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In November 1986 a Lebanese newspaper revealed the secret arms-for-hostages deal between Tehran and Washington that subsequently became known as the Iran-Contra-Affair. The newspaper had been tipped off by friends of the Iranian radical Mehdi Hashemi who had been arrested shortly before in Iran. This article explores the link between the arrest of the ardent supporter of the then deputy leader Hossein-Ali Montazeri and the secret talks with the US government. The article will show that his arrest was not only an attempt of the then dominant faction around Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to bring the future leader Montazeri under its control, but also an attempt to eliminate a rival actor opposing the rapprochement with the USA and threatening to disrupt the arms-for-hostages deal. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the role of student activism in enhancing or weakening democratization in authoritarian contexts, focusing on the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It contends that while numerous studies indicate that student activism has been crucial in processes of regime change, insufficient attention has been paid to the circumstances under which it contributes to strengthening authoritarian rule. The case of Iran demonstrates that there are two different ways in which this occurs. First, much like many other civil society actors, student activism can be co-opted and at times willingly so because of a coincidence of material and/or ideological interests. Second, even when student activism genuinely pushes for democratization and becomes independent and autonomous from political power, the authoritarian constraints in place can contribute to marginalize it and defeat it. The Iranian case highlights the problems student activism faces when it attempts to disengage from the dominant structures of authoritarian politics, and in line with Jamal's findings, demonstrates how authoritarian structural constraints can undermine the democratic aspirations of well-organised groups. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While dealing with the human rights issue, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), which used to be the main opposition group that fought the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), did not realize that this sensitive struggle would cost it a ‘triple exclusion’. The MKO wished to use international agencies and diplomatic bodies, such as the European Union, the European Parliament, the UN and others, in order to raise the issue of human rights violations in Iran. In general, the aim was to topple the IRI by putting pressure on it through international sanctions and by gathering diplomatic support to replace the IRI with a democratic MKO government. The use of the human rights issue as a tool to gain support resulted in the opposite of what they wished. They became discriminated against by the IRI and excluded from the Iranian and international political spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the political power of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the era of Iranian history following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Specific focus is given to the general militarization of Iranian politics and society during this period. The author identifies the Iranian military state as a "praetorian" one. The authors discuss the social upheavals and protests following the June 12, 2009 elections in Iran, emphasizing the role of civil society in them. They detail the political stability of Iran while describing difficulties caused by this stability for the international community.

The primary aim of this article is to examine the policies of the elite in Iran in relation to political parties and organizations that have emerged between 1979 and 2009. It also attempts to argue that the politics of factionalism has proven to be incapable of creating a viable political system. On the other hand, it has been difficult to anticipate the emergence of a system based on party politics in Iran more than three decades after the revolution. The findings of this article demonstrate how determined the elite were in shaping politics in Iran, and will also show that the move away from factionalism to a system based on party politics between 1997 and 2009 faced stiff opposition from the conservative elite. The situation polarized politics in Iran and further increased intra-elite factionalism. This article relies mostly on Iranian primary sources, accessing opinions that have not yet been published or discussed. The focus is on examining the relationship between high-ranking members of the elite and organizations representing different interests within the system that came to existence either before or immediately after the revolution in 1979. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on Iran's efforts to become a nuclear power, and the efforts of the U.S. to prevent this, particularly through imposing sanctions. The antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century is discussed, and issues related to U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy initiatives are analyzed in this context. It is argued that sanctions have some effect on public opinion, but will not produce direct changes in the policy of Iran's rulers.

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on Iran's efforts to become a nuclear power, and the efforts of the U.S. to prevent this. The antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century is discussed, and issues related to U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy initiatives are analyzed in this context. The Iranian people are said to have shown a desire to normalize relations with the rest of the world. However, it is argued that the country's rulers are more interested in propping up their anti-democratic regime through repressive political violence and electoral fraud.

The article discusses the foreign policy of the government of Iran, as of January 2010. It focuses on the antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. which has prevailed since the late 20th century, and the question of whether Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President Barack Obama will be able to negotiate some form of detente. Iran's attempts to become a nuclear power, and U.S. military operations in two of Iran's neighboring countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, are discussed in this context.

This examination of the changes that have occurred in the relationship between the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the supreme guide during the past 30 years suggests that the Islamic Republic as a theological entity died just before noon on June 19, 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Semitism is deeply ingrained in Shi `i Iran, both religiously and historically. Apart from being the first enemies of Prophet Muhammad, Jews have been been the subject of gross accusations, such as having a desire for world control, exaggerating the dimensions of the Holocaust, committing genocide, using blood in making unleavened bread, and distorting Holy Scriptures. The establishment of a Jewish state, Israel, added a political dimension to the already hostile religious attitude towards the Jews. This hostile religious-political attitude was contained to a large extent under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, but it burst out with vigour after Khomeini and his fellow clerics took over the reins of power in 1979. Faced with the constraints of international game rules and the pressure of a Western public opinion sensitive to expressions of anti-Semitism, the ruling clerics attempted to conceal their anti-Semitism by adopting a number of tactics, such as issuing far fewer public anti-Semitic statements, or by allowing others, through 'freedom of speech', to 'freely' express their anti-Semitic views. This is in line with taqiyyah (concealment) -- one of the basic principles of Shi `i Islam. The primary purpose of this article is to show that in spite of its repeated public announcements in differentiating between 'Jews' and 'Judaism' (the religious dimension), on the one hand, and 'Zionism' and 'Israel' (the political dimension) on the other, the Islamic regime in Iran not only fails to make such a differentiation, but actually often identifies the two as one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the two political factions in Iran, the Jihadi (traditionalist combative) and the Ijithadi (creatively interpretive) and their competition and accommodation since the Revolution. The author argues that US-policy and developments in the region have favoured the Jihadis and enabled President Ahmadinejad to act more intransigently and assertively than would otherwise been the case. At a time of profound shift in the sectarian and strategic balance in the region, the challenge for the US and its allies is to widen the arena for Ijithadis within Iranian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides insight into the potential direction that Muhammad Khatami's administration might take in the areas of economic system, political structure, and foreign policy in Iran. Reference to the assassination of the Ayatollah Khomeini, a revolutionary leader; Factors which have played a crucial role in shaping the Islamic Republic economic policy; Information on United States President Bill Clinton's policy towards Iran.