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Objective We investigate the phenomenon of municipal-level strategic voting in a high-profile mayoral election with a nonpartisan ballot. The rate of strategic voting is calculated, and we investigate whether different types of anti-candidate attitudes (based on policy or personality) affect strategic behavior. Methods We use survey data from the 2014 Toronto Election Study. Results The estimated rate of strategic voting was 1.3 percent. Among those who did cast a strategic ballot, we find that anti-candidate attitudes did not affect the likelihood of voting strategically—until the source of the dislike is considered, at which point electors who dislike a candidate on the basis of personality are shown to be more likely to cast their ballots strategically. Conclusions Strategic voting was minimal, and did not affect the election outcome. The type of dislike toward a candidate (either on the basis of policy or personality) affects strategic behavior.

Using the concept of good governance, this article assesses how voting rules in the World Bank Group's primary loan facility determine members’ ability to influence the formation of winning coalitions in the Executive Board. In weighted voting systems, the percentage of votes held by an actor does not adequately measure the ability of that actor to affect outcomes because voting weights do not account for either the possible number of coalitions that may form or the number of votes needed to pass a resolution. In short, weighted voting systems cannot be straightforwardly analysed with reference to voting weights but instead require the determination of relative voting power. Using multiple measures of a priori voting power, data are presented before and after recent voice reforms. Results indicate that the United States, as expected, holds the largest share of voting power. Also, as expected, most borrowing members have little voting power. Unexpectedly, in several voting groups a single member is able to ensure its election to the Board. Hence, other members of these voting groups have no formal influence on the Board. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of voting power analysis for the concept of good governance within the World Bank.

Objectives This article assesses the conditions under which voters are more likely to vote “correctly” in direct democratic ballots. We look for determinants of correct voting simultaneously at the individual and contextual levels through a multilevel approach. At the individual level we provide special attention to the level of sophistication and the use of cognitive heuristics. At the contextual level we will investigate how the nature and content of political campaigns—more specifically, their intensity and negativity—enhance correct voting. We test our empirical models in the “hard-case” scenario of Swiss direct democracy. We propose an alternative approach for the measure of correct voting, one that makes a full use of survey data but that tries to replicate the original idea of comparison between uninformed and informed voters to establish the “correctness” of a decision. Methods We use two different data sets that cover all direct democratic votes held in Switzerland, at the federal level, between 1999 and 2005; this period covers 23 ballots, during which 75 different projects were voted. To measure correct voting and all individual variables we rely on the VOX survey data, collected on a representative sample of about 1,000 individuals after each direct democratic vote in Switzerland. To measure campaign intensity and negativity we rely on an original data set that codes the content of every campaign ad published in the six major Swiss newspapers during the month prior to each ballot. Results We show that political sophistication and the use of referential heuristics strongly enhance correct voting. Furthermore, at the contextual level, we show that campaigns with high intensity decrease correct voting, especially when combined with high negativity, even though the direct effect of negativity on correct voting is positive. Conclusion We contribute to the existing literature in a threefold way. First, our results provide an additional confirmation that correct voting exists under both individual and contextual influences. Second, we assess the presence and determinants of correct voting in direct democracy, a “hard-case” scenario, and find that the share of citizens who vote correctly is in line with the levels found for American citizens during elections, and that the main determinants seem to hold for both elections and direct democracy. Third, our alternative approach to measure correct voting highlights that the original idea of comparison between uninformed and informed voters, usually dealt with through experimental protocols, can be replicated with survey data.

