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The article offers information on a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, which highlights Senate consideration of treaties and nominations. It mentions final vote on agreeing to the resolution of ratification. It also mentions the Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, governs committee procedure for treaties and resolutions of ratification.

The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the Convention) was adopted at the Hague Conference on Private International Law on November 23, 2007. The Convention contains procedures for processing international child support cases that are intended to be uniform, simple, efficient, accessible, and cost-free to U.S. citizens seeking child support in other countries. The United States was the first country to sign the Convention. For many international cases, U.S. courts and state Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agencies already recognize and enforce child support obligations, whether or not the United States has a reciprocal agreement with the other country. However, many foreign countries will not enforce U.S. child support orders in the absence of a treaty obligation. On August 30, 2016, President Obama signed the instrument of ratification for the Convention. On September 7, 2016, the United States deposited its instrument of ratification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the depository for the Convention. Thirty-three other countries, including the European Union, have also ratified the Convention. Although it is not the Senate’s role to ratify treaties, it provides its advice and consent to a treaty’s provisions. On September 29, 2010, the U.S. Senate approved the Resolution of Advice and Consent regarding the Convention. Implementing legislation for the Convention was included in the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 4980), which was enacted into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. 113-183. H.R. 4980 was passed by the House on July 23, 2014 (by voice vote under suspension of the rules), and by the Senate on September 18, 2014 (by unanimous consent). P.L. 113-183 included provisions that would implement the Convention. Specifically, it contains several provisions related to the international enforcement of child support orders. It contains provisions designed to improve child support collections in cases where the custodial parent and child live in one country and the noncustodial parent lives in another country. It ensures that the United States is compliant with the Convention and any other multilateral child support enforcement treaty and, requires states to update their Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) law to incorporate any amendments adopted as of September 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Additionally, P.L. 113-183 facilitates greater access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) by foreign countries and tribal governments as part of improving child support collections. P.L. 113-183 also allows the federal income tax refund offset program to be available for use by a state to handle CSE requests from foreign reciprocating countries and foreign treaty countries. Once the Convention is in force (January 1, 2017) it would apply to cases being worked between countries that are party to it (currently 34 countries, including the United States and the European Union). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the history that highlights the U.S. position on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which it has not ratified as of June 2015. Topics include the September 2015 move of U.S. President Bill Clinton to submit the CTBT to the U.S. Senate, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush's nuclear posture review and nuclear testing, and the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama and its position on the CTBT.

An appendix is presented of the ratification process for arms control treaties signed by the U.S.

The article discusses the nuclear nonproliferation treaties entered into the by the U.S. Topics covered include the uniqueness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist nations in their peaceful nuclear programs and the ratification by the U.S. of the protocols to the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ).

The article reports on the ratification in the U.S. and in Russia of the new strategic arms reduction treaty (new START). Topics include the submission of the treaty package by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama to the Senate which includes the Protocol, treaty text, and Annexes, the submission of the treaty by Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev for approval of the Duma and Federation Council of the Russian Parliament, and the treaty's entrance into force and implementation.

The article offers a report on the central limits and key provisions of the new strategic arms reduction treaty (new START) between the U.S. and Russia which was signed by both parties on April 8, 2010. Topics discussed include the limits on delivery vehicles consisting of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and warheads. Also discussed are the ratification process, military forces under the treaty, and issues for U.S. Congress.

The article reports on the policy issues associated with the U.S. ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Topics discussed include U.S. policymakers' concern over the impact of the CRPD on national sovereignty, the argument of the proponents of the CRPD that existing U.S. laws exceed the requirements of the Convention, which means that no threat to sovereignty exists, and questions regarding the role of the Disabilities Committee.

The article discusses the January 2015 study of the U.S. Congressional Service Research titled "United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities: Issues in the U.S. Ratification Debate" by Luisa Blanchfield and Cynthia Brown. Topics discussed include the U.S. administrative and Senate actions taken in connection with the Convention, the key issues in the ratification debate and the laws that protect the rights of people with disabilities in the U.S.

The article describes the process of treaty ratification in the U.S. where responsibilities of the President and the Senate are outlined in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Topics include the amended Arms Control and Disarmament Act, executive agreements that are not approved by the U.S. Congress such as the 1963 Hot Line Agreement and the 1973 Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. Conditions for Senate approval under Senate Rule XXXl are also discussed.

An appendix on the U.S. treaty ratification process is presented.

The article focuses on the ratification process of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that was signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2014. It discusses the hearings on the treaty held by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that started in April 2009, the approval of the Resolution of Ratification by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the difficulty experienced by then-President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev in getting approval from the Russian Parliament.

