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The North African Barbary States are usually dismissed as an unimportant, though bothersome, pirate base of little consequence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This thesis challenges that idea by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of Barbary's role in trade and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, especially as it affected Britain and how the British were able to carry out their military and political goals in the Mediterranean. The study is based on the correspondence between the British government and its military leaders in the region, the correspondence and reports generated by British consuls working in Barbary, import/export records, and a database tracking British shipping to and from North Africa during the conflict. To the British, Barbary was not an irritation but an asset. Britain was able to manage Barbary's trade and foreign policy over the course of the twenty-three-year conflict. This was accomplished in two key ways: as a source of supplies for British forces and through the diplomatic role provided by Britain's extensive consul network. Though the North African states were neutral for the majority of both wars, Britain worked strenuously to maintain and increase its trade and diplomacy with Barbary for the benefit of the British armed forces. British trade with Barbary, supported by the British-Barbary diplomatic relationship, directly contributed to British successes in the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsula.

Throughout the age of sail, with the exception of finance, there was no aspect of naval warfare that exhibited as much difficulty and anguish as manning the fleet. Finding the necessary skilled seamen to man warships was the alpha and omega of problems for the Royal Navy, as in wartime it was the first to appear with mobilisation and the last to be overcome. Manning the Royal Navy was an increasing problem throughout the eighteenth century as the Navy and British sea trade continuously expanded. This resulted in a desperate struggle for the scarce resource of skilled manpower, made most evident during the initial mobilisation from peacetime to wartime footing. There is no doubt that the Royal Navy depended on able seamen as if they were the very lifeblood of the ships on which they served. In manning its fleets the Royal Navy had to also consider the merchant marine, which depended upon skilled mariners and supplied the British Isles with food, stores, and the economic income generated by sea trade. The task of manning the fleets proved extremely difficult and was only accomplished under great stress as both the Royal Navy and the merchant marine struggled to obtain the services of vitally important skilled mariners. Therefore the fruits of the Royal Navy’s avid search for seamen during the French Revolutionary Wars must be viewed in light of its success in dominating the oceans of the world. This research proves that the Admiralty of the British Royal Navy was as concerned and as cautious in manning warships as they were in fighting them. It also shows that much of what history has said about naval manning has been based on conjecture rather than fact. This research utilizes statistics to reanalyze naval manning and provide a basis for future research.