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President François Hollande entered public office in 2012 with a non-interventionist agenda that promised to draw down French troops in Africa and promoted collective African and European mechanisms to reduce France's military footprint in the region. One year later, the same president deployed 4,000 combat troops to Mali, initially without any multilateral participation. To understand this apparent contradiction between multilateral rhetoric and operational unilateralism, this article looks at France's efforts in previous years to establish African and European military operations in support of the Malian state. The article finds that France's commitment to multilateralism is genuine yet not absolute – meaning that French policy-makers do not shy away from operational unilateralism if conditions on the ground seem to require swift and robust military action, as long as they can count on the political support of key international partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effects of UN peacekeeping and international counterterrorism operations upon the possibilities of peace in Mali. Following the January 2013 French operation Serval, the international intervention was divided between two military missions: UN peacekeeping in Mali and French-led counterterrorism. The article explores what it means to distinguish between peacekeeping and counterterrorism for international conflict management and Malian conflict resolution dynamics. It is argued that the binaries of war and peace, and of intervention and sovereignty, are no longer opposites, but blurred into an emerging ‘new normal’ of permanent military intervention. The construction of a regional counterterrorism governance or militarisation is shown to circumvent the fundamental questions about Malian peace, state sovereignty, and nationhood. The article points to how the international ‘division of labour’ between peacekeeping and counterterrorism defines the possibilities of peace in Mali in relation to the perceived necessities of the ‘global war on terror’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) has become among the deadliest in UN history, suffering from attacks by violent extremists and terrorists. There are strong calls to give UN peacekeeping operations more robust mandates and equip them with the necessary capabilities, guidelines and training to be able to take on limited stabilisation and counter-terrorism tasks. This article conceptually develops UN counter-terrorism operations as a heuristic device, and compares this with the mandate and practices of MINUSMA. It examines the related implications of this development, and concludes that while there may be good practical as well as short-term political reasons for moving in this direction, the shift towards UN counter-terrorism operations will undermine the UN’s international legitimacy, its role as an impartial conflict arbiter, and its tools in the peace and security toolbox more broadly, such as UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the sad track record of the EU Battlegroups has attracted considerable scholarly attention, analyses have largely focused on obstacles related to the provision of the Battlegroup troops and to the consensus within the EU Council, hence taking a supply-side perspective. This article calls for complementing this perspective with an analysis of the demand for their deployment. That implies analysing whether and why the EU Battlegroups were (not) considered as an option by those actors taking the initiative to intervene in a particular crisis. Applying a rational-institutionalist approach, this article explains the absence of the Battlegroups from three recent crises: Libya (2011), Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2013–2014). Using data from document analysis and elite interviews, it shows that once a rapid military reaction became urgent, the EU Battlegroups were not even considered as an option by those initiating an international reaction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The March 2012 coup in Mali opened the door to expanded territorial occupation in northern Mali by Tuareg separatists and subsequently armed Islamist extremists. French forces intervened at the behest of the interim government in Mali. This article examines how various actors frame the conflict to their advantage. While the Malian government and France are allies, the position of various Tuareg actors shift over time as they strategize and weigh the value of allegiance with the French. Local extremist organizations are labeled as terrorists and are targeted as enemies. This article argues that the conflict has been decontextualized and framed within the ‘war on terror’. France’s decision to intervene and to expand their regional military presence, rather than exit, is legitimized by the framing of their intervention as integral to counterterrorism efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discuss various issues in the magazines which includes Operation Serval in Mali, FARC-EP insurgency in Colombia and drone attacks by US in Pakistan.

In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The European Union (EU) is to promote various principles, including peace and justice for human rights violations in its external action, according to the Treaty. In fragile contexts, peace and justice are considered fundamental for contributing to reform that addresses the causes of conflict and prevents recurrence. This paper draws on field research to examine whether and how the EU translated these principles of peace and justice into policy and put them into practice in its response to the crisis in Mali in 2012 by contributing to peace mediation, transitional justice and security sector reform. It demonstrates the importance of considering practice to understand EU foreign policy. It finds that the EU emerged from the crisis a political actor, and although in many ways it promoted reform, in practice it risks supporting business as usual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali were in 2013 given peace enforcement mandates, ordering them to use all necessary measures to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ identified groups in the eastern DRC and to ‘stabilise’ CAR and northern Mali. It is not new that UN missions have mandates authorising the use of force, but these have normally not specified enemies and have been of short duration. This article investigates these missions to better understand the short- and long-term consequences, in terms of the willingness of traditional as well as Western troop contributors to provide troops, and of the perception of the missions by host states, neighbouring states, rebel groups, and humanitarian and human rights actors. The paper explores normative, security and legitimacy implications of the expanded will of the UN to use force in peacekeeping operations. It argues that the urge to equip UN peacekeeping operations with enforcement mandates that target particular groups has significant long-term implications for the UN and its role as an impartial arbitrator in post-conflict countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies of French Africa policy have traditionally focused on its neo-colonial basis and the often corrupt nature of the relations it engendered because of the connivances of semi-official and unofficial networks and covert practices that characterised it. These are often referred to in the literature as la Françafrique. In seeking to understand François Hollande's Africa policy this article moves away from a neo-colonial, Françafrique analytical framework and instead seeks to engage with the continuity versus change debate in French Africa policy through the lens of geopolitics. The three central themes of Hollande's Africa policy—security, partnership and trade—are analysed, focusing firstly on the French interventions in Africa, notably in Mali, since 2012, before discussing French engagement with African regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, and the increasing importance attached to economic and trade links. The article ends with a brief survey of some of the challenges facing French Africa policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the June 25, 2014 United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2164 Authorizing the Revision of the MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) Mandate, along with information on the context of the document. Topics include actions by the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), May 2014 violence provoked by the militant group Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), and international cooperation regarding Mali's crisis.

