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This paper rethinks the relationship between rights protection and global constitutionalism by taking on the issue of the latter’s corresponding political order in the light of looming transnational emergency powers. By removing the veil from the aggregate power structure underlying global constitutionalism, it makes a twofold argument about global constitutionalism. First, in contrast to the separation of powers in domestic constitutional orders—which operates as a structure of “articulated governance” based on the logic of articulation—the structure of aggregate power prevents transnational governance from growing into another all-powerful sovereign creature—what will be called “control by aggregation.” Yet such control is limited. With respect to a transnational state of emergency such as that illustrated by the Eurozone crisis, this paper further argues that the structure of control by aggregation founders when constituent sovereign states continue to be the masters of international relations. To tame transnational executive power, a rethinking of global constitutionalism along the lines of articulation is suggested. Non-sovereign constituent regimes under multilevel constitutional ordering can act as an irritant to force sovereign states to articulate emergency actions, paving the way to opening shadowy transnational administration to public scrutiny.

Olympic stadia are often regarded as a political showcase involving a range of influences: the host nation’s international politics, the interests of transnational capitalism along with site-specific meanings and the power of iconic architecture. By examining the 2020 Tokyo Olympic main stadium as a case study, the paper analyzes the controversial Zaha Hadid’ stadium plan in relation to the Japanese nation branding initiative. In doing so, the paper argues that ‘branding’ should be seen as part of an economic and cultural system which seems to enhance the global value of iconic architects and their buildings. Yet, the power of brands can be understood as a contingent entity. This is because its ambivalenct nature entails a tension between exclusiveness and banality; additionally, it could be difficult for branded architects to work across the different regimes of global and local politics; and they are of course also constrained by the logic of neoliberal transnational capitalism. By investigating a major global branded architect, Zaha Hadid and her architecture plan, the paper considers why a new image of Japan could not be adequately created by Hadid’s aesthetics and narratives of the Olympic stadium which should be regarded as a national cultural legacy. The paper then discusses the contested processes of image-making and narrative creation in relation to the representation of Japan in contemporary Olympic culture. The paper concludes with an examination of Kengo Kuma’s architecture language in his 2020 Tokyo Olympics stadium design.

This paper assesses the allocative performance of foreign aid donors. It does so by identifying the consistency of the share of donor aid allocated to each developing country with these their shares of global poverty. A given donor's allocative performance is maximised if the share of its aid to each developing country exactly equals its share of global poverty. This is equated with fairness in the international allocation of aid. The allocative performance of all donors, all bilateral donors, all multilateral agencies, all non†DAC donor countries, the EU, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States for the years 2010–15 is assessed. The best performance is exhibited by all bilateral donors, while that for an individual donor is exhibited by the United Kingdom. Non†DAC donors exhibit the worst performance. The paper also identifies which developing countries receive the most and least aid relative to their shares of global poverty.

Supply chains have more and more become global supply chains, due to which it becomes increasingly more difficult for states to monitor whether the production process of goods entering the territory has been free of labour rights abuses. States are less able to hold corporate entities accountable that are knowingly or unknowingly benefiting from labour rights abuses. Transparency measures have been suggested as a way to close this accountability gap and circumvent traditional issues of enforcement when production and consumption of goods takes place in different jurisdictions. This paper discusses whether transparency measures live up to these expectations by assessing the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (California Act). We analyse whether the Act does indeed contribute to greater accountability by filling the existing information gap between companies and consumers. The workings of the Act, as well as its impact on primary stakeholders will be determined. The paper discusses action taken by companies, consumers and non†governmental organizations by looking at the degree to which the new California Act generated differences in behaviour and practices of these affected parties. Based on this information the question is answered which possibilities and limitations are connected to the use of transparency measures in combatting the abuse of labour rights in the global supply chain. It is discussed which lessons can be learned from the California Act and which policy implications this could have for future transparency measures.

The relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main features of globalisation. In this paper, we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspective, since FDI takes not only direct but also indirect channels from origin to destination countries because of firms’ incentive to reduce tax burden, to minimise coordination costs and to break barriers to market entry. We use a unique data set of international corporate control as a measure of stock FDI to construct a corporate control network (CCN), where the nodes are the countries and the edges are the corporate control relationships. Network measures, as the shortest path length and the communicability, are then computed on the CCN to capture the indirect channel of FDI. Empirically, we find that corporate control has a positive effect on trade both directly and indirectly. The result is robust with different specifications and estimation strategies. Hence, our paper provides strong empirical evidence of the indirect effects of FDI on trade. Moreover, we identify a number of interplaying factors such as regional trade agreements and the region of Asia. We also find that the indirect effects are more pronounced for the manufacturing sector than for primary sectors such as oil extraction and agriculture.

Young people's geopolitical subjectivities are heavily informed by past events in ways that have not been sufficiently acknowledged in the existing literature on youth geopolitics. This paper demonstrates how work on memory can be brought into dialogue with critical geopolitics to identify the assemblage of socio-spatial practices that shape how young people learn about geopolitics. It interrogates what memories and their attendant landscape manifestations and rituals ‘do’ to young people growing up in the Falkland Islands, a society that continues to live with the legacies of a sovereignty dispute that triggered the Falklands War just over 30 years ago. Young Islanders’ embodied and relational encounters with memory through the surrounding environment and adults are shown to play an important role in shaping their perceptions of contemporary geopolitical relations with Argentina. These can both reproduce and/or rework collective memory narratives, emphasising the importance of looking beyond mnemonic discourses manifest in institutional and official spaces. The paper makes a conceptual contribution to debates about young people's agency in relation to geopolitics. While children and young people are considered active agents capable of forming their own views, they are also presented with potent memories of past geopolitical eras that propagate certain understandings of international relations. Engaging scholarship on memory can help address the tensions inherent to recognising children and young people as social and (geo)political actors, within the context of structures, institutions and relationships that have a strong bearing on how their agency is expressed. In a methodological sense the paper illustrates how research might productively incorporate the adults who are influential in the formation of young people's geopolitical subjectivities.

