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In this article the author discusses military policy in Great Britain. At issue is an examination of a British government report on military matters released during a period of continuing developments in national security. The author urges an expansion of Great Britain's strategic forces and considers aspects of deterrence and coercion in place of more traditional military actions. The article asserts that there is a need for a clear understanding of the motivation of Great Britain's potential adversaries.

In 2000 the Howard government formed a consultative committee to review defence policy and gauge public opinion on defence issues. It concentrated on the impact of budgetary stringency and dramatic strategic change and supported increased defence spending on equipment to cater for high-level threats. Was there a thorough review? Inconsistencies occurred in the reports developed from the review and statements made by senior policy-makers while it was being conducted. The way the review was undertaken points to conceptual tensions in Australia's strategic culture and serious problems with entrenched interests in the services. Unless these challenges are addressed, a thorough review of defence policy cannot be undertaken. The review process itself needs to be reviewed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes as a point of departure a notion of reorganization as a way of managing risk. It examines the reorganization process in the Norwegian central administration for homeland security. As a central theme the paper explores why the proposal to radically reorganize the administration by replacing a network model with a hierarchical model resulted in a much more modest change to a hybrid agency model. The descriptive part of the paper traces the reorganization process, starting with the initiative taken by the Ministry of Justice in 1999 to establish a public commission and ending with the final parliamentary resolution in 2002. Despite the 9/11 terrorist attack that occurred in the middle of the process and its implications for security, only minor changes were made to existing arrangements. A striking feature of the process was negative coordination, indicating that the wish to coordinate was greater than the willingness to be coordinated. To understand why this was so, we look at bureaucratic politics and bargaining between different interests, at institutional identities and strong cultures and traditions within different governmental bodies. We focus especially on framing processes within and between organizational fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary 'just in case'- though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain - for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances - what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoinstitutionalists applying the logic of rational choice institutionalism have leavened our understanding of public agency design and evolution in the domestic and national security policy domains. This paper seeks to advance theory building in empirically grounded ways by assessing the explanatory power of an important theoretical perspective (rational choice institutionalism), in an understudied “hybrid” policy domain where domestic and national security aims interact (domestic environmental policy and national security policy), and in an organizational type (the U.S. military) that has drawn scant attention from students of bureaucracy in political science, public administration, or public management. Analysis of three major efforts to green the U.S. military suggests that the patterns of politics accompanying agency evolution involving hybrid policy domains differ from domestic and national security domains in ways that limit the generalizability of rational choice institutionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes and evaluates the four approaches to nuclear threat assessment that are most commonly employed by U.S. national security analysts: (1) comparisons of U.S. and Soviet expenditures on nuclear forces; (2) comparisons of static indicators of nuclear capability, such as number of weapons or measures of the destructive power of these weapons; (3) using deterrence theory and battle simulations to predict nuclear war outcomes and evaluate the deterrent capability of U. S. nuclear forces; and (4) analyzing official Soviet military doctrine to make inferences about Soviet goals, images, and plans for nuclear war. The analysis of each approach begins with a brief description of how the approach is implemented. Next the conceptual bases of the approach both theoretical and empirical are examined. Then applications of the method are evaluated in terms of how well they deal with the uncertainties inherent in any attempt to assess nuclear capability or threat. Finally, applications of each method are evaluated in terms of how they incorporate subjective judgment, how well they document critical assumptions, and the extent to which they use sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of varying critical assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]