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Psychiatric evidence may be admissible in cases where provocation is a defence against a charge of murder. It is admissible if it assists the understanding of the defendant's characteristics insofar as they affect the perceived gravity of the provocation. It may shed light on characteristics that put the defence out of reach of some defendants. The leading cases of Ahluwalia {1992}, Humphreys {1995} and Thornton {1996} are used to illustrate how psychiatric evidence is relevant to homicide cases involving the 'battered woman syndrome' (BWS). Two unreported cases are used to illustrate further how psychiatric evidence may support the defence of provocation in BWS cases. It is suggested that such cases require an analysis of the abuse and its effects, elucidation of the defendant's characteristics, attention to the role of intoxication and identification of a real link between the characteristics and what would appear to have been provocative words or behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a murder trial the prosecution sought leave of the court to call the head of medical services of the prison where the defendant had been remanded in custody. It was the defendant's evidence that he had not been present at the scene of the killing. The head of medical services, first in his report and later in a statement, said, however, that the defendant had told him that he had in fact been present. The court confirmed that no privilege attached to the communication between doctor and patient, the evidence was not obtained unfairly and it was not unfair to admit the statement in evidence. The trial judge approved the practice by medical practitioners of informing prisoners at the earliest opportunity that anything they say to a doctor in prison might be used in evidence, and went on to say that it is preferable to note the practice or its implementation on the prisoner's medical record. This case is used to discuss the case law that has established the rules concerning confidentiality in relation to medical consultations, and to suggest practical measures to avoid the difficulties inherent in the disclosure in legal proceedings of information supplied to medical practitioners who have been asked to report on a patient's condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describes a case focusing on the ability of an 18-year-old woman to manage and administer her property since suffering from a brain injury in a road accident. Details of the case; Proposals for changes in the law relating to capacity.

A 21-year-old man attacked a fellow patient in a hospital ward and was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm. Before sentencing, oral evidence was given by a consultant psychiatrist to the effect that the risk of his causing serious harm to the public was low. Nevertheless a restriction order was imposed. He appealed successfully against this imposition. The appeal was upheld on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that he would cause serious harm to the public and that the trial judge, in construing s.41 of the Mental Health Act 1983, had fallen into the trap of applying the adjective 'serious' to the noun 'risk' rather than to 'harm'. This case is considered against the background of the Butler Committee recommendations, which led to the wording of s.41, and in the light of the leading case of Birch, which drew attention to this particular trap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A widow terminated her relationship with a married man. He fetched some personal effects from her house on a Friday afternoon and then called an ambulance. She refused to go in the ambulance and went to her nextdoor neighbour's house. The police and the woman's GP arrived. The GP contacted the local psychiatric hospital. The consultant on call advised her removal by the police to a place of safety and advised the GP to make a recommendation under s. 2 of the Mental Health Act and post it to the hospital. The woman said that as she made to leave the house, she was grabbed by policemen and taken to an ambulance. She was transported to a psychiatric hospital, handcuffed and taken to a locked ward where, at 10 p.m., she was detained under s. 5(2). At 1 p.m. the following Monday she was seen by another consultant who made the second recommendation for detention under s. 2. An approved social worker decided not to apply for her detention. The woman continued to be detained until 10 p.m. that night. She sued for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, trespass and assault. The police and health authority made payments into court which she accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A 38-year-old man charged with unlawfully causing grievous bodily Warm to his wife with intent to do her grievous bodily harm pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm but denied that there was any intent to cause grievous bodily harm. In his evidence the defendant said that he seemed to be like an observer, he could not influence what he was doing and it was like watching himself hitting himself. Medical evidence called in his defence was to the effect that he was in a state of severe depersonalization and was not able to form a specific intent to cause his wife serious harm. Medical evidence called by the Crown was to the effect that dcpersonalization is a disorder not of doing or volition but of the perception of doing or volition and a depersonalized intent is nevertheless an intent. The defendant was convicted by a majority jury of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so. The psychopadiology of depersonalization is discussed and similarities are drawn between this case and cases involving hysterical dissociation where it has been held that the relevant defences are insanity and automatism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]