In this paper, I demonstrate the identity transformation of North Korean women in interaction with state and non-state actors and domestic and regional structures, which I formulate for the purposes of this paper. From a state-centric social constructivist perspective in politics and international relations, I examine how the identities and interests of North Korean women are constituted and reconstituted in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and five South-East Asian countries along their migration routes before they reach the Republic of Korea – the so-called “Seoul Train in the Underground Railway”. Back in their country of origin, North Korean women are socially constructed as Confucian communist mothers. In China, the most frequently depicted images of North Korean women are trafficked wives. By paying for smugglers to cross borders to neighbouring South-East Asian countries, North Korean women finally become the agents of their own destiny, refugees in waiting to be transferred to South Korea.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has grown into a central feature of the global carbon market. Besides a range of normative and evaluative research into the CDM, scholars have applied international relations perspectives in which the CDM has been analysed as an example of global governance, engaging multiple actors across administrative levels. This paper focuses on a national government and how its activities affect the CDM market. We draw on an empirical case study of China to demonstrate how governmental action can be understood in light of national institutional factors, defined as normative, cognitive or regulative elements. The paper describes and explains the extensiveness of Chinese government action regarding the CDM and discusses its consequences for the market.

Rarely does one come across critical analysis which looks at islands as the strategic and candid promoters of a role as political and economic usufructuaries over external resources. This paper is premised on the proposition that a small territory is especially obliged to use extra-territorial resources as its hinterland for economic success. Such resources extend over a whole range of goods and services and include access to investment, welfare, security, stable currency, international relations, specialised labour power, transfers, markets and higher education. The MIRAB syndrome is one way of articulating this condition. This paper proposes a second cluster of features that are, or can be, deployed by small territories in a manner somewhat different from MIRAB; this second cluster has a more proactive policy orientation and a disposition towards carving out procedural and jurisdictional powers. It is thus proposed to consider a small territory’s engagement with the external hinterland as a position on a sliding scale, a strategic mix of options located between two distinct development trajectories, of which MIRAB is one and the PROFIT model the other, peer-reviewed

n June 2004, the Yale historian Paul Kennedy wrote an article for the British daily The Guardian entitled 'the pivot of history' (Kennedy 2004). Despite the omission of the word 'geographical', it was readily apparent that the opinion-piece was referring to Halford J. Mackinder's 'The geographical pivot of history' presented to the Royal Geographical Society on 25 January 1904 and published in the Geographical journal three months later. Why would readers of a centre-left British newspaper be interested in a long dead conservative and arch-imperialist and a paper delivered 100 years ago? Kennedy proposed that the value of Mackinder's paper was several fold it not only pointed to the significance of distance/terrain/climate in shaping the conduct of international relations, but it also enjoyed a predictive value and designated the direction of world history against the backdrop of what Mackinder (1904, 421) termed 'the end of a great historic epoch'. But Kennedy was also pointing to Mackinder's contemporary geopolitical resonances

Introduction In March 2002, a committee of the Grand Manan Lobster Fishermen's Sector (Grand Manan Island, New Brunswick, Canada) presented a report to the Annual Meeting of the Fishermen's Association (GMFA). In its report, the committee announced its intention to demand access to a new summer lobster fishery in an internationally disputed area known as the Grey Zone. In this way, a debate was launched in the small island community of 2,700 people, a debate that involved international politics, resource and environmental conservation and local community social relations. In the media coverage over the ensuing months, one commentator described the impasse as 'the murky hand of history's oversight (that) has come out of the coastal fog to provoke a potentially dangerous situation' (Russell 2002). This paper explores the ways in which environmental issues are being drawn into increasingly complex agendas at different scales of legality and social and economic relations. The marine environment, on which this case study is focused, is inextricably intertwined with social, economic and political relations, all of which are embedded in history and particular meanings of identity tied to a resource. In drawing upon two main bodies of literature, in common property/ fisheries management and in international maritime boundaries, I wish to argue for an enriched understanding of environment-society relations that incorporates individuals, communities and nation states in a complex network of relationships and governance. This case study illuminates the inextricable links between local histories and social structures and problems of resolving larger processes of resource allocation and power relations. In their critique of scarcity as the root cause of 'violent environments', Peluso and Watts (2001) provide a helpful way to understand the many dimensions of social and political tensions that unfolded in the summer of 2002 on Grand Manan Island. Their discussion illuminates the complex ways in which processes of environmental change are both constituted by and in part themselves constitute the political economy of access to and control over resources. In this narrative that focuses on a disputed area known as the Grey Zone, two stories overlap in ways that obfuscate each other's key issues. As well, both stories contain dual problematic elements. The first story, simplistically described as an international-boundary question, in reality incorporates two separate but related problems of territoriality and sovereignty. Part of the dilemma for legal historians and current negotiations is the interlinking of sovereignty over Machias Seal Island, with national territoriality defined by the international boundary itself. Moreover, this double-sided problem is made even more complex and multilayered because of the second part of this narrative that unfolds concurrently. The second story revolves around social structures and personal identities in a small fishing community in the context of common property and resource management. Key issues include environmental degradation, different regulatory regimes for marine resources that govern accessibility and local community institutions, social relations and normative practices. Clearly incorporating a variety of issues at different levels of application and understanding, complexity defines both this web of relationships and the overlapping web associated with the boundary question. Between Canada and the United States there remain five unresolved boundary disputes (Gray 1994), one of which, the focus of this paper, is the east coast maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine. (1) The two overlapping stories involve negotiations and disputes between two national governments, between communities of fishers in two countries, between Canadian fishers and two government departments and between factions within the community of Grand Manan itself. The boundary dispute is a tangled network of regulatory regimes, informal fishing rules and practices and unclear political agendas. …

