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In this analysis, we examine the relationship between the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) at the state level in India and the initial policy responses among Indian state governments to the COVID-19 pandemic between January and April 2020. We find that by April 2020, Indian states with a relatively lower ENPP adopted more stringent measures to address the spread of the pandemic while states with a higher ENPP adopted less stringent measures. We hypothesize that it may have been more difficult for states with a larger number of parties to quickly adopt mitigation measures early in the pandemic, while it may have been relatively easier for states with a smaller number of parties. We discuss avenues for future research given the findings and the data presented in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on host-state foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect host-state foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950–2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper, I examine the impact of winning and losing in parliamentary systems on protest behavior. I argue that losers in parliamentary systems with single party, majority governments are more likely to protest than losers in systems with coalition governments. In the empirical analysis, I provide support for my argument using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey from 2001 to 2006. The results suggest that losers in single party, majority systems were more likely to protest than their counterparts in coalition systems. In addition, while it is unclear whether winning and losing had an effect on protest behavior in coalition systems, losers in single party, majority systems were more likely to protest than winners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]