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The purpose of this paper is to examine the present U.S. use of the concept of 'corporate culture' using the sociology of Emile Durkheim as a conceptual framework. Durkheim was concerned with understanding where potential sources of morality might reside in a rapidly changing, increasingly differentiated society. Proponents of corporate culture do not rely specifically on Durkheim's work but essentially answer his question by suggesting that the corporation is the appropriate site for moral order. In this paper it is argued that the attempted manipulation of a corporation's culture is simply an addition to other forms of control which companies have tried to implement. More than other forms of control, however, corporate culture elicits sentiment and emotion, and contains possibilities to ensnare workers in a hegemonic system. On the other hand, strengthening corporate cultures in the U.S.A may also lead to increased worker homogenization and activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article identifies the American philosophical antecedents that informed Woodrow Wilson Sayre's failed attempt to climb Mount Everest in 1962. Sayre, a philosophy professor at Tufts University, was an extreme proponent of individualism and saw the challenge of climbing Everest as a struggle of one man against cold, 'antiseptic' Nature. In his writings on the subject Sayre uses some of the same cultural notions about humanity and mountains that were current in American intellectual culture during the 19th century. The paper traces these notions from the Transcendentalists and American poetic descriptions of mountains through to Sayre's writings. The paper ends by describing the official response to Sayre's expedition as revealed in archival sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though it lacks adequate empirical support, the hypothesis of declining social attachments as a source of American social problems persists. Both mass society theory in the mid-twentieth century and the theory of declining social capital in the late-twentieth century have had broad appeal. This paper demonstrates the continuities in argument and assumptions between these two theories as well as the modifications of the theory in the face of cultural change. It suggests that some of the weaknesses in the theory of decreasing social capital can be traced to the assumptions it shares with mass society theory—assumptions rooted in concerns about individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic immigration, the rise of new religious movements, burgeoning religious individualism, and the ascendance of the New Age have all been cited as responsible for a growing diversity of religious expressions in the United States. While each of these theses may have merit, little systematic inquiry has been brought to bear on the composition of the margins of the American religious economy. Further, there are serious questions about our ability to gauge the growth and composition of these diverse groups using extant data. In this paper, I examine patterns of growth and retention in the "Other" religions reported by respondents to the 1973-1996 General Social Survey. Using NORC tabulations not available in the GSS datafiles, I construct trends in affiliation with the diverse groups that comprise this category. My findings reveal considerable growth in the "other" religions, however about half of the growth in this category is a function of growing numbers of Christians being erroneously placed in this group. I revise the overall distributions of religious affiliations to take into account Christian misclassification, and this yields better estimates of the proportion of Americans who identify with non-Judeo Christian faiths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Group inequalities in the United States are most often attributed to the characteristics of the individuals who belong to these groups; thinking about structural causes of group inequalities is rare. This paper reviews cognitive, cultural, and systemic reasons for this bias. The efficacy of education as a way to increase structural thinking was investigated in two studies of college students' causal thinking about group inequalities. Both studies involved a course on intergroup relations that covered structural sources of racial or ethnic inequalities. Results supported hypotheses that the course would increase structural thinking about racial or ethnic inequality, and that structural thinking would generalize to inequalities nor explicitly covered in the course. Both course content and active learning pedagogy were related to structural thinking about inequalities. Active learning was also related to applying structural thinking to targets of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current investigation tested life satisfaction (LS), a cognitive component of subjective well‐being, among emerging adults, in the context of individualism (I) and collectivism (C), by distinguishing both cultural and individual levels of analysis, considering their horizontal (H) and vertical (V) dimensions, and controlling age and gender effects. Emerging adults (N = 1760 university students, aged 18–25, Mage = 19.46, SDag = 1.50) located across four countries, namely China, Italy, Russia, and the USA, known to differ in the individualism index value (IDV), completed measures on the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism and Life Satisfaction. At the cultural level, an ANCOVA showed a significant country effects on LS. The post hoc comparisons indicated that the higher the country IDV score, the higher the average LS score, in the following order: Americans, Italians, Russians, and Chinese. At the individual level, LS was unrelated to HI and VI. Instead, it was associated with HC and VC. The positive link between LS and VC suggested an important role of family connectedness on LS across different cultures during emerging adulthood. However, contrary to previous studies, LS was unrelated to HI and VI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beginning immigrant teachers may experience cross‐cultural conflicts because their home cultures may differ in important ways from U.S. school culture. In California, mentors are assigned to work with new teachers, many born in other countries, to solve a range of problems—often attributable to cross‐cultural conflicts between the culture of the school and the cultures of these teachers. Mentors are veteran teachers, but even those who receive special training as mentors are not educated in theories explaining how culture influences child‐rearing and schooling practices. In this study, 12 beginning immigrant high school math and science teachers born in Asia and Latin America participated in lengthy, semi‐structured interviews conducted by an experienced mentor specialist (not known to the participants). Conflicts