One of the most pressing concerns in the study of international relations today is to develop a systematic account of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. This paper argues that domestic politics frequently influences foreign policy through a process of decisionmaking that grows out of the decision-maker's awareness of the requirements for effective action in the political context. It is therefore necessary to develop a theory that can explain how the political context's characteristic features affect decision-makers' thinking. In attempting to combine insights culled from the literature on political decision-making with psychological theories of decision-making processes, this paper offers a first step toward such a theory.

International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered. By Patrick James. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002. 328 pp., $65.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-8142-0900-9), $24.95 paper (ISBN: 0-8142-5095-5). Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. Edited by Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 400 pp., $48.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-262-05068-4), $24.95 paper (ISBN: 0-262-55041-5). Debates about the philosophy of science have not always received the attention they deserve in international relations scholarship. It is only natural that most research has tended to focus on substantive theoretical and empirical issues. However, as the discipline has matured, deeper questions have emerged about the overall development of knowledge within the field. In a seminal contribution, Robert Keohane (1986) used criteria derived from Imre Lakatos' “methodology of scientific research programs” to appraise progress within the study of international relations. Some twenty years later, Patrick James' International Relations and Scientific Progress and Colin and Miriam Elman's Progress in International Relations Theory represent the next statement in this rich avenue of inquiry. Both books make a comprehensive attempt to evaluate the success of research within the field using a sophisticated range of criteria drawn from debates in the philosophy of science. They not only offer a guide to the state of the art in world politics, but they also provide a model for how the philosophy of science can usefully structure the development of research in the social sciences. Patrick James' International Relations and Scientific Progress mounts a defense of structural realist theory in terms of its ability to generate a progressive social scientific research agenda. The book focuses exclusively on this issue, enabling it to provide an extended treatment of this approach. Colin and Miriam Elman's Progress in International Relations Theory consists of a collection of essays that appraise all the major theoretical schools in the field using criteria explicitly derived from the philosophy of science. Thus, whereas James offers depth of application to a specific theoretical approach, the Elmans analyze a broader range of perspectives. Both books take Lakatosian methodology as their central point of departure. Indeed, an important contribution made by both studies is that they provide …

Although there is some agreement about the sorts of underlying forces that gave rise to the events of September 11, the theoretical and policy implications that flow from them remain contentious - the US's overwhelmingly military response notwithstanding. In contrast to much of the orthodoxy that characterises contemporary theoretical and policy debates, we argue that there should be a recognition that the pursuit of security is a complex, multi-dimensional enterprise. We contend that unless security studies and practice begins to incorporate a more complex understanding of the contemporary international system, it will continue to be incapable of addressing many of the potential threats that confront even the most powerful states. The first part of this paper looks at the contested notion of 'globalisation', and the way that international society has been conceptualised in both the conventional security studies/international relations literature, and in the field of international political economy (IPE). The second part of the paper looks at the continuing influence of state-centric security discourses and highlights their inability to provide a conceptual framework for security provision in a global era.

This paper surveys hostile reactions to claims that the I I September attacks were understandable in terms of the actions of the west towards poor parts of the world and the rich countries' own public commitments to democracy and affluence at home. The paper argues that domestic resentment is likely to continue to foment because concerted institution-building commensurate with the rich countries' material capacities has been neglected. Much responsibility for the global discontent can be attributed to policies advocated by the west and imposed on both rich and poor countries alike by policy-elites within the rich countries. Intellectuals have a role in re-activating the sorts of high-minded state-building and policy-making capacities that preoccupied them in the immediate post-1945 period.

The intersections and conversations between feminist geography and political geography have been surprisingly few. The notion of a feminist geopolitics remains undeveloped in geography. This paper aims to create a theoretical and practical space in which to articulate a feminist geopolitics. Feminist geopolitics is not an alternative theory of geopolitics, nor the ushering in of a new spatial order, but is an approach to global issues with feminist politics in mind. ‘Feminist’ in this context refers to analyses and political interventions that address the unequal and often violent relationships among people based on real or perceived differences. Building upon the literature from critical geopolitics, feminist international relations, and transnational feminist studies, I develop a framework for feminist political engagement. The paper interrogates concepts of human security and juxtaposes them with state security, arguing for a more accountable, embodied, and responsive notion of geopolitics. A feminist geopolitics is sought by examining politics at scales other than that of the nation-state; by challenging the public/private divide at a global scale; and by analyzing the politics of mobility for perpetrators of crimes against humanity. As such, feminist geopolitics is a critical approach and a contingent set of political practices operating at scales finer and coarser than the nation-state.