In this paper, we propose an improved electronic voting (E-voting) system based on our previous work Name and vOte separaTed E-voting system. The proposed E-voting system, referred to as Enhanced Name and vOte separaTed E-voting system, is improved with a new protocol design and a watchdog hardware device added to ensure voter confidentiality and voting accuracy. In our improved scheme, rather than Election Committee and Vote Counting Committee, an impartial third party, Ballot Distribution Center, is proposed to take the responsibility of distributing ballots. The votes and the candidates' names are separated into two parts while voters cast their votes. The watchdog device records all voting transactions during the election to prevent voting disputes and other malicious behaviors from voter frauds. Our proposed procedure addresses issues related to voter confidentiality and candidate privacy, voting frauds and voting accuracy, and will thus help to create a fair election. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Correct voting in elections has been extensively analysed in the recent past. However, thus far, correct voting in direct legislation has hardly been investigated. This is all the more surprising since direct legislation is a more demanding form of democracy and, thus, to vote one's true preferences in direct legislation represents a greater challenge than picking the “right” party or the “right” candidate at elections. Moreover, the few researches on the correctness of individual referendum votes used a measurement method that we think has some methodological shortfalls. Instead, we want to propose another better-suited method of measuring correct voting in direct legislation settings. This method makes use of voters' stances on the issue at stake. Besides, we will scrutinize the share of correct voting as well as its determinants on the Swiss popular vote of November 2009, which included three rather different propositions. The study shows that a majority of Swiss voters are indeed able to vote their true preferences. The ability to vote correctly depends primarily on the individual voter's project-specific knowledge, but also, under certain circumstances, on the use of heuristics.

How do measures to increase turnout affect election outcomes? I use a novel approach to analyze how these measures influence both voter turnout and the candidates' political positions. In general, lowering the net expense of voting reduces political polarization. If the net expense of voting is made very low, then candidates no longer have an incentive to take partisan positions to motivate turnout and will converge at the median voter's ideal point. For small changes in the net expense of voting, however, decreasing the cost of voting and penalties for not voting (two common measures) can result in drastically different political outcomes. Counter intuitively, measures that make voting cheaper might not increase turnout: since these measures decrease the difference between the candidates' political positions, they also decrease the benefit of voting.

The problem of many democracies is low voter turnout. One reason is the voting procedure, which only allows voting for a party or candidate. Introduction of voting against could bring more voters to the polls. The concept of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998) suggests that people who focus on prevention would vote more eagerly if they are given the opportunity to blackball disliked candidates. This article describes 2 studies that verify this hypothesis. In the first study, over two thirds of participants declared that they would vote more willingly if they had a “for or against” choice at the election. The second study shows that the “pro or anti” formula is especially attractive to participants with a prevention regulatory focus.

This paper analyzes sequential voting in binary elections when voters are motivated by a desire both to elect their preferred candidate and to avoid a long and costly election. I find a unique equilibrium in which a voter's action depends both on the intensity of the voter's preferences as well as how well the candidates have done in earlier voting rounds. This equilibrium results in momentum in which voters are more likely to vote for the candidate currently in the lead. Furthermore, the probability a voter votes for a candidate is increasing in the size of the candidate's lead. As a consequence, a candidate is more likely to win the election if the candidate's stronger supporters vote earlier in the election.

Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent.

What are the incentives for voters to vote strategically when legislative policy outcomes are constrained by a system of checks and balances? The policy-balancing theory supposes that moderate voters split their tickets because such splitting is the only way these voters can achieve moderate policy outcomes. I show that a different type of strategic voting, policy stacking, is characteristic of legislatures that endow the majority party with only limited institutional powers. Focusing on voting for the president and House of Representatives in the United States reveals that a substantial proportion of voters engage in policy-stacking behavior, but very few engage in policy-balancing behavior.

Two game-theoretic arguments for the potential rationality of voting are presented. The first argument suggests that people make choices that allow the most favorable forecasts. People choose to vote inasmuch as they project their own choices between voting and abstaining more strongly onto members of their own political group than onto members of other political groups. Relevant evidence is reviewed and extended by new findings in a simulated public-goods dilemma. The second argument suggests that people preview how they will feel about each of the four possible scenarios generated by the conjunctions of their own choices (to vote or to abstain) and the election outcome (victory or defeat). They choose to vote inasmuch as they feel their own vote will not be wasted. The implications of both arguments for efforts to increase turnout are discussed.

