The two main legal forms of insurance companies are stock companies and mutual companies. The main characteristic of a mutual company is that it is owned and controlled, at least in theory, by its policyholders. In a context of growth, one major handicap inherent in the mutual form is its limited access to the equity market. A new type of insurance organization was recently allowed in the province of Quebec, Canada, so that an insurance company would have access to the equity market while aiming at preserving the mutual philosophy. According to this new scheme, the voting rights of the policyholders are transferred from the insurance company to an upstream holding whose sole purpose is to control the insurance company transformed from a mutual to a stock company. Outside investors are then allowed to hold a minority interest in this new stock company. This type of organization will be described in more detail later on. It is believed that this new scheme will attract the capital necessary to achieve growth objectives, while leaving the control of the stock insurance company in the hands of the policyholders. The relative advantages of the stock and mutual forms of insurance companies have been studied from different standpoints, and therefore contributions can be found in the actuarial, legal, and financial economic literature. While some authors have focused on technical and performance issues related to the legal form of the company, and to the conversion of stock to mutual or vice-versa (Cameron, 1981; Gold, 1975; Plumley, 1984; Spiller, 1972), a great deal of research has been devoted to issues of governance, incentive conflicts, and the determinants of ownership structure in stock and mutual companies (Carter & Stover, 1990; Doherty & Dionne, 1987; Gingras, 1984; Hansmann, 1985; Lamm-Tennant & Starks, 1989; Mayers & Smith, 1981, 198; McNamara & Rhee, 1992). Most of this literature put into evidence the widespread agency problems in the insurance industry, which can be related, to some degree, to the high level of asymmetry of information between the seller and the buyer in this industry. The asymmetry of information is not surprising, given that a life insurance policy is an intangible product, based on a probabilistic reasoning not easily grasped. The history of the North American life insurance industry unveils a non-negligible number of mutualisations and demutualisations. These have been rationalized along different lines, often related to agency problems, and are often associated with wealth transfers from the policyholders to the shareholders. Let us recall here the Armstrong-Hughes investigation at the beginning of the century, which resulted in a large number of mutualisations. This investigation was set up following, notably, the detection of widespread use of disguised tontine plans where the owners of the insurance company were the main beneficiaries at the expense of the policyholders. A wave of mutualisations in Canada at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was officially justified by the fear of foreign takeovers. However, it could as well be argued that some mutualisations served as a pretext for private stockholders to make a good deal at the expense of future policyholders. A main issue in most demutualisations was the estimation of an appropriate compensation to the policyholders, in order to avoid wealth transfers from the policyholders to the stockholders. The new form of insurance organization analyzed in this paper also carries with it potential wealth transfers at the expense of the policyholders, in the form of a put option given to external investors. It will be argued, however, that in this special case, it can actually be rational for the policyholders to subsidize external shareholders, in order to avoid bankruptcy costs. Bearing in mind the potential wealth transfers associated with a change of legal form, the purpose of this paper is to analyze this new form of organization where mutualist and capitalist shareholders coexist. …