reported by participants were analysed from the perspective of differences between the collectivistic cultures of the teachers and individualistic culture of the schools in which they teach. The conflicts reported, primed in part by the nature of interview questions, were categorised as having to do with differences in perceptions of the roles of parents, teachers and students and relations among those roles—particularly in terms of role hierarchy and regard for authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Y. Takano and E. Osaka (2018, this issue) provide strong and irrefutable empirical evidence that the "common view"—that Japanese are typically collectivists whereas Americans are typically individualists—is not supported by data. Given other reviews in the past that have led to the same conclusion, in this commentary, I argue that now is the time for the field to take stock and reconsider this common view. This commentary briefly describes conceptual, empirical, and practical problems concerning the common view and offers suggestions to move beyond it. By moving beyond the common view, and other similar explanations of cross‐cultural differences, cross‐cultural researchers in particular can lead the way in facilitating a further evolution of research and theory about the link between cultures and individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been long believed that the Japanese are typical collectivists whereas Americans are typical individualists. To examine the validity of this common view, we formerly reviewed 15 empirical studies that compared Japanese and Americans regarding individualism/collectivism (I/C), and found that the overwhelming majority of those studies had not supported the common view (Takano & Osaka,). In this follow‐up, we reviewed 20 additional empirical studies (7 behavioral studies, 13 questionnaire studies), most of which had been published after the former review. When combined with the formerly reviewed 15 studies, 19 studies reported no clear difference, and 11 studies reported that Japanese were more individualistic than Americans. These 30 studies are inconsistent with the common view. Only 5 studies supported the common view, even when we included 3 studies whose validity was questionable. After it was formerly found that the common view was not supported empirically, a variety of alternative accounts were presented regarding the reason for this finding. We examined three major accounts in light of the reviewed studies and found that none of them was congruent with the empirical data. Thus, it seems to be reasonable to conclude that the common view is not valid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continuing a long-standing trend in the U.S. Social Security Administration database of first names ( N = 358 million), American parents were less likely to choose common names for their children between 2004 and 2015, including the years of the Great Recession (2008-2010). These trends were similar in California (severely affected by the recession) and Texas (less affected). Over a longer time period (1901-2015), cyclical economic indicators were either not correlated with common names (e.g., stock market performance) or worse economic times predicted fewer common names. The results are consistent with increasing individualism, with limited support for the idea that economic threat leads people to embrace uniqueness and no real support for the idea that economic deprivation leads to more communal name choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the heels of recent police shootings of an unarmed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina, and the death of Freddy Gray in Baltimore, Maryland, that stoked racial tensions, this article examines how beliefs about race and racial inequality influence whites' attitudes toward the use of force by the police since the mid-1980s. Our main dependent measure is a composite index ('Police Force Index') constructed from four survey items from the 1986-2012 National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey ( GSS). Results show that (1) beliefs about race do indeed significantly predict whites' attitudes toward police use of force, and more importantly, (2) this effect has remained constant since the mid-1980s. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings and suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new framework for understanding cultural differences in self-construal by noting the duality of this construct. Based on the analysis of the adaptive roles of self-construal, we predicted that a US-Japan difference in self-construal exists in the contrast between self-expression and rejection avoidance. We confirmed these predictions using newly constructed self-construal scales. Compared to Japanese respondents, American respondents were higher on self-expression and lower on rejection avoidance. Our findings regarding the contrast between distinctiveness of the self and harmony seeking, which are traditionally discussed as the core features of independence and interdependence, did not support the standard cultural psychological view. The two groups of respondents did not differ on distinctiveness of the self and the American respondents were higher on harmony seeking than were Japanese respondents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of the reemerging threat of preventable diseases and the simultaneous vaccine risk controversy, what explains variations in Americans' policy preferences regarding childhood vaccinations? Using original data from a recent nationwide Internet survey of 1,213 American adults, this research seeks to explain differing public opinions on childhood vaccination policies and related issues of governance. As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group cultural theory of policy preference formation suggests, cultural biases have a significant impact on the formation of preferences toward various vaccination policies. Hierarchs are in support of mandatory vaccination, oppose religious and philosophical exemption, and believe the government should preside over vaccination-related decisions. Fatalists strike a bold contrast in their opposition to mandatory vaccination policy and support for religious and philosophical exemptions and the role of parents in deciding on vaccinations. Falling between hierarchs and fatalists, egalitarian support for vaccinations is stronger than individualists'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the life and career of economist Elinor Ostrom. The author reflects on her application of the rational choice model in political science and methodological individualism to understand cooperative behavior and institutions. Other topics include the book "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action," individuals and the perceived costs and benefits of future actions, and common property regimes.

