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A vital political opposition is one of the cornerstones of democracy, yet we know surprisingly little about the conditions that shape it. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of parliamentary opposition in European Union (EU) politics in five countries: Denmark; Germany; Ireland; Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Based on an extensive hand-coded data set of 7,520 statements made by members of parliament (MPs) during both plenary sessions and deliberations during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings, we examine how institutions and party characteristics shape two types of oppositional behaviour: the expression of critique and the presentation of alternatives. We find that both factors are important for understanding to what extent, and how, opposition is voiced in national parliaments. Oversight institutions’ strength and a party’s degree of Euroscepticism jointly function as significant determinants of the likelihood that MPs will express opposition in the form of critique. However, when it comes to the likelihood of offering alternatives, oversight institutions’ strength fails to explain variations in the share of alternatives, while degree of Euroscepticism remains a significant predictor.

Is oppositional behaviour in legislatures gendered? Despite a growing literature on gender and legislative behaviour, there is a conspicuous absence of research on differences between female and male members of parliament (MPs) when it comes to one of the key aspects of parliamentary debates: the voicing of opposition. This article connects the literature on gender and legislative behaviour with opposition scholarship. We examine the role of gender for oppositional behaviour in four legislatures with a focus on debates concerning European Union affairs. Our results show that female MPs generally are equally likely to express opposition as their male colleagues. This result, however, is conditioned by government status. Whilst there is no significant difference between the proportion of opposition expressed by female and male MPs from opposition parties, we find that male MPs representing government parties express more than twice as much opposition as their female colleagues.

This study attempts to break new ground by systematically comparing oppositional behaviour of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the two key arenas found in parliament: the plenary and the committee. Do MPs express more opposition frontstage in the plenary than backstage in the committee when discussing European affairs? The article sheds new light on political opposition in parliament by using a dataset of hand-coded statements made by MPs during plenary debates and European Affairs committee deliberations in five national parliaments. The results lend strong support to the main hypothesis that MPs express more opposition during plenary debates than committee deliberations.

This study provides new insights regarding how the EU dimension relates to the left-right dimension in national politics. It does so by examining to what extent parties’ oppositional behaviour in EU affairs in parliament is a function of their distance to the government, other parties, the voters and party supporters on the EU dimension and the left-right dimension, respectively. The results suggest that oppositional behaviour is determined by two parallel dynamics: When expressing opposition, political parties are receptive both to the positions of the government and other parties on the EU dimension, and to the positions of voters and supporters on the left-right dimension. Our results thus indicate that the politicization of EU affairs in national parliaments primarily is an elite phenomenon. In their relation to the voters and supporters, parties still primarily navigate along the traditional left-right dimension.

Previous research has looked at how Eurosceptic challenger parties can cause mainstream parties to change their policy positions and bring about adjustments to their programmes. We explore whether this contagion effect extends to the parliamentary behaviour of mainstream parties in European Union (EU) affairs. The empirical analysis is based on a large-scale study of 6215 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committee of Sweden between 1995 and 2016. A dynamic panel analysis of the data shows that the oppositional behaviour of Eurosceptic challenger parties has a significant impact on the opposition statements made in EU affairs by mainstream parties. These findings have important implications for the general understanding of factors that drive national EU opposition.

This article offers a comprehensive comparison of oppositional behaviour in European Union (EU) affairs in six countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. By drawing on a unique data set of hand-coded statements made by Members of Parliament during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings it provides new knowledge on political opposition. The data uncover that there is more opposition expressed in EU affairs than has been assumed by previous research. The results also reveal that there exists considerable cross-national variation in oppositional behaviour during EAC deliberations in the six countries. The study finally shows that Eurosceptic parties are key drivers of opposition in EU affairs, especially when it comes to opposition directed at the EU political system.

The Paradox of Political Opposition in Multilevel Europe: Examining Plenary Debates in Thirteen Parliaments

This article examines patterns of oppositional behaviour in the German Bundestag’s Committee on European Union Affairs (EAC) for two separate legislative periods (2005–2009 and 2009–2013). The study makes two contributions to previous research. It, first, shed some much-needed empirical light on political opposition in the Bundestag by examining how much and what kind of opposition exists in the German EAC. Secondly, the article examines the differences in oppositional behaviour of the Members of Parliament between the two legislative periods following an institutional reform in 2009 that afforded the Bundestag with increased opportunity structures in Europen Union affairs.

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in-depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity-oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alter- natives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understand- ing of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.