The article discusses the ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010. Topics discussed include the components of the treaty package, the meeting held by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to mark up the Resolution of Ratification for New START and the submission by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev of the treaty to the Parliament.

The article focuses on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010. Topics discussed include the provisions of the NEW Start, the monitoring and verification regime in the treaty, the limits set by the treaty on delivery vehicles and warheads and the ratification of the treaty by both parties. Also included are charts showing the limits in START, Moscow Treaty and New START and the U.S. strategic nuclear forces under New START.

The article discusses the influence of the U.S. Congress on the implementation of U.S. President Obama's plan to pursue additional reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons. It highlights the dependence of the this influence on the mechanism the administration uses to reduce U.S. nuclear forces, the need for the U.S. to submit a new arms control treaty with Russia for ratification, and authorization and appropriations required if Obama seeks to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons unilaterally.

The article explores the ratification process observed by the U.S. and Russian legislative bodies before signing the New START Treaty. Several meetings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee are explored, which heard testimonies from former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The process on coming with the implementing rules for the treaty are explored.

An appendix is presented regarding the U.S. treaty ratification process related to arms control.

The article discusses the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which aims to ban the development, production, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical and toxin weapons. It claims that there are 188 countries that have ratified the treaty, which became effective on April 29, 1997, as of July 2013. It cites the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the responsible party to monitor the implementation of the CWC.

The article discusses the U.S. and Russian ratification processes of the New START Treaty. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama submitted the treaty to the Senate on May 13, 2010 while Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev to the Russian Parliament on May 28. It then details the enforcement and implementation of the treaty after U.S. Secretary Hillary Clinton and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification on February 5, 2011.

The article focuses on a report titled "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress as of July 12, 2013. Topics discussed include the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Treaty signed between the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010, ratification process of the U.S. and Russia to implement the treaty and a table showing U.S. strategic nuclear forces under the new treaty.

The article focuses on national policies toward nuclear weapons testing and the enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) . U.S. President Barack Obama promised in 2009 that he will pursue the ratification of the CTBT. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. considers the prevention of nuclear proliferation and terrorism as its key objectives. France and Great Britain currently have their own separate stockpile stewardship programs.

The article discusses the developments in the New STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010. It focuses on the issues tackled by the U.S. Congress during its ratification process for the treaty. It claims that the New START aims to provide transparency and openness for both parties in order to achieve strategic stability.

The article discusses the developments of the New STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010. It focuses on the ratification process for the treaty by the U.S. Congress, which received the treaty from the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama on May 13, 2010. Hearings on the treaty were conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

An appendix is presented of the U.S. treaty ratification process.

The article highlights the U.S. and Russian Resolution Ratification for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Strategy (START). It mentions activities under the treaty that were carried out by the U.S. and Russia. A joint statement on the sharing telemetry on missile test launches were signed by both countries. Data exchanges released by the two nations indicated the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), heavy bombers and warheads.

The article discusses the limitations and important provisions of the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START). It explores the measures of the U.S. and Russian forces under the New START and describes the U.S. and Russian ratification process. It discusses issues facing the U.S. Congress, including the stability of the New START, its monitoring and verification, ballistic missile defenses, non-strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation and arms control after New START.

An appendix is presented which outlines important events concerning the international effort to ban nuclear test and to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CBCT) from 1992 to 2009.

The article cites several arguments in favor and against the possible ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Proponents of the CTBT see it as an important step toward nuclear non-proliferation, also asserting that the U.S. stockpile stewardship program has improved its capabilities to maintain nuclear weapons without explosive testing. Meanwhile, opponents of the CTBT believe that a nuclear deterrence strategy is vital to U.S. national security.

The article describes the differing positions of the world's major nuclear powers on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It notes that Great Britain and France were the first of the original five nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, adding that the two nations have decided to pool together their nuclear stockpile stewardship resources in 2010. It adds that Russia has ratified the CTBT in 2000, but both China and Pakistan have not yet signed the treaty as of December 2012.

An overview of the historical background and recent developments related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is presented. It reports that as of December 7, 2012, 183 nations have signed the CTBT, but the U.S. has yet to ratify the treaty, although it has refrained from conducting nuclear explosion tests since 1992. In addition, the U.S. Congress is considering a fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget request of 7.577 billion U.S. dollars for its nuclear stockpile stewardship program.

The article discusses the ratification of the New START Treaty by the U.S. Senate. Twelve hearings were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee starting on April 2009 and received testimony from more than 20 witnesses including former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger. The Senated Armed Services Committee held a total of 8 hearings and briefings while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up the Resolution of Ratification on September 16, 2012.

