Search

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2008.01148.x Byline: Robert Ackrill (l), Adrian Kay (2) Abstract: The Uruguay Round Agreement made significant changes to the governance of international trade. Trade rules and dispute settlement mechanisms were altered and a series of specific agreements provided for liberalisation across economic sectors. The Agreement on Agriculture, arguably the most difficult and contentious to negotiate, permitted the continued use of trade-distorting instruments, both domestically and at the border. Rule-enforcement in agriculture therefore relies crucially on the clarity of the rules. This paper provides an in-depth study of a unique and critical case for understanding the new rules: the EC sugar regime. This policy was challenged unsuccessfully under the pre-Uruguay Round rules, but successfully under the new rules. This case is particularly valuable in allowing us to isolate the effect of the Uruguay Round on agricultural trade disputes: the policy under challenge was essentially unchanged and the legal actions addressed the same concern - excessive export subsidisation. Drawing on primary and secondary materials and interviews with key policy actors, sugar is used to illustrate how those involved in the multilateral process learned from particular rule weaknesses revealed in earlier cases, revising those rules in the Uruguay Round in such a way that dispute panels can more readily and objectively determine rule breaches. Author Affiliation: (l)Nottingham Trent University (2)Griffith University, Brisbane

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.2008.00137.x Byline: Robert Ackrill (1), Adrian Kay (2), Wyn Morgan (3) Abstract: In 2008, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reached its fiftieth birthday. It has been a constant factor in directing resources to the EU agricultural sector, but the means of channelling these resources have changed considerably over time. This article charts the evolution of the CAPs principal policy instruments and analyzes the welfare effects of its major reforms. It also analyzes these changes in terms of the institutional context of the principal reform pressures, namely international trade obligations and EU budget concerns. We will show that the link between these two pressures was never one of simple determinism: the CAP and its reform can only be understood in light of these pressures and of endogenous vested interests to the policy. En 2008, la Politique agricole commune (PAC) celebre ses 50 ans. Cette politique a ete un facteur constant de l'orientation des ressources vers le secteur agricole de l'UE, mais les moyens utilises pour acheminer ces ressources ont change considerablement au fil du temps. Le present article retrace l'evolution des principaux instruments de la PAC et analyse les effets de ses grandes reformes sur le bien-etre. Elle analyse aussi ces changements dans le contexte institutionnel des pressions de la reforme, a savoir les obligations commerciales internationales et les preoccupations quant au budget de l'UE. Nous montrons que le lien entre ces deux types de pression n'a jamais ete d'un determinisme simple: la PAC et sa reforme ne peuvent etre comprises qu'en examinant ces pressions et les droits acquis endogenes qu'elles generent. Author Affiliation: (1)Division of Economics, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street, Nottingham NG1 4BU, UK (corresponding author: phone: +44 115 848 4234; fax: +44 115 848 4707; e-mail:robert.ackrill@ntu.ac.uk). (2)Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics & Public Policy, Griffith Business School, Nathan, Brisbane QLD 4111, Australia (phone: +61 (0)7 3735 5401; fax: +61 (0)7 3735 7737; e-mail:a.kay@griffith.edu.au). (3)Associate Professor in Economics and Director of Teaching and Learning, School of Economics, B3, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK (phone: +44(0)115 9515473; fax: +44(0)115 9514159; e-mail:wyn.morgan@nottingham.ac.uk).

The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy needs additional reform, although price supports were lowered at the 1999 meeting. Plans include review of rules for arable agriculture in 2002 and the dairy industry in 2003.