The role of American leadership in the UN climate negotiations that produced the 2015 Paris Agreement is examined. First, United States (US) climate goals are identified. Then, utilizing unique survey data collected at eight UN climate summits between 2008 and 2015, the extent to which the US was recognized as a leader by potential followers is investigated. Finally, the extent to which US goals are reflected in negotiation outcomes is evaluated. Recognition of the US as a leader varied over time, peaking at the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Paris, reflecting US leadership in shaping the outcomes of both meetings. Although the results reveal a divided leadership landscape in which the US must compete for leadership with other actors, such as the European Union and China, US leadership was crucial to the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement.

In rhetoric and action the European Union has attempted to be a global leader in forging solutions to confront the problem of climate change. Using unique survey data collected at five consecutive UNclimate summits from 2008–2012, this article provides evidence on the extent to which the EU is actually recognized as a leader in the UNFCCC climate negotiations, investigates how perceptions of EU leadership have evolved overtime, and helps make sense of the role that the EU has played in recent negotiation outcomes. The survey’s findings show that recognition of the EU as a leader dropped sharply in 2009 at the COP 15 summit in Copenhagen, but has climbed again in subsequent years. The results reveal a fragmented leadership landscape in which the EU must share or compete for leadership with other actors, such as the USA and China, who hold drastically different institutional design preferences and leadership visions than those promoted by the EU. The article’s findings provide insight into the dynamics that both foster and frustrate the EU’s aspiration to lead the effort to reach a deal on a binding post-2020 climate change agreement in Paris at COP 21.

This contribution examines the role European Union (EU) leadership played in the outcome of the 2015 COP21 climate summit in Paris. The EU’s attempts to realise its bid for climate change leadership are scrutinised by investigating to what extent the EU is actually recognised as a leader by potential followers and to what extent the EU has succeeded in achieving its negotiation objectives. To address these issues we utilize survey data collected at eight UN climate summits from 2008 to 2015 and evaluate the results of the climate negotiations particularly with respect to the Union’s goal attainment in Copenhagen and Paris. Our findings, which reveal a fragmented leadership landscape in which the EU must adjust its leadership strategies in relation to other powerful actors, such as the United States and China, provide insights into leadership theory and the EU’s prospects for exerting influence as an external actor on the world stage.

This study examines how European Union member states have undertaken constitutional change to adjust to the new conditions that follow from membership in this supranational organization. The article seeks to explain what factors determine why constitutional reform induced by EU membership is sometimes brought about by changing the wording of the constitutional document (explicit change), and sometimes by changing the meaning of the constitution while leaving the constitutional text itself unaltered (implicit change). The current study provides new insights regarding constitutional change by formulating and testing a number of rival hypotheses about what explains cross-national variation in the use of different methods for achieving constitutional reform. The results show that three factors stand out as important determinants for EU-induced constitutional change: constitutional rigidity; public opinion; and the number of cabinet parties.

Constitutional change can be achieved either by changing the explicit wording of the constitutional document, or by way of changing the meaning of the constitution while leaving the constitutional text unaltered. This study systematically compares the use of these different modes of constitutional change in the new EU member states. The results show that implicit constitutional change is the more frequently used method, but also reveal substantial differences between member states. By comparing constitutional change trajectories in the Baltic States, this study reveals that public opinion, constitutional rigidity and constitutional courts stand out as important determinants for EU-induced constitutional change.

Under de drygt två hundra år som förflutit sedan det moderna forskningsuniversitetet såg dagens ljus i dåtida Preussen har vetenskap bevisligen gjort världen bättre. Fyra k:n – kunskap, kreativitet, kritikoch kollegialitet – har utgjort nyckeln till denna exempellösa framgång. Akademins framsteg har dock inte vilat på den demokratisk-politiska logik som genomsyrar dagens samhälle, utan på en parallell och alldeles egen verklighet där ett fritt sökande upprätthållits genom att forskare drivits av sitt engagemang och sin nyfikenhet. När denna anda får råda inom vetenskapen blir det också bra för samhället i stort. Men i det projektsamhälle som alltmer tar form och där tiden, resultaten och utvärderingen är centrala, framstår akademins och vetenskapens sätt att fungera som provocerande. Liksom stora delar av den offentliga verksamheten lever i dag akademin under trycket av kortsiktig resultatleverans.Hur kunde det bli så, och vad gör vi åt det? Denna problematik är temat för Det hotade universitetet, som är redigerad och författad av engagerade forskare, tidigare universitetsrektorer och ämbetsmän som är förskräckta över en utveckling där djup kunskap, vildsint kreativitet, kritiska samtal och kollegialt ansvar kastas på sophögen. Denna utveckling kan inte, och får inte, fortsätta. Då rycker vi undan mattan för mänskliga framsteg och ett civiliserat samhälle. Det är hög tid att försvara de värden som akademin har stått för sedan lång tid tillbaka – inte för att de är traditionella, utan för att de är det modernaste vi har.