The article reports the ratification of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 by U.S. President Barack Obama on November 16, 2012. The legislation is passed in response to the initiative of the European Union to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from international flights under the Emissions Trading Scheme. An overview of the negotiation with the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization is also discussed.

The article presents the report "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions" released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of November 30, 2012. Topics discussed include central limits on delivery vehicles and warheads, implementation of the U.S. and Russian ratification process, and monitoring and verification of the ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Task (START) treaty signed between the U.S. and Russia.

An appendix is presented of the U.S. treaty ratification process.

The article discusses the ratification process of both the U.S. and Russia for the New START Treaty. In the U.S., the treaty's approval must have a vote of two-thirds of the Senate. The Senate approved the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of 71-26 on December 22, 2010. In Russia, the treaty was supported by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma and approved it by a vote of 350-96 on January 25, 2011. Instruments of ratification for the treaty were exchanged on February 5, 2011.

The article describes the ratification of the New strategic arms reduction treaty (START) by the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. Senate approved the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of 71-26 and U.S. President Barack Obama signed the instruments of ratification in February 2011. On January 26, 2011, the upper chamber of Russia's parliament, the Federation Council, approved the ratification of the treaty and Russian President Medvedev signed the instruments of ratification on January 28, 2011.

The article offers information on the report "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of December 7, 2011. Topics discussed include adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.N General Assembly, nuclear testing by the U.S., and nuclear testing by North Korea. Also mentioned are nuclear disarmament and ratification of Indonesia with the treaty.

The article discusses a report about the issue of the U.S. ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The CEDAW addressed the rights of women and calls on state parties to act on the elimination of any form of discrimination against women. The report examines the policy and issues of the U.S. in its ratification debate. An overview of the background, objectives and structure of CEDAW is provided.

The article discusses some issues and policy options that play a role in the debate for the U.S. ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The issue of national sovereignty in the debate of U.S. ratification of CEDAW is discussed. The effectiveness of CEDAW as a mechanism for addressing women's rights internationally is said to be a major point of contention among opponents and supporters of the U.S. ratification.

The article focuses on the process of treaty ratification by the U.S. Constitution.

A variety of aids that relate to articles that appeared in the March 23, 2011 issue of the journal "Congressional Research Service" is presented.

The article outlines the negotiations that occurred between the U.S. and Russia prior to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty in 2002. It focuses on the different positions of the two countries with respect to the form and content of the Treaty. The article notes that the principle behind the content of the Moscow Treaty reinforces the U.S. proposals for limits and counting rules, transparency, and verification. Analysts affirm that in form, the Treaty supports Russia's desire to have a legally binding agreement with the U.S. on arms reduction.

