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Introduction Srigupta, a Buddhist philosopher in the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) tradition, was born in Bengal in present-day India in the seventh century. He is best known for his Introduction to [...]

I. Introduction The distinction between 'the two truths' was initially developed to resolve seeming contradictions in the Buddha's teachings. (1) The Buddha teaches that persons should act compassionately, that persons [...]

I. Introduction Several philosophers, in both Buddhist philosophy (see, e.g., Zahavi, Thompson, and Siderits 2011) and Western philosophy (Unger 1979a, 1979b, 1979c; Stone 2005) have claimed that the self does [...]

Both Renaissance Europe and Ming China witnessed an epoch-making declaration of the liberation of the mind, a manifesto that laid the groundwork for the emergence of the modern subjective self. [...]

The Nyaya philosopher Udayana devotes the first chapter of his Atmatattvaviveka (ATV) to refuting the Buddhist thesis of universal momentariness--the view that nothing which exists can persist through time--and to [...]

Introduction and Summary of Previous Article This is the second of two articles describing the influence of Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (Ghazali, d. 1111 C.E.) on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola [...]

Preface Kant has explained his view on modality and modal concepts in general in different sections of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant [1929] 2003) such as the 'Metaphysical Deduction' [...]

Introduction In one of his key texts, the Mulamadhyamakakarika, Nagarjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence. (1) He presents numerous arguments to show that things don't exist [...]

Introduction According to the Buddhist doctrine of Two Truths, there are no persons in our final ontology, but there are persons in our conventional ontology. What does it mean to [...]

In this article, we provide an update on a combined biography of Chambri friends and acquaintances living in their Papua New Guinea home villages and beyond, a biography originally published in 1991 but based on 1987 field research. Incorporating fieldwork extending over the subsequent twenty-eight years, we describe what has happened to some of those we came to know best. In so doing, we address twenty-first century anthropological questions concerning contemporary ontology(ies) and the nature of difference(s) by conveying how these Chambri have continued to seek personal and collective worth, while remaining caught up in an encroaching and shifting regional, national, as well as world system. KEYWORDS: Papua New Guinea, ontologies, histories, biographies, sociocultural change, Anthropology has recently become caught up in debates about ontology(ies) and the nature of difference(s) in a twenty-first-century world where people are rooted in place, go and come through national [...]

Let me begin by thanking my commentators for taking the time to read my book and to write such constructive commentaries. I would also like to thank Christian Coseru for [...]

Introduction The similarities in the philosophies of Parmenides and Sankara (1) need to be better understood than they have been so far. I will argue that the goal they share [...]

Introduction This essay works from the hypothesis that the classical Chinese word wu [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] can be interpreted both as ontic nonbeing and ontological nothingness (1) and [...]

In his article in this issue, ''How do Madhyamikas Think?' Revisited,' Tom Tillemans reflects on his earlier article 'How do Madhyamikas Think?' (2009), itself a response to earlier work of [...]

We thank Brook Ziporyn for a creative and imaginative treatment of our view in a context we had not considered, that of Tiantai theory. Ziporyn's main criticisms of our position [...]

Among all aspects of Dogen's philosophical thought, his theory of time has without doubt received the most attention. Even in English there exist two book-length studies of this topic, (1) [...]

This essay starts with a clarification of the assumption that prima facie all experience is lived embodied experience. Subsequent to a brief allusion to Leibniz' mind-body parallelism and to an identical denial in some Indian schools like Samkhya of any real relation holding between self and body, it is shown how embodiment yet remains in these schools the chief condition of the possibility of experience and voluntary action (karma). Following the inevitable discussion of the question of the reality and distinctiveness of the body is a sympathetic consideration of the concept of bodily subjectivity. The question of the self is then taken up by showing how subjectivity proper belongs to the self, rejecting in the process not only anti-self views but also the view that all subjectivity is exhausted in bodily subjectivity. The question of the layers of subjectivity is then discussed, with emphasis on that reflective subjectivity in which, it is contended, we snap our links with the concerns of the ordinary intentional life and launch ourselves on non-egoistic concerns. Finally, the issue of the possibility of (a) the disembodied existence of the self and (b) experiences in the absence of the present body after death is examined., I I think, from the standpoint of present experience, one can fairly start by saying that all experience is lived embodied experience, though it is clear that such a statement, [...]

Introduction In his book Monad and Thou: Phenomenological Ontology of the Human Being, Japanese philosopher Hiroshi Kojima proposes to redefine the I-Thou relation, first extensively investigated by Martin Buber, and [...]

Introduction: The Concern with Ontology in Tiantai Buddhism The issue of ontology in Zhiyi's Tiantai teaching is the central focus of Mou Zongsan's study Buddha-nature and Prajna wisdom (Foxing yu […]

It is not accidental that many East Asian thinkers have expressed their views on reality in terms that relate to the, perception of space and time--views that are markedly different […]