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En su discurso ante el Parlamento alemán Benedicto XVI sugirió a los políticos democráticos que centraran su atención en el patrimonio cultural de Europa al tener que decidir sobre cuestiones relativas a la dignidad humana. El patrimonio cultural europeo se ha desarrollado a través del encuentro de teólogos cristianos, filósofos estoicos y destacados eruditos del derecho romano. En el Bundestag el Papa expuso el concepto de una ley natural que encuentra sus raíces en la creación y la conciencia. En su discurso hizo referencia a un libro de Wolfgang Waldstein, un renombrado profesor austríaco de derecho romano. El presente trabajo compara la enseñanza sobre la ley natural de Benedicto XVI y Álvaro d'Ors. El artículo considera el conocido texto del jurista romano Ulpiano ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, y la frase de Cicerón: vera lex recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi a la luz de la traducción e interpretación del profesor d'Ors. En el artículo se hace una breve reseña de un catálogo de temas de derecho natural elaborado por Álvaro d'Ors que proporciona una idea sobre su pensamiento jurídico al tiempo que es un buen ejemplo de su concepción personalista del derecho. In his speech to the Bundestag Benedict XVI suggested to democratic politicians to focus their attention to Europe’s cultural heritage when having to decide on questions pertaining to human dignity. The European cultural heritage has developed through the encounter of Christian theologians, Stoic philosophers and prominent scholars of Roman law. In the Bundestag the Pope offered the concept of such a natural law which finds its roots in creation and conscience. In his address Benedict XVI made reference to a book by Wolfgang Waldstein, a renowned Austrian professor of Roman law. The present paper compares the teaching on natural law of Benedict XVI and Álvaro d’Ors. The paper considers the well known text by the Roman jurist Ulpian – ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit – and the sentence by Cicero: vera lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi in the light of the translation and interpretation of Álvaro d’Ors. The paper also comments briefly on a catalogue of subjects belonging to natural law elaborated by Álvaro d’Ors that provides an idea on his legal thinking and is also a good example of his personalist conception of law.

El trabajo pretende dos objetivos: A) Analizar la tolerancia como virtud publica en una sociedad abierta y democratica. Esto hace necesario preguntarse por su justificacion, su funcion en las sociedades actuales y sus limites. Tambien se hace la distincion entre dos tipos de tolerancia: la tolerancia negativa, que equivaldria a soportar pensamientos, opiniones o conductas con las que se esta en desacuerdo, incluso que se rechazan de manera radical, y la tolerancia positiva, que a partir del desacuerdo intentaria comprender las posturas contrarias, poniendose en lugar del otro. B) Estudiar la aportacion a la idea de tolerancia que podemos encontrar en algunas de las novelas de Benito Perez Galdos publicadas a finales de los anos setenta del siglo XIX. Galdos es un observador genial de la sociedad de su tiempo y un creador inagotable de personajes. Su literatura tiene, ademas, una vocacion pedagogica evidente que puede completarse con su compromiso en la politica activa espanola de la epoca cuando lo considero oportuno. La tesis que se quiere mantener en el trabajo es que, con frecuencia, la imaginacion literaria crea la moral social y la vision y valoracion de la conducta humana que mas tarde es objeto de reflexion por los filosofos y de regulacion por parte de los legisladores. Es decir, Galdos al describir situaciones de intolerancia en sus personajes literarios nos esta obligando a pensar sobre los beneficios de la tolerancia y los perjuicios de la intolerancia. Como ejemplo de la practica de la tolerancia positiva se senala la interesante y enriquecedora amistad entre el tradicionalista Jose Maria Pereda, el conservador Marcelino Menendez Pelayo y el liberal Benito Perez Galdos. This paper has two purposes. On one hand, to analyze tolerance as a public virtue in an open and democratic society. This requires asking about its justification, its function in today’s societies and its limits. There is a distinction between two types of tolerance: negative tolerance, which would be equivalent to putting up with thoughts, opinions or behaviors with which one disagrees, even radically rejecting them, and positive tolerance, which, based on disagreement, would try to understand the opposing positions, putting oneself in the place of the other. On the other hand, to study the contribution to the idea of tolerance that we can find in some of the novels of Benito Pérez Galdós published at the end of the seventies of the 19th century. Galdós is a brilliant observer of the society of his time and an inexhaustible creator of characters. His literature has, in addition, an evident pedagogical vocation that can be completed with his commitment in the Spanish politics of the time when he considered it appropriate. The thesis of this work is that, frequently, the literary imagination creates the social morality and the vision and valuation of human conduct that later is the object of reflection by philosophers and regulation by legislators. In other words, by describing situations of intolerance in his literary characters, Galdós is forcing us to think about the benefits of tolerance and the detriments of intolerance. As an example of the practice of positive tolerance, the interesting and rewarding friendship between the traditionalist José María Pereda, the conservative Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo and the liberal Benito Pérez Galdós is pointed out.

Los estudios sobre la política norteamericana y la promoción de la democracia en España durante el franquismo, han sido relegados durante muchos años, al darse por sentada la naturaleza propagandística del discurso público estadounidense. Con el fin de aquilatar cuáles fueron los verdaderos móviles y condicionantes de Washington en sus relaciones con Franco y su régimen, en la primera parte de este artículo se examinan brevemente los cambios operados en las concepciones geoestratégicas norteamericanas a partir de los años 30 del siglo XX. La segunda parte, que constituye el núcleo del trabajo, se centra en el examen del caso español a partir de la documentación sobre España entre los años 1945-1973 conservada en los «National Archives and Records Administration» (NARA) en College Park, Md. The studies on the American democracy promotion policy towards Francoist Spain have been many years relegated once taken for granted the propagandistic nature of the American public discourse. However, in order to assess what were Washington’s real aims and determinants in its relations with Franco and his regime, in the first part of this article we briefly examine the changes operated in American geostrategic conceptions from the 30s onwards. In the second part, in what constitutes the core of this paper, a more detailed focus is put on the examination of the Spanish case from the documentation on Spain between the years 1945-1973 preserved in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Md.

In this paper, I address religion from a legal perspective. I argue that religion should be settled outside the secular legal system; otherwise, the secular legal system would not be truly secular. However, religion demands special protection as a public good and social value, as it constitutes an extrinsic constitutional limit of the legal. For a secular legal system, protecting religion ultimately means protecting human beings’ pursuit of the suprarational. Protecting suprarationality has three important legal consequences: (a) suprarational acts in the strictest sense should never be validated as legal acts; (b) democratic communities should not use suprarational arguments in legal discourse; and (c) the secular legal system cannot regulate suprarationality or the essentials of the religious community. The protection of religion demands both a dualistic structure that distinguishes the political community from the religious community and the treatment of religion as a right: the right to religion.