We define Endogenously Weighted Plurality Voting (EWPV) as the voting rule that, each individual being allowed to cast exactly one vote, selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes. Endogenously Weighted Approval Voting (EWAV) selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes when each individual can cast as many votes as he wants. In both cases, each individual can vote for any other individual, i.e., the set of candidates is the set of voters. In this study, we give necessary and sufficient axioms for EWPV and EWAV. We also propose a simple model where EWAV is more efficient than the traditional Approval Voting.

The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.

A common bit of public political wisdom advises that in certain three-way elections, one should cast a strategic vote for one of the top two candidates rather than a conscience-driven vote for a third candidate, since doing otherwise amounts to ‘throwing one's vote away’. In this paper, I examine the possible justifications for this pragmatic advice to vote strategically. I argue that the most direct argument behind such advice fails to motivate strategic voting in large-scale elections, since there is no significant chance that one's own vote will alter the outcome of the election, even in plausible close-call cases. In short, the lack of probable pragmatic effect undermines the pragmatic motivation for altering one's baseline voting behavior. However, an indirect argument succeeds in motivating strategic voting in some scenarios. Such an indirect argument relies on the possibility of one acquiring an obligation to engage in public strategic campaigning for one of the top two candidates. In many cases in which one strategically campaigns, one will, indirectly, acquire an obligation to vote strategically in accord with one's prior public campaign activities. Thus, the common bit of political wisdom about strategic voting can be justified, though only indirectly.

In the wake of the voting controversy of Election 2000, along with passage of a congressional measure designed to fix what many believe is an ailing voting system, research into the impact of voting equipment on residual voting error has become a crucial question as the states prepare to replace existing voting equipment through the use of matching federal funds, to adjust existing equipment, or to face yet more lawsuits. Most existent studies into the link between voting equipment and residual voting error have concentrated on voting equipment across the states rather than within the individual states, generating results that are subject to a possible aggregation bias. Using a variety of statistical techniques, data on Election 2000 U.S. presidential and U.S. senatorial races are analyzed in an attempt to determine the impact of voting equipment on the voting error levels intrastate in those races. This study presents analysis of two sets of state data, Wyoming and Pennsylvania, and is used to argue that the infamous punch-card voting equipment may not be a significant contributor to an increase in voter error when analyzing intrastate, contrary to existing research that indicates it is significant when analyzed across multiple states. This research underscores the importance of researchers’ ideological perspectives in application of statistical methodology to the American policy arena.

Objectives. Political science long ignored the actual mechanics of voting—until the 2000 presidential contest. This research note offers a systematic empirical inquiry into the potential effects of various voting methods and electorate–specific variables on the rate at which citizens register a preference via the act of voting. Methods. Voting methods were analyzed in relation to the rate of undervotes recorded in Georgia’s 159 counties during the 2000 general election using a set of multivariate models. Results. Lever machines and fill in the oval optical scan ballots are associated with lower rates of undervoting. Counties with large numbers of new registrants, lower education levels, and a higher proportion of African–American voters were found to have higher error rates. Conclusions. The results of this study provide strong evidence that voting methods and ballot types, as well as electorate–specific characteristics, are key factors in determining the error rate associated with the process of voting at the county level.

Data from a far from satisfactory election are used to illustrate the effects of changes in voting methods.

In this paper, we propose a practical and secure electronic voting scheme suitable for large-scale distributed systems such as the Internet. As in most of the voting systems in the literature, the proposed voting scheme allows only eligible voters to vote once, protects the voters' privacy, and ensures the accuracy of the tally. In addition, the proposed scheme satisfies further important criteria, namely, it tolerates abstention and does not require voters to control whether their votes have been correctly processed. If a subset of voters does not vote, the elections cannot be disrupted. Furthermore, anyone, including an external observer, can easily be convinced that the election is fair, that is, that the published final tally is fairly computed from the ballots that were correctly cast. It follows that the proposed voting scheme strengthens the security properties of the electronic voting procedure, simplifies the interaction of voters with the electronic voting system, and contributes to increased voter confidence in the degree of security of the electronic voting procedure. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Due to the rapid progress in computers and communication networks, we may want to hold a secure electronic election on a public network. The election scheme that we proposed in this paper can fully conform the requirements of holding a large-scale election. The privacy of the voters can be preserved against the voting center. No one, including the voting center, knows which voting strategy each voter adopts. The voting center cannot present a false tally without being caught. Then, “Electronic Election” on a public network is possible by employing our proposed scheme. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Economists have long been puzzled by the fact that people vote in elections even though their influence on the electoral outcome is infinitesimal and they can 'free ride' on the voting of voters favoring the same candidate. This well-known 'paradox of voting' assumes that people vote as an investment in the electoral outcome. The authors develop a new test of the hypothesis that voting is a form of investment, as opposed to the alternative hypothesis that voting is a form of consumption. Their empirical results suggest that voting is a form of consumption, implying that the paradox of voting may be exaggerated. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