As readers will recall from the previous issue of Political Psychology (April 2004), the special issue on prospect theory in political science and political psychology has been broken into two parts. The substantive introduction to this topic and to the papers in the first part of the special issue appeared in April. This second commentary introduces the final three papers in this special issue. William Boettcher's article "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion" presents both an experimental test and a methodological critique of prospect theory as it has been used in political science. In particular, Boettcher notes, in line with Kahneman's (2000) argument, that political scientists confront unique challenges in seeking to apply the findings from laboratory experiments to realworld problems in international relations. Boettcher calls for a careful consideration of the signal differences between laboratory domains and those presented by real-world decision-making, which obviously present a whole host of pressures, constraints, and demands that would be impossible and unethical to simulate in a laboratory. As a result, the issues of external validity and generalizability remain open and subject to further empirical tests, validations, and/or discounting. Boettcher's article also reports the results of three experiments designed to examine the difference between domains in explicitly political contexts involving group decision-making. Like framing, group decision-making remains a fruitful area for the expansion and development of prospect theory in political science. Because few political decisions rest on one person's choice alone, and most political decisions involve some kind of group decision-making process, advances in the use of prospect theory in group interactions remain a crucial component of broader applicability for the model within political science. Boettcher's first experiment finds little support for the impact of framing on group polarization. The second and third experiments suggest stronger support for predicted findings in the area of preference reversals, especially when the context of framing effects

Students of International Relations are taught that the modern nation-state has a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence. However, in the case of the Republic of Cyprus this does not seem to be the case, since its armed forces, the Cypriot National Guard (CNG), are intimately embedded within Greece’s military structure, and half the island remains under Turkish occupation. The colonization of Cyprus (1571–1960) and subsequent decolonization has led to the gradual construction of two rigid identities, Greek and Turkish, that have been institutionalized legally and imposed constitutionally. This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, how does the CNG perform and therefore constitute a ‘Greek identity’? Second, is this performance epistemically violent, hindering the formation of hybrid identities? We use autoethnography, interviews, and insights from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus and Judith Butler’s performativity theory to explore these two questions. We argue that the CNG performs a Greek identity in three key configurations: 1) the operational link between the Greek Army and the CNG; 2) the explicit connection to both ancient and modern Greece through various CNG insignia and practices, including parades and marching songs; and 3) the entrenchment of the Greek Orthodox Church within its practices.

International relations scholars debate whether the current liberal order can adapt to power shifts among the great powers. Yet historically, contestation among the great powers has often revolved around the question of whether the international system should be organized along liberal and institutional lines in the first place. In this paper, I examine great power negotiation strategies at the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, an often overlooked yet critical episode of liberal order‐building. As rising powers shuffled the great power ranks, many hoped that the Hague conferences would prevent arms racing, reduce the barbarity of war, and promote peaceful solutions to international crises. Champions of liberal rules and institutions used principled persuasion, appealing to shared norms and collective identities. They also engaged in rhetorical coercion, seeking at times to shame potential obstructionists. Yet the conferences revealed the profound limitations of these soft‐power based negotiation strategies. For a brief moment in 1899, circumstances allowed champions of the Hague system to persuade states to sign on to the laws of war and to embarrass states into accepting arbitration. Yet by 1907, conditions had changed and obstructionists were able to mobilize broad coalitions to block significant change. The Hague conferences highlight the importance of interstate coalitional networks in institutional adaptation.

This paper was selected for publication in the AAA’s Anthropology News as part of the "Rethinking Race and Human Variation" special editions of February and March 2006. The special editions were sponsored by the Understanding Race and Human Variation project and funded by the Ford Foundation. The Understanding Race and Human Variation project is a multi -year public education effort funded by the National Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation. This paper represents the views of the author and not that of the AAA or the Understanding Race and Human Variation project.

Official statisticians around the world are faced with the herculean task of populating the Sustainable Development Goals global indicator framework. As traditional data sources appear to be insufficient, statisticians are naturally considering whether big data can contribute anything useful. While the statistical possibilities appear to be theoretically endless, in practice big data also present some enormous challenges and potential pitfalls: legal; ethical; technical; and reputational. This paper examines the opportunities and challenges presented by big data for compiling indicators to support Agenda 2030.

This paper argues for the potential of discursive psychology (DP) in the study of post-truth politics. Work produced outside of psychology is considered, particularly from political science and international relations, which have made a promising start. Providing an overview of this body of research, I argue for their respective strengths and weaknesses. The literature so far tends to work with the notion that truth and emotion are matters that are, or at least should be, distinguishable. Instead, I argue that, rather than lament the blurring between truth and untruth, one should look to how these unfold as matters of practical concern in political discourse. DP is a tool particularly suited to the task; it highlights the importance of viewing ‘truth’ as a rhetorical resource. In this light, we can view post-truth politics as a rhetorical matter rather than a degeneration of truth.

This paper investigates the impact of regional political instability on the political instability of a country. Our identification strategy relies on the spatial nature of international relations. We use the characteristics of the neighbors’ neighbors as the instruments for the neighbors’ political instability and regional dummies to control for common regional shocks. We show that political instability in neighbor countries has a strong positive impact on a given country’s political instability. The average of neighbors’ population size appears to be a significant mediating factor behind this relationship.

The language of democracy has become common in international law, the legal system that regulates relations between nation states. This interest in democracy has however largely ignored democracy at the international level and focused instead on national democratic standards. In this paper, I start by sketching the threadbare debates about democracy beyond political borders in international law and then turn to the way that international institutions have developed this concept, particularly in the peace and state-building boom associated with the end of the Cold War. The two contexts for democracy have taken different directions. In the case of democracy at the international level, the discussion has become polarised between global North and South, with democracy being promoted by the South as an omnibus agenda to remedy economic and political inequalities. In the case of democracies within states, international lawyers have taken democracy to have a fixed form, associated with specific institutional practices and structures, limiting its capacity for transformation.

