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One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not ‘real’ future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes ‘truly’ future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the great apes to find little doubt that our closest relatives possess such ability. We conclude by urging that future-oriented cognition not be viewed as expression of some select set of skills. Instead, research into future-oriented cognition should be approached more like research into social and physical cognition.

International audience; Using a novel paradigm, Tayloret al.[1] recently investigated whether NewCaledonian crows make causal interventions in comparison to 24-month-oldchildren. They view a causal intervention as the ability, after having onlyobserved a correlation between cause and effect, to produce a novel behaviouralpattern to recreate the same outcome. They conclude that New Caledoniancrows cannot make causal interventions, whereas most children can. Theyalso question whether any previous work has provided evidence for causalinterventions in corvids. We argue that their conclusions are prematurebecause of both methodological and theoretical limitations to their study, andbecause their analysis of previous work is ambiguous.