All relevant contigencies have been investigated in order to establish the frequency with which a Condorcet winner is elected under the plurality and approval procedures when voters are assumed to act sophisticatedly, and given that: (1) there are three candidates of whom one must be elected; (2) voters have complete information regarding all other voters (strict) preference orderings; (3) the electorate consists, alternatively, of three, four, or five blocks of voters; 4) all contingencies are considered equally likely. The main results are: (i) the approval procedure is significantly more Condorcet-efficient than the plurality procedure; (ii) when a Condorcet winner exists, a non-Condorcet winner is elected very rarely under both voting procedures; (iii) voting under the approval procedure results more often in a determinate winner when a Condorcet winner exists, whereas voting under the plurality procedure results more often in a determinate outcome when there are cyclical majorities; (iv) sophisticated voting under the approval procedure seems to be more Condorcet-efficient than the sincere version of this procedure, whereas the Condorcet-efficiencies of sincere and sophisticated voting under the plurality procedure are not significant different.

This paper examines two-stage voting procedures [x,k,y] at the level either of a local governmental organization or of a national governmental system in which x is the number of candidates a voter is to vote for on the first ballot, k is the number of candidates to be placed on the second ballot according to the greatest vote totals from the first ballot, and y is the number of the k candidates on the second ballot that a voter is to vote for on the second ballot. The winner is the candidate with the most votes on the second ballot. These systems are practical in many situations and correspond to many two-stage voting systems in current use. The main purpose of the paper is to assess the propensities of alternative two-stage systems to elect the candidate which would be elected by a theoretically more sophisticated but less practical norm procedure such as simple majority of the Borda sum-of-ranks method. Extensive computer simulation, restricted to three to ten candidates but allowing a variety of methods by which voter preferences are randomly generated, reveals that the best propensity maximizing two-stage system has the form [x,2,1] in which exactly two candidates appear on the second ballot. Under the restriction that a voter is to vote for only one candidate on each ballot, the best system is common double plurality [1,2,1]. Without this restriction the best system usually has x = 2, with x approximately equal to the optimal number of candidates to vote for on the single ballot in a one-stage election in which the winner is determined by the greatest number of votes from the single ballot.

This paper is concerned with the use of voting procedures by groups of individuals to produce a social choice. Several new conditions that voting systems might be required to meet are suggested in this paper. These criteria are varying expressions of the notion that when there are more than two alternatives, social choice should be based on the results of majority voting on pairs. Five voting procedures or social choice functions are examined with respect to these conditions plus a condition requiring the social choice set to be externally stable. Two functions of the five examined are clearly better, according to these conditions, than the remaining three.

This paper analyzes decision making by simple voting procedures in organizational or societal systems. The simple voting procedures investigated are those that do not require voters to rank candidates when one of three or more candidates is to be elected to a single office or position. The procedures are compared on the basis of their propensities to elect the simple majority candidate when it exists. Propensity is measured in terms of efficiency of the procedure, which equals 100 times the probability that the candidate elected by the voting procedure is the simple majority candidate, given the latter exists. The procedures examined use either one or two ballots. On the first or only ballot they ask each voter either to vote for not more than so many candidates (variable procedures) or to vote for exactly so many candidates (constant procedures). Depending on assumptions about voter preferences and voting behavior, either the best variable procedure or the best constant procedure can have the higher efficiency. However, in both the one-stage and two-stage contexts, the difference in efficiency between the most efficient variable procedure and the most efficient constant procedure is usually negligible from a practical standpoint. On the other hand, efficiency can vary significantly depending on the number of stages and the number of candidates to be voted for, or up to, on the first ballot.