Past research has posited that effective leadership is an essential ingredient in reaching international agreements and overcoming the collective action problems associated with responding to climate change. Despite its fundamental importance for leadership relationships, the demand side of the leadership equation has been comparatively neglected in the literature. In this study, we answer several related questions that are vital for understanding the leadership dynamics that impact the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. Are there any leaders in the field of climate change and, if so, who are they? How do followers select climate leaders? What factors are important to them? Using unique survey data collected at four consecutive United Nations (UN) climate summits, Conference of Parties (COP) 14–17, this article investigates which actors are actually recognized as playing a leadership role in the UNFCCC negotiations and probes how followers select leadership candidates in this issue area. The survey findings reveal a fragmented leadership landscape, with no one clear-cut leader, and spotlight that if an actor seeks to be recognized as a leader, it is crucial to be perceived as being devoted to promoting the common good.

After the ambiguous outcome of the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen, the countries of the world, under the auspices of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, are now negotiating to reach a new international climate agreement by the 2015 summit in Paris. The EU, China, and the US are the most influential actors in this process. Utilizing a leadership perspective, this contribution focuses on the interplay of leadership forms, leadership visions, and leadership recognition with regards to the three greenhouse gas giants vying to mobilize support and shape the evolving global climate regime. The chapter analyses recent outcomes and developments in the UNFCCC negotiating process and considers the prospects for a new climate agreement that would be applicable to all parties and enter into force by 2020.

What role does leadership play in facilitating international cooperation in a complex global world beset by a variety of enduring and emerging transnational challenges? Scholars and practitioners alike have pointed to the importance of leadership in surmounting the barriers associated with reaching international agreements and achieving cooperative solutions. This chapter examines the relationship between international cooperation and leadership by critically reviewing the important contributions that have been made concerning the conceptualization of leadership, the motives actors have for engaging in leadership behavior, the sources of leadership influence, as well as the various modes of leadership that aspirants of international influence can utilize. It also highlights recent research that has focused on the demand side of leadership, leadership recognition, the factors that influence how followers select leaders, and the impact leadership exerts on international cooperation and negotiation outcomes. The chapter closes by pointing to new research frontiers that scholars of international leadership would profit from better addressing in the future, such as the need to increase our knowledge concerning shared leadership and the role of leadership in the post-negotiation and implementation phases of multilateral cooperative endeavors.

This article explores the under-researched issue of how constitutional change is brought about in modern democracies. Despite the fundamental importance of constitutions, we know surprisingly little about whether constitutional change is achieved by changing the explicit wording of the constitutional document, or by way of changing the meaning of the constitution while leaving the constitutional text unaltered. Which is the more common method and what variations in the use of these different methods are there in democratic political systems? This study systematically compares the use of explicit and implicit constitutional change in European Union (EU) Member States. The results show that implicit constitutional change is the more frequently used method, but also reveal substantial differences between EU countries. The article closes by discussing the road towards a theory of constitutional change. It does so by presenting five testable propositions that could lay the foundation for a theory of constitutional change., Hur regleras EU-medlemskapet?

Debattartikel, sidan 5 i del 1.

It has been widely recognised that national courts play a significant role in the process of European integration. By asking the European Court of Justice for preliminary rulings, national courts have contributed in promoting legal integration. Although previous research has recognised the importance of national courts, we still have only limited empirical knowledge on how they act. This article examines whether national courts act as promoters of legal integration or defenders of the national interest. It does so by providing a systematic investigation of: 1, what type of cases they refer to the ECJ, and 2, what type of opinions they attach with preliminary references. The article utilise data from all 67 cases referred to the ECJ during the period 1995-2009. The results indicate that Swedish courts act strategically to balance the claims of providing the ECJ with preliminary references and the demands for taking national considerations into account.

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Debattartikel publicerad online 2013-03-09.

