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The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

Revision in history is conventionally characterized as a linear sequence of changes over time. Drawing together the contributions of those engaged in historiographical debates that are often associated with the term "revision," however, we find our attention directed to the spaces rather than the sequences of history. Contributions to historical debates are characterized by the marked use of spatial imagery and spatialized language. These used to suggest both the demarcation of the "space of history" and the erasure of existing historiographies from that space. Bearing these features in mind, the essay argues that traditional, temporally oriented explanations for revision in history, such as Thomas S. Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions," miss the mark, and that a more promising line of explanation arises from the combined use of Michel Foucault's idea of "heterotopias" and Marc Augé's idea of "non-places." Revision in history is to be found where writers use imagery to move readers away from rival historiographies and to control their movement in the space of history toward their desired vision. Revision is thus associated more with control than with liberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is an account of the "revisionism" movement of the 1970s and 1980s in Soviet history, analyzing its challenge to the totalitarian model in terms of Kuhnian paradigm shift. The focus is on revisionism of the Stalin period, an area that was particularly highly charged by the passions of the Cold War. These passions tended to obscure the fact that one of the main issues at stake was not ideological but purely disciplinary, namely a challenge by social historians to the dominance of political history. A similar challenge, this time against the dominance of social history on behalf of cultural history, was issued in the 1990s by "post-revisionists." Although I was a participant in the battles of the 1970s, the essay is less a personal account than a case-based analysis of the way disciplinary orthodoxies in the social sciences and humanities are established and challenged, and why this happens when it does. In the case of Soviet history, I argue that new data and external events played a surprisingly small role, and generational change a large one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the introduction of the notion of "paradigm" into the language of educational research and curriculum evaluation. The introduction is based on a misunderstanding or inaccurate representation of Kuhn's work. The term can also lead to unclear thinking among educationists especially those involved with curriculum evaluation. It can also lead to unproductive debate and misrepresent the educational research enterprise. There are also dangers posed by the too easy acceptance of the concept by educational researchers.

In this article the author focuses on the controversy surrounding sociologist Thomas S. Kuhn's book entitled "The Structure of Scientific Revolution." The author here makes two points that are raised for sociology by Kuhn's argument. The first point will detail the non-radical and the radical responses to his account, both responses being characterized by a belief that Kuhn's argument about natural scientific development somehow legitimates the sort of sociology they are currently practicing. The second point is that it does not follow from this that Kuhn is of no interest to sociologists; on the contrary, he has an extremely interesting although limited sociology of natural scientific knowledge. What are the non-radical and radical sociological reactions that have developed or could develop in response to this thesis? Central to both and to Kuhn's argument is the notion of a paradigm. The none radical sociological reaction is the claim that if sociology is to develop it must transcend the present situation where there are multitudinous pre-pre-paradigms competing with each other, where work is done at all sorts of levels and significance, and where there is excessive methodological neurosis.