In an extended era of privatization initiatives, when accountability principles and competitive business logics pervade school discourse and practice, what is left of the 'public' part of public schooling? When market rationality privileges individualism and competition and provides much of the justification for the aims of U.S. schools, how is the notion of the public good evidenced? In this essay Deron Boyles makes the claim that public schools inordinately function as private markets-as places where a unidirectional narrative of 'givens' reinforce individualism, competition, and corporatization under the guise of merit, testing, and school-business partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, David Labaree examines the paradox of educationalization in the American context. He argues that, like most modern Western societies, the United States has displayed a strong tendency over the years for educationalizing social problems, even though schools have repeatedly proven that they are an ineffective mechanism for solving these problems. He starts by examining the ways in which the process of educationalizing social problems is deeply grounded in American beliefs, social processes, political and organizational tensions, and structural possibilities. These include utility, individualism, optimism, professional interest, political interest, political opportunity, structural limits, and formalism. Then Labaree examines the roots of education’s failure in the role of social reform agent. Finally, he closes with an analysis of why we continue to pursue educationalization in the face of its ineffectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I point to contradictions in American individualism not unlike those suggested by Robin M. Williams Jr. I go on to suggest how twenty-first-century sociologists might better understand this aspect of American exceptionalism: not as an egoistic, asocial individualism, but as a covenantal, social voluntarism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The definitions of individualism/collectivism and the content of scale items used to assess them could explain the lack of cross-cultural differences reported in some research. Specifically, existing scales may not adequately assess expected cultural differences. In study 1 , a new scale was given in Japan and the USA. Three factors were identified in both cultures. Japanese scored higher on the others focus factor but scored lower on the helping others factor than the US Americans. In study 2 , a forced choice version replicated results in study 1 . In studies 3 and 4 , the factor structure and cultural differences were replicated and the convergent and the divergent validities of the scale were examined. Results indicate that Japanese may be more others oriented depending on the item content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The postmodern critique of modernity has focused on the construction of the modern subject and the self-disciplining and self-cancellation tendencies within it. This critique, however, fails to consider what happens during the early years of children’s development — the period during which the modern subject is made, and the one in which the paradoxes and ambiguities inherent in modern subjectivity are established. In this essay Guoping Zhao analyzes how children’s developmental process affects the definition and formation of the self in the United States. She uses a cross-cultural lens, comparing the dominant cultural ideas and practices associated with child development in the United States (stemming from the ideology of liberal individualism) with those influenced and supported by Confucianism. Zhao argues that children’s paths of development are not natural but cultural ones guided by underlying ideologies, and ultimately concludes that this cultural process determines the shapes and forms of the modern subject and the nature of individual freedom and autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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“Winnowing” is the pre-floor process by which Congress determines the small percentage of bills that will receive committee attention. The vast majority of proposals languish in this vital agenda-setting stage, yet our understanding of winnowing is nascent. Why do some bills move forward while most fail? I examine that question here by developing and testing a theoretical framework of winnowing grounded in bounded rationality, which includes institutional and sponsor cues and also incorporates the unique issue milieu. A heteroskedastic probit model is utilized to analyze the winnowing fate of all bills introduced across five issue areas in the House and Senate from 1991 to 1998. The findings counter much received wisdom and suggest that the process is indeed cue based. The majority party helps structure this critical process in both chambers, though party effects appear stronger in the House. Contrary to recent work on the rise of Senate individualism, the seniority of the sponsor has significant effects in both the Senate and House, but again exhibits a stronger effect in