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To end the Colombian civil war known as La Violencia (1948–1957), the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed in 1958 to reconcile under the National Front, a 16-year coalition regime based on administrative power-sharing and presidential alternation (Kline 1980: 71–72). In 1961 Congress passed an Agrarian Reform Law but, bowing to the landowners' interests, the first two governments of the National Front took no serious steps to redistribute land (Tobon 1972). Determined to implement the reform, the next president, Liberal politician Carlos Lleras (1966–1970), promoted legislation granting land rights to tenants and sharecroppers and boosted the capabilities of INCORA, the Institute of Agrarian Reform. In 1967, he also launched an initiative to establish ANUC, the National Peasant Association of Colombia, as a state-sponsored organization that would promote peasant involvement in the provision of rural services and in the agrarian reform program (Zamosc 1986: 50–54). From the start, it was clear that Lleras expected that, as a peasant force pushing for land redistribution, ANUC would exert the pressure that was needed to overcome the landowners' opposition and facilitate INCORA's work. In the organizational campaign, promoters from the Ministry of Agriculture scoured the countryside instructing peasants about their rights, forming local and regional peasant associations, and grooming promising activists into a national leadership (Zamosc 1986: 54–60). When ANUC's national congress met in 1970, the number of registered members was about one million. The response had been especially strong in the areas of traditional haciendas (large estates), where tenants and sharecroppers wanted land of their own; and in the piedmont forest frontiers, where peasant colonists demanded infrastructure and services (Zamosc 1986: 61–62). Keywords: political sociology; class; conflict; movements; social change

Objective We investigate how beliefs about scientists and presidents affect views about two pandemics, Zika virus (2016) and COVID‐19 (2020). Methods Three New Hampshire surveys in 2016 and 2020 provide data to test how beliefs about scientists’ practices and presidential approval relate to pandemic views. Results Support for presidents consistently predicts perceptions of scientists’ integrity and trust in science agencies for information, but the directionality changes from 2016 to 2020—increased trust among Obama‐supporters; decreased trust among Trump‐supporters. Respondents who believe scientists lack objectivity are also less likely to trust science agencies during both Zika and COVID‐19 and are less apt to be confident in the government's response in 2016. Assessments of pandemic responses become increasingly political during 2020; most notably, support for President Trump strongly predicts confidence in the government's efforts. Conclusion Results highlight how beliefs about scientists’ practices and presidents are central to the science–politics nexus during pandemics.

This article draws from recently developed frameworks for the analysis of complex, boundary-spanning policy problems to consider the response of the Brazilian government in the initial stages of the novel coronavirus pandemic. The timeframe selected for analysis covers the first 12 weeks after the first confirmed case in the country. Analysis is focused on government coordination, including major policy measures such as a constitutional amendment and provisional presidential decrees, and on the role of discourses in policymaking. Findings indicate that the Brazilian government failed to respond properly to the pandemic and did not steer public action toward collectively accepted goals. Further consideration raises the question as to whether the government tried to halt the spread of the virus;an analysis of the ideology embraced by the national-populist political coalition suggests that the dehumanization of political enemies is a strategic alternative. Conclusions argue that the dehumanization of the other is a viable strategy for the government and suggest that the pandemic crisis is part of a continuum of crises that calls for a reframing of societal choices and political-economical design in Brazil and elsewhere.

Recent studies highlight positive effect of political connections on firm performance and stock returns. This paper shows that the positive effect of political connections on the cross-sectional stock returns disappears in the weak presidency period, defined as the last two years before the presidential party change, or period of low job approval ratings. The extent of the presidential party?s control over the Congress does not affect our main result. The result is driven by small firms, who typically do not have financial resources to hedge away political risks, and by the firms located in the states where residents more strongly support the president. Additional test suggests that the industries that rely on heavy government expenditure use a variety of political strategies to maintain the value of their political capital even during the weak presidency period.

The 2021 transition will be remembered as the most tumultuous in over a century. President Trump sought to delegitimize the presidential election as flawed and refused to concede his loss, and several of his departments and agencies slow‐walked their cooperation with the incoming team. Further, the insurrection on the Capitol and the Trump impeachment trial brought more turmoil. The question this article will consider is how, in such an environment, did Joseph R. Biden manage to complete the basic transition preparations needed to get off to the fast and effective start his administration had? A presidential transition has two dominant threads that come together to pave the path to a productive beginning. In 2020, early transition planning by the Biden team and existing laws detailing what resources the federal government will provide, when, and under what conditions were two important elements in his successful transition. Additionally, an effective transition depends on people leading it who have experience in both management and government service. The 2020–2021 transition had both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Presidential Studies Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Objectives The political discourse surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election highlighted discontent with both Congress and corporations, a reality corroborated in recent scholarship highlighting declines in institutional confidence among U.S. citizens. Here we test theories of institutional confidence to understand the social and cultural determinants of confidence in Congress and corporations prior to the start of the 2016 presidential campaigns. Methods We draw on data from the Religious Understandings of Science Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted in 2013–2014 (N = 9,416). Results We find that political ideology largely explained confidence in corporations while social location (particularly racial‐ethnic identity and gender) strongly related to confidence in Congress. Seemingly opposing factors converged to predict trust in both institutions. Conclusions Institutional confidence is shaped not only by social and cultural factors but also by the symbolic functions of institutions themselves.

Making 'connections that count' is the theme of Kate Richards' presidential year, as she takes the reins at the top of the RCVS. Here, Josh Loeb chats to her about her background, her varied career and her plans for the future.