This report provides an introduction to the roles that international law and agreements play in the United States. International law is derived from two primary sources—international agreements and customary practice. Under the U.S. legal system, international agreements can be entered into by means of a treaty or an executive agreement. The Constitution allocates primary responsibility for entering into such agreements to the executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become binding upon the United States, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. Secondly, Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Thirdly, many treaties and executive agreements are not self-executing, meaning that implementing legislation is required to provide U.S. bodies with the domestic legal authority necessary to enforce and comply with an international agreement’s provisions. The status of an international agreement within the United States depends on a variety of factors. Self-executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to state law, and inferior to the Constitution. Depending upon the nature of executive agreements, they may or may not have a status equal to federal statute. In any case, self-executing executive agreements have a status that is superior to state law and inferior to the Constitution. Treaties or executive agreements that are not self-executing have been understood by the courts to have limited status domestically; rather, the legislation or regulations implementing these agreements are controlling domestically. The effects of the second source of international law, customary international practice, upon the United States are more ambiguous and controversial. While there is some Supreme Court jurisprudence finding that customary international law is part of U.S. law, conflicting U.S. statutes remain controlling. Customary international law is most clearly recognized under U.S. law via the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which establishes federal court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by aliens for violations of “the law of nations.” Recently, there has been some controversy concerning references made by U.S. courts to foreign laws or jurisprudence when interpreting domestic statutes or constitutional requirements. Historically, U.S. courts have on occasion looked to foreign jurisprudence for persuasive value, particularly when the interpretation of an international agreement is at issue, but foreign jurisprudence never appears to have been treated as binding. Though U.S. courts will likely continue to refer to foreign jurisprudence, where, when, and how significantly they will rely upon it is difficult to predict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of the state congress in referring Article V Convention amendments in the U.S. Topics discussed include logical progression of the ratification process, determination on the condition of convention-proposed amendment, and initiative of U.S. Senator Sam Ervin regarding the right of the Congress to withhold an amendment on the grounds of failure of the amendment or procedural irregularities in the convention.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties currently bar all but underground tests with a maximum force equal to 150,000 tons of TNT. The Natural Resources Defense Council states the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006. Since 1997, the United States has held 23 "subcritical experiments" at the Nevada Test Site to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia reportedly held some since 1998. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CTBT in 1996. As of November 17, 2009, 182 states had signed it; 151, including Russia, had ratified. Of the 44 that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, 41 had signed and 35 had ratified. Five conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently in 2009. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate. In October 1999, the Senate rejected it, 48 for, 51 against, 1 present. It is on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's calendar. It would require a two-thirds Senate vote to send the treaty back to the President for disposal or to give advice and consent for ratification. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, "my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." U.S. ratification would be followed by a diplomatic effort to secure ratification by the remaining states that must ratify for the treaty to enter into force. Past nuclear testing treaties have been accompanied by "safeguards," unilateral measures consistent with the treaties that the United States can take to buttress its nuclear intelligence and weapons. President Clinton conditioned his support for the CTBT on a package of safeguards, and President Obama said in his Prague speech, "As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies." Thus, safeguards may accompany a future CTBT debate. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. It considers the Stockpile Stewardship Program (listed as Weapons Activities), which seeks to maintain nuclear weapons without testing; the FY2010 appropriation is $6.384 billion. Congress considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests. The FY2010 request is $26.0 million. This report will be updated. For a detailed presentation of pros and cons, see CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan Medalia. For a discussion of safeguards and the CTBT, see CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments, by Jonathan Medalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2007, leaders of the European Union (EU) signed the Lisbon Treaty. With the completion of ratification by the Czech Republic on November 3, 2009, all 27 EU member countries have ratified the document, and it is expected to come into force on December 1, 2009. The Lisbon Treaty reforms the EU’s governing institutions and decision-making process to enable the EU to operate more effectively. The treaty grew out of the proposed “constitutional treaty” that foundered after French and Dutch voters rejected it in referendums in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice with the creation of a new position, President of the European Council. This individual will chair the activities of the 27 EU heads of state or government, working to facilitate consensus and ensure policy continuity, guide the strategic direction of policy-making, and give the EU greater visibility on the world stage. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty creates the new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a de facto EU foreign minister who would be supported by a new EU diplomatic service. The Lisbon Treaty makes changes to the EU’s internal decision-making mechanisms. These changes have been designed to streamline the process and make it less susceptible to gridlock or blockage by a single member state. The treaty attempts to address concerns about democratic accountability and transparency in EU policy-making by granting a greater role to the directly elected European parliament, national parliaments, and citizens’ initiatives. The Swedish Presidency of the EU is planning to use a special EU Summit, probably taking place in mid-November 2009, to resolve remaining institutional questions about the treaty’s implementation. A number of important decisions need to be made, including who to appoint to the new President and “foreign minister” positions, and how the exact role of these positions will be defined. Experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty would have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations. While the treaty is unlikely to have major effects on U.S.-EU trade and economic relations, some believe that it could allow the EU to move past its recent preoccupation with distracting internal questions and take on a more active and effective role as a U.S. partner in tackling global challenges. There are indications that adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would make the EU more amenable to future enlargement, including to the Balkans and perhaps Turkey, which the United States strongly supports. On the other hand, skeptics maintain that a stronger EU poses a potentially detrimental rival to NATO and the United States. This report provides information on the Lisbon Treaty and possible U.S.-EU implications that may be of interest to the 111th Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the report "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of November 23, 2009. Topics discussed include the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), reports on nuclear tests performed by several countries including the U.S., and nuclear testing treaties. Also mentioned are U.S. ratification of treaties, and the role of United Nations in controlling nuclear weapons and nuclear policies.