A decision procedure called utility value voting is considered in which each of several voters provides utility values for each of several candidates. These utility values from each voter are normalized by a positive linear transformation so that a largest normalized value is unity and the smallest is a preassigned nonnegative number less than unity. This number is called the “influence” for the voter. The decision is made using a probability mixture that maximizes the geometric mean of the expected utilities for the voters. It is shown that the procedure is Pareto optimal (efficient), and that the size of the effective minority increases with the influence value. Examples are included to show that insincere voting is not generally advantageous when the insincere voter has no information about the utilities and voting strategies of the other voters. The procedure and its results are illustrated by an engineering design example, where ten teams of scientists were the voters, and by a personnel selection example, where the 27 attributes of each candidate were the voters. The system can be used by a single person, as in the personnel selection example, or by an organization of any size, as in the ten-voter engineering design example.

This paper contains a study about decision making in groups. The author analyzes the manipulability of four voting systems: Borda, Coombs, Hare, and plurality. The Hare voting system was found to be the least manipulable; the Borda, the most manipulable. The results of this study indicate that the logical possibility of manipulation threatens the legitimacy of voting outcomes.

Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishes. The candidate with the most votes is elected. Approval voting is analyzed here from the viewpoint of expected utility maximizing voters. Approximately optimal voting strategies are developed. The relative abilities of votes for different numbers of candidates to affect the outcome are assessed, and the issue of equity among voters is addressed. It is argued that approval voting is more equitable than the common plurality voting system.

This paper investigates the degree to which single ballot weighted voting procedures for multiple alternative elections select the simple majority alternative when it exists. Emphasis is placed on procedures which are easiest for voters to respond to, namely those which ask the voter to indicate, with or without ranking, his most preferred alternatives. A simulation based on randomly generated preference orders is used to estimate agreement between the weighted rules and majority rule. The results obtained may provide useful input to the design of voting systems in situations where majority rule is felt to be a desirable ideal but where practical considerations weigh against a system which attempts to determine whether there is a simple majority alternative and, if so, which alternative it is.

A voting procedure can be manipulated if, by misrepresenting his preferences, some individual can secure an outcome which he prefers to the outcome he gets when he is honest. This is an expository paper on the theory of voting manipulation. Section I is an historical sketch of the contributions of Condorcet, de Borda, Arrow, and others. Section II provides a set of examples of manipulation: of plurality voting, of majority voting, of exhaustive voting, of the single transferable vote procedure, and of approval voting. It also contains an example of a nonmanipulable random voting scheme. Section HI provides a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulation theorem.

Increasingly a case is being made that voting systems are highly manipulable —whether by strategic voting, agenda setting, or vote trading. Yet there exists little hard evidence on the actual extent of manipulation in real world settings1 To a large degree this lack of evidence is a result of voting methods that allow only partial recovery of individual preferences over multiple alternatives and of a natural desire of legislators not to publicize misrepresentation of preferences or strategic agenda setting. Yet if we are to understand the empirical relevance of recent advances in the theory of voting, attempts must be made to apply new theoretical work to real world voting situations. In this paper we attempt to do this for voting in Scandinavian legislatures. Our major concern is with effects of the order of voting on legislative proposals and with strategic voting that takes advantage of existing voting orders. Two distinct approaches are used. First, we present a detailed analysis of three situations in the Swedish parliament in which strategic voting was relevant. From these we conclude that when manipulation occurs in the Swedish context, it is not by altering the order of voting or by the creation of new, confounding alternatives, but by using strategic voting to take advantage of existing voting circumstances. Second, we take a more sweeping but less detailed look at voting in the Scandinavian legislatures. It appears from this analysis that the major way in which strategic voting is avoided is by limiting the number of alternatives to two.

