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In the Anthropocene, practicing diplomacy with a renewed emphasis on strategy is critical. However, the implications of the planet's new geological reality – of which climate change is the primary indicator – have not been internalised into policy and practice thus far at both the domestic and international levels. Brazil is no exception. In this article, the strategic diplomacy framework is applied to the Brazilian case as a policy proposal and diagnostic tool to (a) identify the country's strategic climate interest, (b) propose a diplomatic strategy capable of addressing the gravity of the climate crisis, and (c) analyse the factors blocking the development of a national agenda and policy consistent with a climate security scenario. Despite Brazil's vast natural capital, powerful interests in the agribusiness and energy sectors, lack of vision among the ruling elites, and a poorly educated population in a society still marked by high levels of poverty and income inequality have precluded the country from developing a leading role in the global climate arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has proved to be one of the greatest threats to human survival on Earth. Its mitigation requires that the greatest Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emitters adopt low carbon development, reducing emissions substantially. Brazil is among them. Although deforestation is still the main source of Brazilian emissions, since 1990 emissions from energy systems and industrial processes have increased and their shares in total Brazilian emissions have been consistently larger. It is the objective of the article to analyse Brazilian energy-climate policy and politics from 1990 to 2014 in order to clarify Brazilian progress towards low carbon development and Brazilian positions in the international climate change regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessing the changing role of the emerging powers in global climate change negotiations, with special attention to Brazil, we ask why they have agreed to voluntary reductions at home without formalising those commitments in ways that might persuade other large emitters to make similar binding commitments. We argue that for very large emitters, the climate issue does not evince the ‘global commons’ logic often attributed to it. Instead, since their actions can directly affect climate outcomes alone or in small groupings, large emitters are more responsive to domestic cost-benefit calculations, making international commitments based on shifting interest group pressures at home. In Brazil, a coalition of ‘Baptists and bootleggers’ found principled and interest-driven reasons to support new climate commitments after 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]