The January 2013 French military intervention in Mali exposed the rising threat of ‘terrorist’ and illicit networks in the Sahel, but more importantly the intertwined limits of Malian politics and of the international politics of African conflict management. While much has been written about the ‘liberal peace’, this article argues that what is at stake in this debate is the consistency of the ‘liberal peace’ ideological form and what governance requirements it imposes. Such an ideology necessarily intersects with ongoing Malian peace-, nation- and statebuilding dynamics and competing normative orders that transcend state borders and nationalist projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent conflict in the Sahel area is another case where the nexus of terrorism and organized crime causes challenges to the international community. Comparing the situation with that of the Andean region brings forth the challenges faced when dealing with this type of conflict: the states’ weak presence in the remote regions, the insurgents’ ability to offer income and “security” to the people, immediate threat to international investments, unresolved political/regional issues, the marriage of convenience of insurgents/terrorists and organized crime, internal divisions of the insurgent groups and also ideologies surviving or suffering after the elimination of their leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a summary of events in politics and government in Africa from July 2012-2013. A contradiction is discussed between an improving rate of economic development in African countries and an increase in political instability in many countries. The intervention of France in Mali, political violence in Nigeria and a coup d'etat in Central African Republic are among the examples cited of the latter.

The article presents an overview of politics, government and economic conditions in European Union (EU) countries and Turkey from July 2012-July 2013. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis of the eurozone monetary union is considered. France's intervention in Mali is discussed. An increase in euroskepticism in Great Britain is examined. Turkey's foreign relations are discussed.

The structural problems characterising Mali interlocked with the dynamics of crisis triggered by the war in Libya in 2011, causing the collapse of one of the few African democracies. The Tuareg rebellion of 2012, thecoup d’étatand the Islamist takeover of Northern Mali were the three key phases of this crisis, which pushed France – the former colonial patron – to intervene military. After analysing the major local actors involved in the crisis, the article critically analyses the engagement of the EU in the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the impact, or lack thereof, on France's financial austerity measures on the country's national security policy as of 2013. It is argued that budget cuts have not had an effect on France's interventionist policies, as evidenced by its military operation against jihadist rebels in Mali and French President François Hollande's potential support for international invention in the Syrian Civil War. The author sees continuity in the security polices of Hollande and former President Nicolas Sarkozy. Other topics addressed include a lack of support for intervention from the U.S. and the Libyan Civil War.

The authors offer a commentary on the hostage crisis that took place in January 2013 in In Amenas, a town in Algeria which led to the death of at least 39 hostages and 29 militants. A background of the reasons for the occurrence of the hostage crisis at the Tigantourine gas facility is provided. They question the ability of the Algerian authoritarian regime in dealing with the Islamic extremism and terrorism in Mali and explore the implications of the French intervention in Mali.

It is over twenty years since the ‘international community’ embarked on what seems to be an increasingly regular policy of intervening in the internal affairs of states on humanitarian grounds. A massive literature has developed that analyses the theoretical, political, legal, normative and strategic dimensions of humanitarian intervention. This article engages with that literature and attempts to draw a provisional balance sheet for this twenty-first-century activity by examining a number of key cases and analysing the motivations and drivers behind the decision to intervene as well as the practical consequences of the intervention itself. In the context of the recent crises in Libya, Syria and Mali, which are seemingly comparable situations but which have produced significantly different policy preferences on the part of the international community, the article concludes that there are few clear prescriptions as to when intervention is and is not appropriate or justified. The cases examined suggest that, all too often, intervention takes place hastily and in ad hoc fashion with too little thought about the medium- and long-term consequences, which often turn out to be in contradiction with the original motives for intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author reflects on the success of the periodical "African Identities," which celebrates its 11th year in 2013 and the crisis in Mali, a country that has enjoyed a reputation of being one of the successful democratic nations in Africa. The author states that the crisis in Mali originates from the March 2012 coup prompted by the rebellion in the north and the widening gap between the rich and the poor people of the country. The author discusses the French intervention in the Malian conflict.