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This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes' commitments to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different conceptions of necessity in Descartes' framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the impossibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God's essence are absolutely immutable, truths about the essences of God's creation are conditionally immutable, i.e., they can change if God's will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths otherwise without undermining their necessity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main results of the existential analytic of Being and Time is the priority of the possible over the actual in the way of being proper to human existence. Possibility has a foundational meaning in the modal structuring of existence. In this paper, I present the sketch of an existential notion of necessity. Following a path opened by Oskar Becker, I try to uncover the existentially necessary at the limits of projection on existential possibilities, that is, at the authentic historicality of Dasein. Focusing upon the notion of destiny, I present a concept of existential necessity based on the simplicity and obligation of an existence that is conditioned by finitude and finite freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to clarify the moral concept of law in Kant's doctrine of law through the distinction between legal laws and ethical laws, on the basis of the moral laws. However, it points to an inconsistency between this conception and the recognition of the rights of fairness and necessity, on the one hand, and the non-realization of these rights, on the other. It intends to show that the realization of those rights can take place through an appeal to moral principles, omitting the application of laws with unfair consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to discuss Locke's compatibilism, that is, the lokean thesis that freedom is compatible with the natural necessity. To this end, it is analized the chapter Of The Power (XXI, book II of the An Essay concerning Human Understanding), in which Locke clarifies the concepts of freedom and will. Although Locke, at times, involves himself with the incongruent thesis on compatibilism, he is a compatibilist. The impression that Locke would defend incompatibilists' theories ends up being abandoned when we analyze carefully his general argument about will and freedom. Locke literally defends that the volunteer does not differ from the necessary. As a compatibilist, Locke maintains that will is not free. Thus, the free man can not be the one that is free to want. A man regarded as a free agent is the one that has freedom of action, not freedom of will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]