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The existence of norms in the law that have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, but re-included in the process of forming laws, can cause harm to the rights of citizens that have been guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution, especially if they are placed in the concept of checks and balances. This study has two objectives, namely, first, to analyze the concept of checks and balances and examples of norms that were canceled by the Constitutional Court but revived. Second, the implications of bringing unconstitutional norms to life. This research was conducted using normative juridical research. The results showed that the principle of checks and balances requires that legislative, executive, and judicial powers control each other. Some unconstitutional norms, but re-enacted, are spread through some statutes. The consequences if an unconstitutional article is reinserted into the law, it will threaten the system of checks and balances that have been agreed upon and affirmed in the 1945 NRI Constitution. In order to apply the principle of checks and balances, reviving an unconstitutional clause that has been overturned by the Constitutional Court must be rejected.

One of the features of the presidential system is the process of presidential impeachment. Before the amendment, Indonesia did not have a clear mechanism to impeach the president in the middle of his term. The impeachment of the president is determined by a majority vote in the People’s Consultative Assembly. This is a problem because the impeachment of the president only uses a political process, and there is no legal process in it. After the amendment, the presidential impeachment concept was born that in a presidential system, the president cannot be dismissed only through a political process; there must be a legal process before the political process. Based on the analysis, the process of presidential impeachment in Indonesia does not follow the principle of checks and balances. This is because the impeachment process for the president in Indonesia does not involve the second chamber in the process

The 1945 Constitution as the constitution of the Indonesian state which adopts a distribution of power system accompanied by a mechanism of checks and balances between state institutions based on popular sovereignty. In this case, as the People's Consultative Assembly and the Constitutional Court which have the authority related to the 1945 Constitution directly. Then it contains the research distinction that is the actual inherence of the authority of the People's Consultative Assembly and the Constitutional Court institutions as the guardians of the constitution through a technical review of checks and balances. Therefore, to scientifically strengthen this legal research, a juridical-normative, philosophical and conceptual-critical approach is used. On that basis, it is considered that between the People's Consultative Assembly and the Constitutional Court have actual significance of the checks and balances mechanism on their institutional authority as the guardian of the constitution. Therefore, it has implications for strengthening the institutional authority of the said state institution and realizing the order of legal civilization and democracy in the 1945 Constitution as the state constitution which is the central point of the administration of the Indonesian state as a democratic law state.

Tulisan ini memfokuskan pada 2 (dua) isu utama, yaitu: pertama, bagaimana membangun mekanisme sistem checks and balances dalam mengelola keuangan negara, agar sejalan dengan upaya mewujudkan transparansi dan akuntabilitas pengelolaan keuangan negara? Kedua, bagaimana mengimplementasikan fungsi pengawasan intern pemerintah sebagai bagian dari pengelolaan keuangan negara? Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode yuridis normatif. Pendekatan yang digunakan adalah pendekatan analitis dan yurisprudensi. Sifat dari penelitian yang dilakukan adalah penelitian deskriptif analitis. Mekanisme sistem checks and balances dalam mengelola keuangan negara tidak didukung dengan independensi bendahara pada kementerian/lembaga, karena bendahara diangkat oleh Menteri/Kepala Lembaga sebagai pengguna anggaran/pengguna barang dari kementerian/lembaga yang bersangkutan. Menteri Keuangan sebagai Bendahara Umum Negara tidak memiliki aparat pengawas intern sebagai bagian dari sistem pengendalian intern Bendahara Umum Negara. Inspektorat Jenderal Kementerian Keuangan adalah aparat pengawasan intern Menteri Keuangan sebagai Pengguna Anggaran/Barang. Pemerintah juga perlu melakukan restrukturisasi otoritas pengawasan intern-nya, dengan menempatkan Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP) sebagai aparat pengawasan intern Menteri Keuangan sebagai Bendahara Umum Negara. Bendahara pada kementerian/lembaga direposisi menjadi pegawai negeri Kementerian Keuangan yang ditempatkan di kementerian/lembaga. This paper focuses on two key issues, which are: First, how to build a mechanism of checks and balances system in managing state finance so it will in line with the efforts to achieve transparency and accountability in state finance? Second, how to implement the function of the government internal control as part of the state finance management? The research method used in this paper is normative juridical methods. The approach used in this paper is the analytical and jurisprudential approach. The nature of the research conducted is descriptive analytical research. The checks and balances system mechanism in managing state financeis not supported by the independence of the treasurer at the ministries / agencies, since they are elected by the Minister / Chairman of the Institution as a budget user / users of goods at the ministry / institution. Minister of Finance as State General Treasury officials do not have internal control officials as part of its internal control system. Internal control officers of the ministry of finance is the internal control official Minister of Finance as the Budget User / goods. The government also needs to restructured intern supervisory authorities, by placing the Finance and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) as an internal control official of the Minister of Finance as General Treasurer. Treasurer of the ministries / agencies to be repositioned as a civil servant ministry of finance.

On Research “checks and balances” in legal studies often raises high quality questions such as, does the checks and balances is a doctrine, principle, or legal theory, or maybe precisely the formula of power in politics. History been recorded, that in any discussions regarding the formation of the constitutional separation, division and smelting power is something that is popular to be discussed before and even after becoming the constitution. Therefore, the casting of checks and balances into the constitution is an interesting study to determine the portion and posture.

The Constitutional Court in its decision Number 23-26/PUU- VIII/2010 have been cancelled the applicability of article 184, paragraph (4), which regulates the amount of quorum and approval of quorum in the decision-making process in the Forum related to the plenary meeting house “our opinion the proposal on the right.” In its legal considerations, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the provisions of quorum and the number of quorum approval of 3 / 4 shall be replaced with provisions in decision making on the basis of “simple majority”. This has an impact on the strengthening of the system of checks and balances for the role of legislative control the Executive branch that the abuse of power by the Executive branch can prevent.

Relation between executive and legislative tends to be intricate. Both parties often do not understand the functions and authorities of their respective institutions. At the end, disputes often emerge in playing their roles. This writing tries to discuss the problems concerning two state institutions: the President and the Parliament. The analysis will also address how both institutions manage themselves constitutionally in order not to solely immerse in political interests.