In December 2007, leaders of the European Union (EU) signed the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty aims to reform the EU’s governing institutions and decision-making process to enable the 27-member EU to operate more effectively. This new treaty grew out of the proposed “constitutional treaty” that foundered after French and Dutch voters rejected it in referendums in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice with the creation of a new position, President of the European Council. This individual would chair the activities of the 27 EU heads of state or government to help ensure policy continuity, guide the strategic direction of policy-making, and give the EU greater visibility on the world stage. The President would also coordinate relations between EU institutions. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty would create the new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a de facto EU foreign minister who would be supported by a new EU diplomatic service. The Lisbon Treaty would make changes to the EU’s internal decision-making mechanisms. These changes have been designed to streamline the process and make it less susceptible to gridlock or blockage by a single member state. The treaty attempts to address concerns about democratic accountability and transparency in EU policy-making by granting a greater role to the directly elected European parliament, national parliaments, and citizens’ initiatives. The treaty must be ratified by all 27 members before it can come into force. Twenty-five countries have completed ratification. The treaty overcame a major hurdle when Ireland overwhelmingly approved it in a referendum on October 2, 2009. The vote was Ireland’s second attempt to ratify—Irish voters initially rejected the document in a June 2008 referendum. The Polish and Czech parliaments have approved the treaty, but full ratification by those two countries is still pending presidential signatures. Observers are concerned that the Czech President, in particular, may delay ratification. Nevertheless, the EU has now begun to prepare for the treaty to take effect in early 2010. The Swedish Presidency of the EU is planning a Summit in late October 2009 to resolve remaining institutional questions about the treaty’s implementation. Such a Summit would likely feature vigorous debate about appointments to the new President and “foreign minister” positions. Experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty would have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations. While the treaty is unlikely to have major effects on U.S.-EU trade and economic relations, some believe that it could allow the EU to move past its recent preoccupation with distracting internal questions and take on a more active and effective role as a U.S. partner in tackling global challenges. There are indications that adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would make the EU more amenable to future enlargement, including to the Balkans and perhaps Turkey, which the United States strongly supports. Others maintain that a stronger EU poses a potentially detrimental rival to NATO and the United States. This report provides information on the Lisbon Treaty and possible U.S.-EU implications that may be of interest to the 111th Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2007, leaders of the European Union (EU) signed the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty aims to reform the EU's governing institutions and decision-making process to enable the 27-member EU to operate more effectively. This new treaty grew out of the proposed "constitutional treaty" that foundered after French and Dutch voters rejected it in referendums in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice with the creation of a new position, President of the European Council. This individual would chair the activities of the 27 EU heads of state or government to help ensure policy continuity, guide the strategic direction of policy-making, and give the EU greater visibility on the world stage. The President would also coordinate relations between EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty would also create the new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a de facto EU foreign minister who would be supported by a new EU diplomatic service. The Lisbon Treaty would make changes to the EU's internal decision-making mechanisms. These changes have been designed to streamline the process and make it less susceptible to gridlock or blockage by a single member state. The treaty attempts to address concerns about democratic accountability and transparency in EU policy-making by granting a greater role to the directly elected European parliament, national parliaments, and citizens' initiatives. The treaty must be ratified by all 27 members before it can come into force. Twenty-three countries have completed ratification. Ireland is the only member state bound by law to hold a referendum on the treaty, and in June 2008 Irish voters rejected it. Ireland plans to hold a second referendum attempting to pass the treaty on October 2, 2009. The EU negotiated concessions with Ireland to improve the chances of approval, and recent polls support an analysis that the treaty is likely to pass the second time—but the final vote is expected to be close and a "Yes" result is not guaranteed. Germany is expected to complete ratification this month. The Polish and Czech parliaments have approved the treaty, but full ratification in those countries requires a presidential signature. Observers are concerned that the Czech President, in particular, may delay ratification. If Ireland ratifies the treaty, the Swedish Presidency of the EU is planning a Summit in late October 2009 to resolve remaining institutional questions about the treaty's implementation. Such a Summit would likely feature vigorous debate about appointments to the new President and "foreign minister" positions. If the Lisbon Treaty fails, the most likely scenario is that the EU will move forward under the current rules of the Treaty of Nice. Experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty would have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations. While the treaty is unlikely to have major effects on U.S.-EU trade and economic relations, some believe that it could allow the EU to take on a more active global role and be a more effective partner for the United States in tackling common global challenges. If the treaty fails, the EU may continue to be preoccupied with distracting internal questions. There are indications that adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would make the EU more amenable to future enlargement, including to the Balkans and perhaps Turkey, which the United States strongly supports. Others maintain that a stronger EU poses a potentially detrimental rival to NATO and the United States.This report provides information on the Lisbon Treaty and possible U.S.-EU implications that may be of interest to the 111th Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship. They are currently negotiating a new Treaty that would replace START. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information-or monitor-these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They also have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other's compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START in mid- 2006. During the Bush Administration, they were unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty's provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed at their meeting on April 2, 2009, to pursue "new and verifiable reductions" in their strategic offensive arms. The two sides are now pursuing negotiations on the new Treaty. The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse or they could extend START for five years. They could extend START, then amend it to ease some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new Treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations. This report will be updated as needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]