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There are over 160 different sets of artificial intelligence (AI) governance principles from public and private organizations alike. These principles aspire to enhance AI's transformative potential and limit its negative consequences. Increasingly, these principles and strategies have invoked the language of "risk management" as a mechanism for articulating concrete guardrails around AI technologies. Unfortunately, what "risk management" means in practice is largely undefined and poorly understood. In fact, there are two very different approaches to how we measure risk. One approach emphasizes quantification and certainty. The other approach eschews the false certainty of quantification and instead embraces the inherently qualitative (and correspondingly imprecise) measures of risk expressed through social and political dialogue across stakeholders. This paper argues that the emerging field of AI governance should embrace a more responsive, inclusive, and qualitative approach that is better tailored to the inherent uncertainties and dynamism of AI technology and its societal impacts. And yet this paper also describes how doing so will be difficult because computer science and digital technologies (and, by extension, efforts to govern those technologies) inherently push toward certainty and the elimination of ambiguity. This paper draws upon experiences from other scientific fields that have long had to grapple with how best to manage the risks of new technologies to show how qualitative approaches to risk may be better tailored to the challenges of emerging technologies like AI, despite the potential tradeoffs of unpredictability and uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issue of domestic political pressure arose in the countries Taiwan, China and the U.S. after the re-election of U.S. President Barack Obama, Ma Ying-jeou as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Xi Jimping as President of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Information on the strategic ambiguity policy of the U.S. in the Taiwan strait, national interest of the U.S. in China and the Taiwan Strait Crises of 2003-2006.

The author proposes a resolution to the ambiguity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) through compliance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. He reviews the statutory language of the Convention and cites the difference between the FCPA and the Convention. He explains the need to align the interpretation of the FCPA with international law.

The concept of ambiguity plays an underappreciated and undertheorized role in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. Its importance is difficult to exaggerate. Ambiguity often functions as the determiner of whether an agency's statutory interpretation will receive deference, as well as whether courts will apply the stare decisis standard for statutory interpretation cases instead of the recent principle that agencies can change their interpretations even in the face of a previous conflicting judicial interpretation. The prominence of ambiguity has caused many commentators and courts to proclaim a bright line distinction between interpretive tools that help evaluate statutory clarity and those that resolve statutory uncertainty. Although linguists would agree that ambiguity is unexceptional in normative legal texts due to its ubiquity, the judiciary, which has created a highly idiosyncratic definition, is far more selective about declaring language to be ambiguous. The judiciary's selectivity regarding ambiguity is driven by its conflation of ambiguity identification with ambiguity resolution, which allows courts to determine arbitrarily the context for resolving statutory meaning through the discretionary selection of judicially created, but untested, interpretive tools. This Article addresses the concept of ambiguity from a linguistic perspective and argues that the United States Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine has fostered an unfortunate emphasis on ambiguity. Instead of Chevron's misguided elevation of the explicit ambiguity determination, judicial review should focus on other considerations. Such a commitment would mean the end of the bifurcated review process that distinguishes between ambiguity identification and ambiguity resolution. It would also allow for the consideration of substantive canons of statutory construction equally in agency and nonagency cases. Finally, it would view Chevron's contribution to statutory interpretation as a softening of the strict stare decisis standard that would no longer depend on a previous explicit ambiguity determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]