This article utilizes a leadership perspective to analyze the ambiguous outcome of the 2009 UN climate summit in Copenhagen. By considering follower perspectives, using unique survey data to empirically identify the leading actors in the climate negotiations, and examining the goals, strategies, and interplay of the different leadership forms of all the main leadership candidates, we are able to give a fuller picture of the importance of leadership in international negotiations and what role leadership played at the COP-15 conference. In addition to the insights generated concerning the dynamics that led to the Copenhagen Accord, the article contributes to the leadership scholarship by illustrating the importance of an analytical framework that incorporates the demand side of leadership, the supply side of leadership, the interplay of leadership visions and forms, and the fit between these elements. We conclude by discussing the implications that our findings hold for future UNFCCC climate negotiations., Clipore

Leadership is an essential ingredient in reaching international agreements and overcoming the collective action problems associated with responding to climate change. In this study we aim at answering two questions that are crucial for understanding the legitimacy of leadership in international climate change negotiations. Based on responses of three consecutive surveys distributed at COPs 14-16 we seek first to chart which actors are actually recognized as leaders by climate change negotiation participants. Secondly, we aim to explain what motivates COP participants to support different actors as leaders. Both these questions are indeed crucial for understanding the role, importance, and legitimacy of leadership in the international climate change regime. Our results show that the leadership landscape in this issue area is fragmented, with no one clear-cut leader, and strongly suggest that it is imperative for any actor seeking recognition as climate change leader to be perceived as being devoted to promoting the common good., Clipore

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There is widespread consensus that effective leadership will be required in order to successfully address the climate change challenge. Presently there are a number of self-proclaimed climate change leaders, but leadership is a relationship between leaders and followers. An actor aspiring to be a leader needs to be recognized as such. Despite its fundamental importance for leadership relationships, the demand side of the leadership equation has been comparatively neglected by past research. In this study we are looking for leaders by analyzing the perceptions of climate change leadership among UNFCCC COP-14 participants. Our results show that the climate change leadership mantle will have to be worn by more than one actor. Among the leadership candidates the EU was most widely recognized as a leader, however, only a small minority reported that they saw the EU as the only leader. The data also show that the US and the G77 thus far have failed to impress potential followers and it was China that clearly emerged as the second strongest leadership candidate.

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Sidan 5 i del 1.Webbversion på UNT.se med rubriken Styrsystem utan styrsel.

Scholars have argued that the Convention method has democratised the process of treaty reform and increased the legitimacy of EU constitutionalization. This study finds that the Convention method has contributed to a slightly more democratic process, but has not in any fundamental way improved the democratic status of the EU’s treaty reform process. We should accordingly not be too concerned over the future fate of the Convention method. From a democratic perspective we should be more worried over the possible scenario that future changes to the EU’s institutional structure will come about through implicit constitutional change without any formal changes being made to the treaties. The cumbersome ratification process could thereby be bypassed. This, however, would deprive EU citizens of the only real opportunities they have of influencing decisions on the overall design of the integration project.

This article examines the nexus between the EU’s goal of being a leading actor on the world stage in devising a global solution to the threat of climate change and the performance of its member states in meeting their climate change obligations. In doing so the article will discuss the concept of EU leadership, examine the modes of leadership the EU has employed in pursuing its climate protection objectives, scrutinise the extent to which EU member states are actually living up to their Kyoto obligations, and analyse how the EU’s own performance, credibility, and legitimacy in this area affects its aspirations to be a key norm-entrepreneur in the establishment of a post 2012 climate change agreement. The article concludes with a balance sheet of some of the Union’s key successes and failures and closes by highlighting some potentially inconvenient truths that might frustrate the EU’s climate protection aspirations., Clipore

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Clipore

s. 8-9 i Clipore : a mistra-funded climate policy research program : Annual Report 2009., Clipore

Negotiations in Amsterdam 1996 and Nice 2000 resulted in deadlocks impossible to break. The failure of these Intergovernmental Conferences gave rise to demands for a new and improved process of treaty reform. The answer offered by the European Council in Laeken was to create a Convention with a mandate to prepare the next reform of the treaties. The broad composition of this Convention raised hopes for a process not exclusively defined by bargaining on behalf of national interests, but rather a more open process where actors would be prepared to listen to each other's arguments. Today, we find two divergent images of deliberation in this body. The first sees the Convention as a deliberative success story; the second argues bargaining dominated the proceedings. However, this far the empirical evidence in support of either claim has been inconclusive. On the basis of interviews with 28 conventioneers, this article ventures a 'final verdict' on the matter, arguing that deliberation was, indeed, a defining characteristic of the proceedings.