the House. Surprisingly, presidential proposals are no more likely to survive than typical bills. The findings further suggest that the entrepreneurial efforts of bill sponsors breathe life into this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author defines individualism and collectivism before examining how they are integral parts of the counseling process for clients and counselors. Although individualism has been assumed to be the norm for the counseling culture in the United States, recent work notes the influence of collectivism on professionals and clients in the counseling system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new trend in Collaborative Family Law (CFL) in the United States and Canada raises new questions about theories of justice. CFL achieves many of the goals of a viable theory of justice and its implicit critique of the legal system is a valid one. However, it unnecessarily demonizes law and has yet to explicitly articulate where it fits in terms of its own theory of justice. After considering the claims made by CFL, it is apparent that while some are productive, others are problematic and should be discarded. Specifically, CFL's rejection of factual determinacy may be inappropriate in some cases. The CFL approach has the potential to ignore problems of power imbalance, and may sacrifice just outcomes for the sake of efficiency. The emphasis on relationships and the need for their protection is not always an appropriate approach, and in demonizing law in favor of private ordering, CFL unnecessarily rejects the importance of law as a site for public participation in the creation and defense of norms. CFL is an important step forward in law reform, but if it is to fulfill its potential, it needs to incorporate within its practice a theory of justice that avoids the pitfalls of liberal individualism and allows for the public authorship of norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increased job complexity and autonomy have often been associated with improved performance in work groups. This study examines the mediating effect of group cohesiveness. The moderating effects of individualism/collectivism on the relationship between job characteristics (both complexity and autonomy) and cohesiveness are also tested. The sample consists of 381 teams drawn from the Hong Kong and U.S. branches of an international bank. The findings indicate that an increase in job complexity and/or task autonomy will increase group cohesiveness, which subsequently translates to better performance. The positive effects of job complexity and autonomy on group cohesiveness are also found to be more prominent for individualistic rather than collectivistic work groups. The theoretical implications of the results and the limitations of the study are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research studied the influence of acculturation on the values of Hispanic MBAs in the USA and the effect these values have on job attribute preferences. As predicted, the less acculturated Hispanic MBAs had significantly higher collectivist values than either highly acculturated Hispanic or Anglo-American MBAs. Surprisingly, acculturation was not related to individualism. As theorized, collectivistic, and not individualistic, values were significantly related to a preference for contextual job attributes. In contrast, individualistic, and not collectivistic, values were related to a preference for task-related job attributes. The findings point to the importance of understanding an individual's level of acculturation and his/her specific values, rather than assuming differences based on ethnicity. In addition, the findings indicate that managers dealing with diversity within the USA or globally must understand their employees' individualistic/collectivistic values before implementing any job design initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the racial ideology of Western nations. A specter is haunting Europe as well as other Western nations, and this time, unlike in 1848, it is not the specter of communism. This time around, it is the ghost of an old Western tradition, the tradition of racism that, as Marx once said about past collective history, "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." In nations with historical racial minorities, such as the United States, New Zealand, Canada, England, and even South Africa, Whites characterize targeted programs to assist racial minorities as "reverse discrimination" or, in the case of the Netherlands, as "positive discrimination." Racist violence is on the rise in the United States, Germany, France, England, the Netherlands, and even Western nations usually perceived as tolerant, such as Spain and Italy. Politicians of all hues routinely make inflammatory racial comments. For instance, in Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said after his 1980 re-election that although the integration of immigrants was very important. It's not easy for Germans who live in an apartment house and don't like the smell of garlic to have to put with it and even to have a lamb slaughtered in the hallway.