Trade policy is among the EU's most significant capabilities in promoting values including human rights. Yet trade policy and the EU's values-based foreign policy are often in tension. Scholarship on the social dimension of trade policy has emphasized the tension between values and the EU's commercial interests. Human rights and conditionality clauses have not been the focus of analysis, yet conditionality is one of the EU's most visible links between the trade agenda and its values-based foreign policy. Analyzing the EU's decision-making in negotiating human rights conditionality, this paper employs the EU–Singapore free trade agreement and its negotiation as an in-depth single case study. The tension between commercial interests and values results in decision-makers promoting incoherent interests. We argue that organizationally defined preferences and issue salience circumscribed the Parliament's impact on decision-making, resulting in concessions on human rights conditionality with Singapore.

We review about 100 papers on Sino-African relations published during the past 5 years for the most part, in order to put some structure on the existing strands. The literature is classified into dominant schools of thought, namely the: neocolonial or pessimistic; balance-development or optimistic and accommodation schools. After the classification, we reconcile the schools of thought in light of dominant themes and debates on development models, inter alia: (1) pessimists versus (vs) optimists; (2) preferences of rights in development models (economic vs political, national vs human & sovereign vs idiosyncratic); (3) the Washington Consensus vs the Beijing Model and; (4) an African Consensus in both the Washington Consensus and Beijing Model. Both the first and second schools have core values articulated by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 56, NO. 3, 2016, pp. 442–470 IS CRIME BAD FOR BUSINESS? CRIME AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY VALUES IN NEW YORK CITY * Michael C. Lens Luskin School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 3250 Public Affairs Building, Los Angeles, CA 90095. E-mail: mlens@ucla.edu Rachel Meltzer Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy, The New School, 72 5th Avenue, New York, NY 10011. E-mail: meltzerr@newschool.edu ABSTRACT. To test how crime affects economic activity, we use point-specific data on crime, com- mercial property sales and assessed values from New York City, relying on an instrumental variables strategy. We find that crime reduces commercial property values, and the magnitude of the effect depends on the type and geography of crime. Elasticities range from −0.1 to −0.5. We find stronger evidence for negative violent crime effects in neighborhoods with lower incomes and higher shares of minority residents. Thus, disadvantaged neighborhoods are doubly harmed by crime—they have higher crime rates and those crimes have stronger effects on economic activity. 1. INTRODUCTION Crime and economic activities are not evenly distributed across urban areas. Neigh- borhoods besieged by crime are often areas that also lack a number of amenities, including thriving businesses. Having fewer neighborhood commercial establishments deprives res- idents of nearby employment opportunities and the ability to conveniently procure food, clothing, and other important goods and services. A lot of research analyzes the extent to which reduced economic activity affects crime in cities, metropolitan areas, and neighbor- hoods, and finds that economic decline in cities and neighborhoods leads to higher crime. However, we do not know much about whether, and how, crime affects economic activity. This paper attempts to address this gap, using commercial property values as a proxy for a neighborhood’s economic vibrancy. Using point-specific crime data and commercial property values in New York City from 2004 to 2010, we test whether crime affects the price that individuals and/or firms are willing to pay for commercial real estate. There is relatively consistent evidence that crime can influence residential prop- erty values and location choices, but does this relationship look different for commercial landowners and businesses? How does crime factor into the cost-benefit analysis for com- mercial properties? Crime can increase the cost of business and can scare off potential customers, all of which should be capitalized into the value of the commercial property. It is unclear whether this prediction plays out empirically and if so, to what extent. *We thank the UCLA Ziman Center for Real Estate for funding this project, the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New York University for generously providing data, and participants in the fiscal policy breakfast seminar at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for helpful feedback. We also thank two journal editors and three anonymous reviewers for extensive comments. We also thank Pooya Ghorbani, C.J. Gabbe, and Conrad Walker for excellent research assistance, and Anne Brown for extensive editing. Received: June 2014; revised: July 2015, October 2015; accepted: October 2015. C 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI: 10.1111/jors.12254

To reverse the downturn in and develop EU–China relations requires mutual understanding. However, the opaque nature of Chinese politics makes it difficult to track China's expectations and its changing views of the EU and their relationship. This paper examines the official Chinese media discourse on the EU's ‘actorness’ and partnership with China. This helps to bridge the gap between international relations and media studies by linking government foreign relations to media discourse. It argues that China's relations with the EU should be characterized neither as a case of a ‘Capability–Expectations Gap’ (Hill, 1993) nor as an ‘Expectation Deficit’ (Tsuruoka, 2008), but should rather be seen as a matter of ‘Reflexive Expectations’ by China. The media analysis shows that China's changing national identity, interests and perception of the EU's capability at various times and in various situations influence expectations.

Concurrent with growing academic and policy interest in ‘geoengineering’ the global climate in response to climate change, a more marginal discourse postulating the existence of a climate control conspiracy is also proliferating on the Internet. Here, the term ‘chemtrails’ is used interchangeably with the term geoengineering to describe the belief that the persistent contrails left by aeroplanes provide evidence that a secret programme of large scale weather and climate modification is on-going. Despite recent calls for greater appreciation of the diverse ways in which people conceive of and relate to ideas of climate control, and widespread acknowledgement of the importance of democratic public engagement in governance of geoengineering, the chemtrail conspiracy narrative has received very little attention in academic work to date. This paper builds on work highlighting the instability of the distinction between ‘paranoid’ and ‘normal’ views, and examines the chemtrail conspiracy narrative as a discourse rather than a pathology (either psychological or sociological). The analysis finds that while some elements of the chemtrail narrative do not lend themselves to democratic processes of deliberation, and potential for engagement with more mainstream discourse appears to be low, nevertheless certain elements of the discourse (such as the moral outrage at the idea of powerful elites controlling the climate, or the importance of emotional and spiritual connections to weather and climate) highlight concerns of relevance to mainstream geoengineering debates. Furthermore, the pervasive suspicion that characterises the narrative and its reminder of the key role that trust plays in knowledge creation and the justification of beliefs, signals what is likely to be a perennial issue in the emerging international politics of geoengineering.