This article deals with decision making in living systems at the levels of the organization, society, or supranational system. Abstention rates have a significant effect on the propensities of different voting procedures to elect the global Condorcet majority candidate in a three-candidate election when it exists. Hence any comparison of voting procedures that is concerned about the election of a global Condorcet candidate should reckon with abstention rates that may obtain for different procedures. Precise and approximate Condorcet propensities as functions of abstention rates are derived for the following voting rules for large electorates: Condorcet rules, including Black's rule; weighted scoring rules, including plurality and Borda rules; approval voting; and runoff elections in which a weighted scoring rule is used to eliminate one of the three candidates after the first ballot.

In this paper we compare two nonranked voting methods: regular approval voting (RAV) and combined approval voting (CAV). Under RAV a voter has two options with respect to each of the competing alternatives—cast one vote in favor or abstain, whereas under CAV he has three options—cast one vote in favor, abstain, or cast one vote against. Under both voting methods it is assumed that one must elect one out of three or more competing alternatives and that the alternative obtaining the largest (net) number of votes is elected. The comparison between these two voting methods shows: 1. Given that a voter is in a decisive position, he will prefer to operate under CAV than under RAV. No voter under CAV will choose to abstain with respect to any of the alternatives. 2. If all voters employ their dominant strategies the final outcome under both voting systems will be the same. 3. For any number of voters and competing alternatives, a single (nth) voter has a smaller probability of not being decisive under RAV and a larger probability of being strongly decisive under CAV. Consequently, the choice between RAV and CAV should depend on: (i) the magnitude of the difference between the expected utility a voter enjoys when he is strongly decisive and the expected disutility he suffers when he is not decisive; (ii) whether, ceteris paribus, a voter derives any psychological satisfaction from being able to vote against disapproved alternatives (CAV) instead of merely abstaining (RAV).

Voting procedures, which playa major role in the decision making subsystems of group and societal level systems, generate interesting paradoxes. Some have been intensively studied in recent years. The possibility that the alternative chosen by simple plurality voting may not be preferred to the defeated alternatives by a majority of the voters has, however, been neglected since its discovery by Borda in the 18th Century. The Borda effect has important implications for democratic theory and practice. With the use of survey data regarding voters' preference rankings, occurrences of the Borda effect were sought in the results of a British General Election. Fifteen instances were found out of 261 three-cornered contests. Fourteen of these resulted in a Conservative win. although in each case a majority of the voters preferred the Labor or the Liberal candidate. The frequency of the Borda effect turned out to be lower than would have been anticipated with equally likely preference rankings, but the phenomenon resulted in a systematic bias in the electoral outcomes.

Students of institutions characterized by plural or repetitive voting show an increasing concern with strategic voting (Niemi and Riker, 1976). Those who study legislative behavior are keenly aware of the importance of strategic voting as an element in the legislative process (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975). Game and social choice theorists are beginning to provide valuable theoretical and conceptual insights into the strategic behavior of legislators and legislatures (Arrow, 1951; Black, 1958; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962). Empirical researchers are relying increasingly on such theories and concepts, while continuing to provide richly detailed descriptions and explanations of legislative behavior (Fenno, 1973; Hinckley, 1972; Manley, 1970; Mayhew, 1974; Rhode and Shepsle, 1973). Students of judicial behavior (Murphy, 1964; Howard, 1968; Rhode and Spaeth, 1976), parties and party systems (Downs, 1957; Sjoblom, 1968), and more generally coalition behavior (Groennings, Kelley and Leiserson, 1970) also express a keen interest in strategic voting. Unfortunately, these theoretical and descriptive developments have not produced a corresponding concern for deriving a valid and efficient method for identifying any major patterns of strategic voting behavior. The dominant methods for analyzing patterns of roll call voting behavior are still those of cumulative scaling and factor analysis. The utility and importance of these techniques is not questioned here, but the assumptions underlying them are at odds with the concept of strategic voting. Admirable advances in measurement such as multi-dimensional scaling (Weisberg and