irrelevant for economic theory. This paper argues that they will only become an essential part of economics if they are embedded into a fully-fledged institutional and evolutionary paradigm. I develop a Neo-Veblenian theory of the individual that starts out from the observation that modern brain sciences do not support the notion of the brain to be an integrated and consistent rational decision apparatus. An evolutionary explanation is offered for this, which reinstates Veblen's distinction between adaptation as engineering optima and social selection. Individual identity does only emerge through communication and interaction among brains, in particular via language. The concept of the "extended brain" is proposed, which is applied to define human individuality as a social phenomenon. Thus, the systematic unity of neuroeconomics and institutional economics is established, [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional economics posits a tension between technological progress and institutional change. I reformulate this idea in the context of universal evolutionary theory, starting out from the definition of knowledge as a set of evolving rules with physical substance. From this follows: 1) the theory of the economic agent has to be based on the analysis of phylogenetic constraints on the brain/mind, and 2) the evolution of knowledge manifests the Handicap Principle, in the sense that truthful information in universal systems of communication comes at a loss of adaptive efficiency. This vindicates the original institutionalist theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]