When contesting for political office, leaders do not only seek to build their own following but also to engage in attacks to destabilize opponent leaders. However, research has yet to explore and explain the nature of attacks that seek to destabilize a leader's influence. Building on the identity leadership model which sees leadership as flowing from a leader's capacity to promote a sense of shared identity with followers, we argue that a leader can be destabilized if followers come to see the leader as defiling, devaluing, dividing, and destroying this shared sense of “us.” To explore these ideas, we analyzed the attack rhetoric used by Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. presidential debates to examine how they sought to subvert each other's leadership. Our analysis supports the proposed model and sheds light on the hitherto underexplored topic of leadership destabilization. Moreover, by helping us understand the ways in which principles of identity leadership can be weaponized to destabilize leadership, the analysis defines an important agenda for future research.

Until recently, presidential job approval has been positively correlated with a healthy economy. Despite pre-COVID-19 sanguine macroeconomic indicators, President Donald Trump's job approval numbers appear to be quite low relative to those of his predecessors. Using a Bayesian model to infer latent presidential approval, we regress approval on consumer sentiment, finding strong evidence of a structural break commencing with the inauguration of President Barack Obama. We also find that the positive associations between presidential approval and consumer sentiment have weakened. Finally, we posit that a polarized political landscape may contribute to the changing of the meaning of presidential approval, which now appears to be a proxy for partisanship.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Abolghasemi, Y, Dimitrov, S. Determining the causality between U.S. presidential prediction markets and global financial markets. Int J Fin Econ. 2020; 1– 23., which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2029. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

Objective This article examines whether female managers and female owners of firms are better empowered in presidential or parliamentary democracies. Parliamentary democracies might be more responsive to the demands of special interest groups, while government decision making might be more streamlined in presidential democracies. Methods We use firm‐level data from the World Bank for more than 100 emerging and developing nations and employ the logistic estimation procedure. Results Results show that female owners of firms thrive in presidential democracies, but the effects on female managers were largely statistically insignificant. Other interesting findings include both female managers and female owners facing special challenges in nations with greater gender inequality, with female owners benefiting in nations with a larger informal sector. Conclusions Our results show that the type of democracy is relevant in female entrepreneurship, with female owners of firms thriving in presidential democracies, but not necessarily female managers.

This paper maps the US presidential terms with price dynamics in US stock markets by focusing on the S&P500 index. Fractional integration techniques, which are more general than other standard methods, are used and the results obtained produce interesting findings. It was found that during the second presidential terms, S&P500 stock market is less efficient and present higher degrees of persistence in its volatility. This is observed independently of the political affiliations of the president in power. The volatility, in general, reflects the spillover of economic excesses at the end of the first presidential term when seeking re-election into the second term in office. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies at the end of the first term may create disequilibria in the economy which are amplified in the second term through a transmission mechanism resulting in contractionary interventionist policies in a situation where no incentive for re-election exists by the incumbent.

In this article, we examine the impact of President Donald Trump's visits on the campaign trail in the November 2018 midterm elections We find that President Trump's visits failed to either boost overall state-level turnout or support for GOP U S Senate candidates in these elections The results reinforce the notion that presidential capacity to influence voting behavior is limited, especially in an era of deep partisan polarization when partisan identity and other, more fundamental considerations shape vote choice and turnout decisions

With countries like Chile facing secularisation, some research predicts religious‐secular cleavages will ‘dealign’, while other research suggests these cleavages will persist so long as religious‐secular divisions are reflected among presidential candidates. Using surveys of first‐round voting intentions in the five most recent presidential elections in Chile, the analysis shows that religious‐secular divisions in voting appear when candidates are divided clearly along religious‐secular lines (and not when divisions among candidates are blurred). These findings suggest researchers need to account for the impact candidates' positions have on the appearance of religious‐secular divisions before declaring that dealignment has occurred.

This symposium assesses the trajectory of European Union (EU) environmental policy and integration in light of the rising pressure for policy dismantling and disintegration. This introductory article discusses the literature and the mixed evidence of EU environmental policy dismantling. Building on the three symposium articles, we investigate the role of the European Commission in this process, evaluating its role as a general ‘motor of integration’ and more specifically as an environmental policy entrepreneur. We find that the current political context does push the Commission to reconsider its entrepreneurial role and adopt the role of a ‘normalised bureaucracy’. Nonetheless, organisational features, such as new organisational hierarchies and presidential leadership, and ideas that frame policy initiatives explain continued policy evolution and resistance to outright dismantling. Scholars also should pay close attention to implementing measures and patterns of enforcement to detect the more subtle policy shifts.

Objective Presidents routinely employ public statements to inform Congress about their position on pending legislation. Position‐taking is strategic, with presidents choosing whether, how, how often, and when to intervene. We move beyond the traditional dichotomies of issuance and position to explore the timing and frequency of presidential position‐taking during the lawmaking process. Method We use Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)–bill‐specific messages addressed to Congress–to analyze presidential communications. Our regression analyses examine both the frequency of SAPs usage on bills and when in the process presidents communicate their position. Results We find that presidents take positions sparingly and most often at the early stages of the lawmaking process. Conclusion Presidential communications during the lawmaking process are more about winnowing options and bargaining over bill text than influencing pivotal votes.

The social welfare effects of legislatures in presidential systems, such as the U.S. Congress, are frequently lamented. In response, there are proposals to reform the separation of powers system by giving presidents control of the legislative agenda and weakening rules such as the filibuster. We provide a game‐theoretic analysis of the policy and social welfare consequences of a more executive‐centric system. Integrating standard assumptions about legislative and executive incentives into a dynamic model of decision making with private investment, we show there are a variety of conditions under which stronger executives do not produce better outcomes. Moreover, we characterize how these conditions depend on factors such as the stability of the policymaking environment or investment fundamentals. Our findings are robust and consistent with empirical observations that U.S. policy outputs are not necessarily worse than those of nations with stronger executives, which more closely approximate prominent proposals by populist‐oriented reformers.