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Raising the question of "genetic engineering" immediately puts people on guard. They are either "fer" it or "agin" it, with little tolerance for more subtle intermediate positions. One observes a headlong dash into camps at opposite ends of the field, tent flaps closed, and shouting from within. Those in one camp view any "tampering" with human genetic material as the first step on the road to the dehumanization of the species; those in the other camp are more cavalier about the new science, believing it just another historical milestone of scientific advancement. The former believe that we are embarking on a voyage that will inexorably lead to the unthinkable-the vulgar redesign of ourselves, as well as the creation of hybrids that live a twilight existence between human and animal, between freedom and enslavement. The latter are more likely to view genetic explorations from a business-asusual perspective, as a venture presenting no qualitatively new problems. The only respect in which these positions are similar is that they share a simplistic view of what promises to be a revolutionary science. To that extent those who hold these views are exquisitely incapable of making the kinds of sober, finely-tuned judgments warranted by genetic prospects. But it is precisely the more extreme and tendentious viewpoints that have been most heard in these matters. Balanced, tentative thinking about difficult issues has too often been edged out by retrenchment into moral absolutes. But at this point our knowledge about genetic engineering is too primitive and fragile to be thrown around in a kind of moral beer bash that does not foresee the next morning's headache. Therefore I propose to sort out some of the main ethical issues generated by the new genetic prospects and to suggest ways of thinking about them. This will involve two major steps. The first is a housecleaning step, an attempt to rid the discussion of some of the conceptual clutter that has diverted attention from the central issues. Essentially this involves exposing what I shall call the "moral fantasies" of certain disputants at both ends of the spectrum. The second is an effort to distinguish and comment upon some of the prominent ethical concerns that ought to occupy scientists and the public alike in assessing our genetic future.