In the past decade, the East-Central European countries were provided significant external capacity building assistance to help their emergence as donors of foreign aid. This paper aims to map these capacity development programmes and identify where they have helped and what challenges remain for the new donors. The main conclusion is that although capacity building has been instrumental in building organisational structures, working procedures and training staff, deeper underlying problems such as low levels of financing, lacking political will, the need for visibility and low staff numbers continue to hinder the new international development policies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit-for-tat in trade policy. By highlighting various strategies in a (linear) partial-equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non- cooperative behavior by limiting market access works as a disciplining device independently of supply and demand parameters. Our theoretical results are backed by empirical evidence that countries more frequently involved in WTO-mediated disputes entailing tit-for-tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.

This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in contests. Applied to international relations, our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts.

This paper provides a sociological model of the key transnational political and economic forces that are shaping the 'global football field'. The model draws upon, and significantly extends, the theory of the 'global field' developed previously by Robertson. The model features four quadrants, each of which contains a dominant operating principle, an 'elemental reference point', and an 'elemental theme'. The quadrants contain, first, neo-liberalism, associated with the individual and elite football clubs; second, neo-mercantilism, associated with nation-states and national football systems; third, international relations, associated with international governing bodies; and fourth, global civil society, associated with diverse institutions that pursue human development and/or social justice. We examine some of the interactions and tensions between the major institutional and ideological forces across the four quadrants. We conclude by examining how the weakest quadrant, featuring global civil society, may gain greater prominence within football. In broad terms, we argue that our four-fold model may be utilized to map and to examine other substantive research fields with reference to globalization.

In spite of the aim of the World Trade Organization and other international organizations to foster international trade and development by lessening protectionism agendas worldwide, there has been a rise in consumer boycotting behaviour at a macro level involving campaigns directed against foreign products from countries embroiled in conflicts in international relations, rather than against products from individual companies perceived to have engaged in a domestic egregious act. While campaigning at this level is becoming a more effective tool for consumer protest, as it negatively affects both the boycotted countries’ macroeconomics and companies’ micro-competitiveness, consumer motivations to participate in macro-level boycotts has so far been overlooked in the boycotting literature. This paper examines consumers’ behavioural intentions to participate in macro-boycotting campaigns within the context of an Arab country, which has recently witnessed a number of campaigns of this nature. Using the theory of planned behaviour the findings of an exploratory qualitative study of Egyptian consumers offer insights into the motives and barriers to individual macro-boycott participation. Findings are discussed together with managerial implications.

This paper examines recent changes at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) regarding the connections between trade liberalization, development, and security. USAID has adopted “trade capacity building” as a framework for development, and, in conjunction with new US national security discourses, now operates under the assumption that underdevelopment is a source of state weakness that produces insecurity. I argue that these changes in how USAID understands and undertakes development constitute the neoliberalization of development. In accordance with these shifts, USAID has redefined critical aspects of its development mission, undergone internal restructuring, and altered its relationship with other US state institutions and capital. The actual prospects for achieving security or development are slim, however, as the agency remains wedded to definitions of both that suggest the only acceptable role for the state lies in facilitating further neoliberalization and promoting the stability of capitalist class relations. An overview of USAID's historical development, and a closer examination of the place of food aid and food security in the agency's development work, demonstrate this.

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are widely used for trade policy analyses and recommendations. Simulation results from these models have also been used as a basis for offering advice to African countries on what positions to take in multilateral trade negotiations. There is however increasing discomfort with the use of these models for policy recommendations, especially in Africa. In this paper we compare the results of several CGE studies that examined the impact of potential Doha Round reforms on Africa and demonstrate that the results differ drastically both in terms of magnitude and direction. Part of the discrepancies in results can be explained by differences in database, model structure, and choice of parameters. Others are, however, difficult to explain because several studies either do not report key assumptions made or do not provide a clear description of how their framework differs from those in the literature. We also show that the modelling approach and the database used in most CGE studies do not take account of key features of African economies that have serious implications for the impact of trade reforms on Africa. Finally, we outline potential consequences of the misuse of CGE models for policy evaluation and suggest pitfalls to avoid if CGE model results are to be taken seriously by policy makers in Africa.

There has been significant amount of aid inflows to developing countries including Ghana, but these have been very volatile. Aid flows have been associated with low domestic resource mobilization and have reduced Ghana to a country heavily dependent on aid. The amount of official development assistance (ODA) inflows has fallen in recent years and has become unpredictable. It is general knowledge that aid has not yielded the desired benefit. In an attempt to improve aid effectiveness donors have used tied aid not just to promote commercial interests but also to target aid to particular projects that have direct links with poverty. However, this has not yielded the maximum benefits required. Recently, the government of Ghana and its development partners agreed on an aid package dubbed the multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS), which would ensure continuous flow of aid to finance the government’s poverty related expenditures. This paper examines the MDBS, with special focus on how it overcomes the problems of tied aid and other project support. It concludes that the MDBS is innovative and could work in Ghana, but it would need trust and a well-designed, coordinated effort on the part of the government of Ghana and its development partners. Second, its effectiveness would depend