The article identifies individualistic and collectivist systems of family eldercare and explores their dimensions. Public and scholarly concern that the family has eroded as an institution and no longer takes care of its members has been a dominant feature of family discourse in recent years. With longer life spans, increases in the average number of years that the elderly live with chronic illnesses and disabilities, and fewer children to share caregiving, family members today provide more eldercare for longer periods than ever before in the U.S. history. Such trends are likely to continue. Current cost containment measures that transfer caregiving work from public social services to unpaid family members indicate families will be absorbing even greater eldercare demands. Collectivist or individualistic orientations to family relations undergirded very different strategies of family eldercare. Individualists minimized caregiving, provided less hands-on physical care to frail elderly parents and relied in- stead on formal supports, such as residential facilities, nursing homes, and hired help.

Culture-related dimensions contribute to a more complete understanding of romantic love. In particular, we suggest that the dimensions of individualism and collectivism, at both societal and psychological levels, offer insights into the nature of romantic love and its perceived importance for marriage. Changes In values pertaining to romantic love and its role In choosing a spouse are evident In several traditionally collectivistic societies and among persons from these societies emigrating to countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States. Given these trends, we discuss the need to study individualism and collectivism at the psychological level and present findings from our own program of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a generation, contemporary mainland Chinese have lived under first a military dictatorship and now a political party dictatorship. How to explain to an eager Chinese academic audience what the American dream of 'liberty and Justice for all'-realized only in part in some areas but approached progressively nearer in others-really means? The U.S. has predominantly a capitalist system but its people are committed to equality of opportunity. It tempers 'rugged individualism' by concern for the poor, the handicapped and the unfortunate. It has many serious economic, social and cultural problems but its citizens, drawn from most of the peoples of the world-not the special interest groups trying to benefit at the expense of others-are determined to solve them equitably and rationally. The trade and budget deficits are related to government instrumentalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's view on the family system in the U.S. and his predictions regarding possible changes in the system by the end of twentieth century. He says that marriage vows have become anachronistic and have lost much of their meaning. According to him, twentieth century will witness the movement of many values formerly associated with family membership over to the individual.

The article presents some sociological insights into American culture and personality. The cross-disciplinary field of culture and personality changes so rapidly that it is difficult for those in one involved discipline to keep up with what is taking place in others. It is even more difficult to ascertain many of the important implications of those changes. The author of this article attempts a brief exploration of a few of the currently emerging implications of this relativity conception. The implications of white-collar criminality and, even more, of broader conception could shake the very foundations of many persons' conceptions of culture, personality, American society, and human society. Just as the psychopathic is a more or less great distortion of the hypothetical normal, so the criminal who is convicted has a great deal in common with other members of society and reflects accurately aspects of society's culture and subcultures. Sharp trading, getting things done, individualism, being competitive and aggressive, and all the rest are traits drilled into boys and girls in business, factory worker, farm, and military families.

In this article, we argue that intergenerational tensions in the United States reflect a strategy for serving the aged that stresses the underlying values of individualism and self-reliance. Using national survey data, we examine the extent to which Americans' view of public responsibility for the aged has shifted between the mid-1980s and late-1990s, a period characterized by the intensification of “generational” politics, as well as a growing hostility toward “big government.” We consider four factors that may be responsible for the escalation of intergenerational tensions as they are manifest in the erosion of public support for programs and policies serving the elderly: (1) Declining intergenerational solidarity with the aged; (2) Increasing concerns over age-inequity in public programs; (3) Increasing concerns over resource-inequity in public programs; and (4) Increasing opposition to big government. Results indicate that the public has generally grown more apprehensive about the value and costs of government programs serving both the elderly and the poor. Yet, the fact that Social Security enjoys far more support than social programs serving the poor suggests that the elderly are perceived as more deserving of their benefits than other dependent groups in society. The public also appears increasingly reluctant to redistribute old age benefits according to need. Age-group contrasts revealed little evidence of direct tension between the generations. The results suggest that growing distrust of government and reluctance to help the poor has indirectly fueled opposition to public spending on the older population. Proposed changes to programs and policies affecting the elderly will need to take into account the ambivalence felt by many Americans toward a government they expect to make good on its promise to care for all older citizens, but to use fewer resources in doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]