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The public accounting systems of the local governments of various countries are shown to have little homogenization. The problems involved in narrowing this accounting diversity are examined, and resulting benefits are offered.

The tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) 'movement' of the 1970s and 1980s can be characterized in part as a struggle between local autonomy and state control. Undeniable shifts have occurred over the same period in state and local revenue systems and functional responsibilities. This article places these shifts within the context of this movement, using pooled, cross-sectional, time-series techniques for the period between 1970 and 1990, in an effort to assess its impacts. Findings suggest that TELs have resulted in increased centralization, lessened local responsiveness, increased use of local non-tax sources of revenue, and a sector less accommodating to the needs of dependent populations. TELs may have also had dubious effects on both the allocative efficiency and equity of the state and local public sector.

The author surveyed newspaper managing editors and municipal finance directors about the effect of newspaper coverage on the accountability of local government budget activities and policies. Using the survey findings, he argues that newspapers are selective about what constitutes news, and that while newspapers receive adequate information from public officials, many reporters and editors lack the training to understand and interpret complex budget activities and policies. A content analysis of newspapers supports the survey findings and presents additional evidence. The result is a weakening of any assessment by the press. Overall, the results challenge the commonly accepted argument that press publicity provides an effective external control over the competence, responsiveness, and accountability of public officials. The article suggests that budget officials can take steps to improve accuracy in reporting and accountability by taking a more active approach with the press.

The evolution of U.S. public budgeting has been described by Schick (1966) as a progression from a control orientation to a management and then a planning orientation. Lee (1992) has tracked the evolution of central budgeting staff largely from a group of accountants to a more varied set of backgrounds, dominated by public administration and general liberal arts educations. As Poland decentralizes fiscal and administrative responsibilities and powers to gminas (local self-governments), the gmina councils are beginning to view the budget as more than a financial accounting tool proscribed and prescribed by the central government. They are beginning to see the potential for using the budget as a policy and management tool. The evolutionary transformation of budgeting, which took fifty years in the United States, may take only five years in Poland. The evidence for this metamorphosis is based on interviews with several gmina city budgeters, with special attention devoted to the city of Lublin.

Financial disclosure practices in US local governments have been improved by regulatory activities of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board with the increased quality of reporting resulting in a greater number of qualified audit opinions. The accounting boards have also generated more extensive information through its Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting program. The program awards recognition for information reported that was not required by the accounting standards board.

This article compares government expenditures by functional category of the federal government relative to state and local governments and the changes in their respective roles since 1955. The article includes a review of the federal role relative to the state and local role on a function-by-function basis for these three and a half decades. This analysis demonstrates considerable stability in the federal sector and the state and local sector, but also the capacity for change.

Is there evidence of a principal-agent problem in the municipal bond industry? Do public managers, either on their own or through private sector agents, act to increase their own utility at the expense of the public? This article examines municipal bond decisions in the context of principal-agent theory based on data collected through a random sample survey of municipal bond issuers. Principal-agent theory is not well developed in the public sector. In the municipal bond industry, however, we have evidence that it helps explain the actions of public managers and elected officials, in particular for pay to play and the importance of interest rates vis-a-vis relationships. These actions carry potential costs to citizens.

Nonprofit organizations thrive on the altruism of citizens, and actively court donors for major gifts. Yet individual gifts to government agencies are often unexpected, sporadic, and initiated by the donor. This article introduces the phenomenon of private giving to local governments and tests hypotheses regarding the expected forms of giving to public agencies. Results indicate that philanthropy is and will likely remain a minor and highly variable source of revenue, making it an ill-suited replacement for broad-based tax revenue. However, deliberate government efforts to provide a suitable environment for private donations appear to succeed in attracting more gifts per capita.

This article empirically investigates the effects of introducing statewide measures to limit the ability of local jurisdictions to raise revenue or make expenditures. It does so in intervals of five years over a 25-year period, using fiscal observations for 31,804 units of local government in 787 metropolitan counties across the contiguous United States. Specifically explored is the effect of tax and expenditure limitations on the variation in revenues and expenditures between general purpose governments and school districts within county areas. Rather than imposing a uniform constraint across jurisdictions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are associated with increased variation across both general purpose and school district revenues and expenditures and, by implication, increased service differentials. Effects are found to be asymmetric, with increased variation greatest within counties comprising the urban core and those with relatively more disadvantaged populations. The implications are that TELs are most constraining on the ability of governments serving economically less prosperous and at risk populations to meet public service needs. Such differential effects are of more than questionable merit and are the result of the application of blunt instruments to what is often an undemonstrated need. The outcome impairs both the efficiency and responsiveness of the local public sector.

The spending preferences of local government budget analysts are based on individual decision modes; how individuals attend to, encode, and process information. While academicians and practitioners tend to assume that a budget analyst's disposition to act leads to specific spending preferences, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. This study draws on two theoretical constructs derived from social psychology, rationality (objectivism), and emotions (empathy). Leary and his colleagues demonstrate that objectivism predisposes one toward rational decision making in a variety of settings, while Eisenberg and her colleagues show that highly empathic individuals are predisposed toward helping and prosocial behavior. Results of this study suggests that empathic budget analysts, those scoring higher on the empathy scale, have distinctly different spending preferences than those budget analysts scoring higher on the objectivism scale; empathic budget analysts are disposed toward humanitarian criteria in decision making while objective budget analysts are disposed toward quantifiable cost-benefit considerations.

Municipal bonds traditionally have been classified into two general types: term bonds, paid off in a lump sum at the end of the term of the loan, and serial bonds, retired in annual installments. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a number of new fiscal instruments have been devised to meet the changing needs of the municipal bond market. While these new financing techniques are not a panacea, their careful application may uncover some real opportunities for meeting the needs of local government for expanded capital facilities.

Rural local governments frequently lack the capacity to analyze and monitor their financial condition. This article presents three tools that were used in a pilot project to analyze the fiscal health of a rural Minnesota county. The article compares and contrasts these methodologies by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses, the usefulness of the results, and the ease or difficulty of use of the tools.