hese thoughtful articles reflect constructively on Mackinder's 1904 Pivot paper, documenting the ways in which his ideas were transposed to other parts of the world and interrogating his very imperial geopolitics a century on. In revisiting Mackinder for this centenary issue, I am reminded that plus ga change, plus c'est la m6me chose. Geographers continue to probe the edges of empire, as critics, patriots, and scientists. Mackinder's 'panoramic view of global imperialism' (see Blouet, this issue) can be juxtaposed with more current occupations, such as 'pre-emptive protection' in Iraq. Mackinder's observation of the shift from sea to land power under the rubric of colonialism may be outdated by contemporary military might, but his imperial logic of geopolitical influence is not. From another perspective, Hardt and Negri (2000) argue in Empire that the United States holds a position of privilege and power in an empire without a centre, one transformed not by the advent of air or land power but by the informational mode of production. One cannot, of course, read Mackinder outside of the strategic debates and international relations of his time (see Venier, this issue), nor can we interpret his 1904 writing in the context of current debates, but tracing critically the ways in which imperial visions are developed and deployed is as relevant as ever. From Mackinder's 'imperial protectionism' (Blouet, this issue) to the Bush Administration's 'pre-emptive' war in Iraq, thinking about geopolitical strategy appears to have changed less than one might like to believe. Mackinder's pivot theory interprets and portrays 'other' landscapes in a detached, neutral manner that naturalizes people and place and scientifically justifies 'intervention' (see Hepple, this issue). For the Bush Administration, in contrast, the 'axis of evil' is vilified in dominant geopolitical discourse, underwritten by scientific claims about the existence of weapons of mass destruction, yet the same kind of justification for imperial invention is made.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy intellectuals have peculiarly identified the Republic of Uzbekistan as the locus of Mackinder's 1904‘pivot’ designation. A century on from his original ‘Geographical pivot of history’ lecture, this paper examines the work of a Russian, an Uzbek, and an American who use Mackinder to understand contemporary Uzbekistani geopolitical orientations, in particular with reference to the USA. Drawing on critical work on the history of geopolitics, it highlights that whilst these texts claim objectivity, they betray political and subjective foreign policy choices. It suggests that whilst the revival of interest in Mackinder testifies to the continued attraction of his ideas, this has, with rare exceptions, been based upon a superficial reading of both his work and the body of secondary literature, and that this raises both disciplinary and ethical concerns.

The paper reports an empirical study of the factors affecting burden sharing among OECD’s 22 DAC members in ‘bankrolling’ the multilateral aid agencies. These are the UN agencies, World Bank’s IDA and non-IDA programmes, regional development banks, European Community, and other multilateral agencies that include the Global Environmental Facility and the Montreal Protocol on environment. Annual data over 1970-2000, pooled across the donor countries, form the basis for the empirical estimation of each donor’s share in the ODA aid receipts for each multilateral agency. Our findings suggest the existence of reverse exploitation, i.e., the financial burden of the agencies is disproportionally carried by the smaller donors. The study also finds that

In this paper we seek to identify historical indicators of international freshwater conflict and cooperation and to create a framework to identify and evaluate international river basins at potential risk for future conflict. We derived biophysical, socioeco-nomic, and geopolitical variables at multiple spatial and temporal scales from GIS datasets of international basins and associated countries, and we tested these variables against a database of historical incidents of international water related cooperation and conflict from 1948 to 1999. International relations over freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative and covered a wide range of issues, including water quantity, water quality, joint management, and hydropower. Conflictive relations tended to center on quantity and infrastructure. No single indicator—including climate, water stress, government type, and dependence on water for agriculture or energy—explained conflict/cooperation over water. Even indicators showing a significant correlation with water conflict, such as high population density, low per capita GDP, and overall unfriendly international relations, explained only a small percentage of data variability. The most promising sets of indicators for water conflict were those associated with rapid or extreme physical or institutional change within a basin (e.g., large dams or internationalization of a basin) and the key role of institutional mechanisms, such as freshwater treaties, in mitigating such conflict.

Studies on transboundary water conflict and cooperation generally consider interstate relations over shared water resources as distinct from intrastate relations. While connections have been made between international water relations and regional relationships in general, it is conceivable that international water conflict and cooperation may also be influenced by domestic water events and vice versa. This paper seeks to investigate the dynamics of water interactions across geographic scale and their relationship to broader international affairs. The research approach involves the creation of an analytical framework for assessing possible linkages between external and internal interactions over freshwater resources. The framework is applied to three case studies - the Middle East, South Asia and Southern Africa - utilizing 'event data'. To validate the findings from the quantitative analyses, the results are compared with conventional qualitative understandings of water and overall relations in the three regions. The comparison demonstrates not only the efficacy of the analytical framework in general, but also highlights, at least in terms of the specific case studies selected, the disparate water dynamics across geographic regions and the importance of considering water events, both national and international, within larger political and historical contexts.

Since the early seventies an increasing attention has been paid to the impact environmental polict nmight have on foreign trade. One of the most important issues is whether countries with relatively strict environmental regulations tend to experience a deterioration of international competitiveness and thus a fall in exports and a rise in imports, of the pollution-intensive commodities or, on the other hand, benefit from the improvement in environmentally more sensitive industries. So far, most empirical studies have concluded that the proportion of environmental costs to the total production costs is still so marginal that environmental policies have hardly any effect on comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. One of the few exceptions is Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997), who found that stricter regulations have some negative impact on bilateral trade flows between OECD countries. The aim of this paper is to show that tyhis outcome is partly due to model mis-specification. The analysis id based on a triple indexed model and on its variants. It is found that, as soon as both the importing and exporting country specific effects are taken into consideration, the relationship between stricter regulations and foreign trade becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that environmental costs do not have a real impact, neither negative nor positive, on foreign trade.

The recent scholarly work on the concept of enduring rivalries offers a promising way to examine strategic interaction among dyads of states over extended periods of time. A focus on rivalry, and on the mechanisms that provide for such interaction, may offer a way to bridge existing theories of international relations that rely exclusively on structure or process. Unfortunately, the potential for theory-building has not been fully realized because research into rivalry has tended to be inductive. This paper seeks to rectify that problem by situating the rivalry concept within a social psychological approach to international relations. The rivalry concept is appropriately located in a theoretical approach that views the international system as a social system where actors are conditioned by mechanisms of competition and socialization.

European Union (EU) studies have entered a highly contentious and, arguably, creative phase. A range of theoretical perspectives, seemingly quite highly differentiated from one another, now compete for influence and ‘space’. However, the questions remain: is EU studies developing theories which are truly competing theories? Or is it developing theories that do not compete so much as they aim to explain distinctly different pieces of the EU puzzle? This paper responds directly to these two questions, while reviewing recent literature on EU governance. It argues, first, that we lack theories of EU governance that are true rivals; and, second, that leading models explain different outcomes at different levels in a multi-level system of governance. The result is somewhat phoney debates between compatible theories masquerading as rivals, and between ‘comparative politics’ and ‘international relations’ approaches. Above all, perhaps, we find middle range theories posing as general or ‘meta-theories’. In the absence of a plausible general theory of EU governance, theorists must choose precisely which type of outcome theywish to explain.

This study examines previous explanations of democratic peace in light of sociocultural factors andforeign policy actions that influence public perceptions of another country. Two experiments assessed the effects of relevant sociocultural and foreign policy action cues on perception of the regime type of a target nation and on public approval of the use offorce. The findings suggest that sociocultural cues affect regime perception. Moreover, perceived similarity of a target nation and foreign policy actions are significant determinants of the public approval of the use offorce in addition to perceptions of regime type. This paper attempts to explore the dynamic underpinning of the phenomenon known as democratic peace-that is, the reluctance of publics of democratic nations to use force against other democratic countries. Specifically, we examine the effects of sociocultural factors and foreign policy behaviors on public perceptions of similarity with other nations and assess their implications for approval of the use of force. The profound realignment of the world's political system over the past decade has resulted in democratic regimes in an overwhelming number of nation-states for the first time in history. According to Kegley and Hermann (1995), some 75% of the globe's governments are now classified as democratic. This "third wave" of democratization, to borrow Samuel Huntington's (1991/92) terminology, has enormous consequences for the future course of international relations. The global democratic transition makes the exact makeup of democratic peace a critical point

In the past decade, the East-Central European countries were provided significant external capacity building assistance in order to help their emergence as donors of foreign aid. This paper aims to map these capacity development programs and identify where they have helped and what challenges remain for the new donors. The main conclusion is that while capacity building has been instrumental in building organizational structures, working procedures and training staff, deeper underlying problems such as low levels of financing, lacking political will, the need for visibility and low staff numbers continue to hinder the new international development policies.

Fundamental changes are taking place within the African State system which is still, in essence, the one created by the colonial powers and inherited at independence by the governments of modern Africa. Powerful forces in the industrialized world continue to have a crucial influence on events in the African continent. This paper identifies some of the key features of the emerging political economy of Africa, focusing on the manner in which external forces combine with internal ones in affecting Africa's politics. It pays attention, amongst others, to the importance of foreign aid as a source of revenue for African elites; the industrialized world's misperceptions of Africa; democratization and the decline of African States since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; surviving patterns of precolonial political entities; new economic patterns in Africa; the policy of the industrialized world towards Africa and the role of African political elites now that, with the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost its global significance; the end of the Cold War as the real end of the colonial order in Africa and the intimate connection to the present crisis of African States; the collapse of African States and the world's policy of abandonment. Bibliogr., notes, ref., sum

The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance. Edited by Rodney Bruce Hall, Thomas J. Biersteker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 272 pp., $65.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-521-81861-3), $23.00 paper (ISBN: 0-521-52337-0). In 1999 Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter published a pioneering collection of essays on the subject of Private Authority and International Affairs . Although Bruce Hall and Thomas Biersteker's The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance is not strictly speaking a sequel, it is a splendid follow-on to the earlier book and a major contribution in its own right to the burgeoning literature on the role of private (that is, nonstate) actors in global politics. Private or nonstate actors in their myriad types have been of some interest for many years (see, for example, Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert 1976) but have truly come into their own with recent writings on globalization, international political economy, postinternationalism (see, for example, Rosenau 1997, 2003), cultural diversity (Berger and Huntington 2002), and terrorism. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance resulted from a 1999 workshop organized by Hall in consultation with Biersteker at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. The workshop was inspired in part by the work of the late Susan Strange on the devolution of state authority to private actors (for example, Strange 1996), and Cutler was one of the participants and a contributor to this volume. Other contributors include Stephen Kobrin, Louis Pauly, Saskia Sassen, Ronnie Lipschutz and Cathleen Fogel, Mark Juergensmeyer, Phil Williams, and Bernedette Muthien and Ian Taylor. Hall and Biersteker provide unusually insightful and provocative introductory and concluding chapters that highlight the major points in the individual chapters and reflect on their common and divergent perspectives. As Hall and Biersteker note (pp. 3–4), traditional approaches to the study of international relations have asserted …

A working paper on British transnational corporations with industrial operations in Anglophone Africa.