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Since 1965, Japan has issued numerous apologies to Korea, which however failed to resonate with the Korean public. To investigate this puzzle, this paper analyses the structure of these apologies and empirically examines their reception in Korea. Blatz et al.'s (Political Psychology, 2009, 30, 219) classification of components of political apologies was applied to conduct a qualitative analysis of 63 official apology statements by Japan to Korea and identify the most frequently used components (Study 1). Korean participants (N = 210) were randomly presented with an experimental vignette consisting of a major apology component to examine their psychological responses, and they also ranked the importance of each major apology component (Study 2). Results showed that while Koreans viewed admission of wrongdoing as an essential and the most demanded component of apology, it was paradoxically the least frequent component offered by Japan in reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the media sociology in Japan. It states that the main stage of social communication is shifting to social media on the internet. It mentions that disaster response has become one of the most important themes of media sociology, highlighting the influence of internet on the availability of computer-mediated communication in Japanese society.

This paper aims to present and discuss social change and social policy in Japan after the mid-20th century from a sociological viewpoint. Japanese social change and social policy from the mid-20th century onward can be categorized into three models in chronological order: escape from mass poverty by means of industrialization, improvement of the social security system to establish a welfare state, and parallel progress of aspiration for a welfare society and workfare. Defined concretely, these are (1) the period that established and improved social security, which started immediately after the end of World War II and ended in 1973, when Japan began to suffer from low growth after enjoying high growth; (2) the period in which finance for social security was adjusted, halfway through which the country experienced a bubble economy; and (3) the period after the 1990s, in which the structural reform of social security went hand-in-hand with labor policy and the advent of globalization. In each of the three periods, the direction of social policy was affected by factors that caused changes in such areas as industrial structure (the decline of agriculture), demographic structure (an aging society), and family structure and work pattern (the growing trend of nuclear families, single-person households, and irregular employment). In Japan, life security now attracts increasing attention, and employment security rather than social security has been the central issue. As it is greatly affected by globalization, employment security grows less conspicuous and makes the vulnerability of social security grow more conspicuous. Social policy has the potential to become an area with which to struggle for national integration and fissures between social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We administered a paper-and-pencil questionnaire to 133 female and 99 male Japanese high school students 13-18 years old ( M = 15.9, SD = 1.57) from the Kansai area to examine cultural influences on their body image and body change behaviours. Our aim was to ascertain the independent and combined influences from traditional Japanese, modern Japanese, and Western values. Cluster analyses identified four 'acculturative' groups: 'anti-modern', 'traditional', 'pro-modern/anti-traditional', and 'pro- Western/anti- Japanese'. Pro-modern and pro- Western adolescents were most dissatisfied with their bodies, and pro-Western adolescents were also most likely to attempt weight loss. The results demonstrate the value of assessing cultural interactions in Japan along three dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Migration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper focuses on the ways in which the department store has become a key site for the constitution of Japanese modernity through the introduction of images and goods taken from the West, along with the emphasis on “Western design” and “Western taste”. These new consumer spaces have become aestheticized in various ways so that we can speak of an “aestheticization” of everyday life. Yet this was also a modernizing learning process for Japanese consumers, hence a key problem was how these new experiences were to be classified and ordered into a relatively stable habitus. The rise of the department store has had an important mediating function here. Department stores not only provided new goods along with interpretations of how to use them, but also acted as theatres, as rehearsal spaces, with front and back stage areas where one can watch the performance, try out for oneself new roles. This is especially the case for women in the city, who were able to explore a new identity space with a new set of competence experiences and pleasures. In this process, the department store also provided a form of women's public sphere where they could enjoy shopping, entertainment and learning opportunities. Department stores encouraged not only a sense of luxury and theatrical settings, but also help to teach women how to assemble new tastes and styles into their lifestyle. In addition, it should be emphasized that in the Japanese case, department stores also played an important role not just as a new cultural initiative on the part of the businessmen and cultural intermediaries who invented consumer culture, but also as a political initiative on the part of the government who sought to link them to the reform of everyday life and the production of good Japanese citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main contentions of this paper are two fold. First, there is a more than century-old Japanese tradition of human rights based on a fusion of Western concepts of natural rights and a radical reinterpretation of Confucianism, the major proponent of which was the Japanese thinker Nakae Chomin. Secondly, this tradition, although a minority view, is crucial for remedying the serious defects in the present Japanese medical system. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Nakae Chomin sought to reinterpret Chinese tradition, especially Confucianism, by injecting the concepts of popular sovereignty and democratic equality, drawn from Western sources. The resulting view maintained the Confucian commitment to a moral nexus for society, but replaced hierarchy with egalitarianism. The pressing need for such an approach to patients' rights in present-day Japan is illustrated by two recent cases: the photographing and commercial exploitation of patients' genitals without serious response by authorities, and the attempt by physicians to manipulate the time of death and, possibly, to improperly pressure family members in order to transplant organs from the brain-dead victim of a criminal assault. Such problems stem from hierarchy and paternalism, which seem to be a legacy of the rapid, state-sponsored introduction of Western medicine in the mid-nineteenth century, and in particular from the government's adoption of and support for German military medicine as a model for Japan.

To begin with one should note that any study of change in the Japanese family must go back over three periods-the pre-Meiji period, the Meiji and post-Meiji period and the post-second world war period. And, in fact, recent sociological studies in Japanese family cover not only the latter stage but the others as well. It would hardly be possible to attempt a complete survey of the trends of these studies in this paper, since considerable background knowledge is needed of the peculiar characteristics of the Japanese family system and of the special concepts employed. Nevertheless, some of the more important aspects can be discussed here. As is well known, the family and the village are the two fields of Japanese sociology in which sociological research had already made a great deal of progress, even before the war. These two fields overlap to a large extent. With the possible exception of the first family sociologist, T. Toda, family sociologists who have made the most important contributions, such as K. Ariga and K. Kitano, are also the rural sociologists. Their studies of the Japanese family have been carried out in relation to the village, and particularly in relation to the "ie," or traditional family system, and the dozoku, which is a sort of special institutional group composed of several it.

The article focuses on some aspects of industrialization and the convergence of contemporary Japan. Thus, this paper examines some of the aspects of change in Japan since the end of the Pacific War, specifically; changes associated with the ways men are managed in the modern sector of the Japanese economy. More recently, some writers have developed the relationship between technology and change. Their examination of the problems of labor and management in economic growth is rooted in the relatively common effects of common technologies in all developing economies. They emerge with a "convergence hypothesis" which argues that almost everywhere the world is in the grip of industrialization. This study takes technology as central in industrialization. Japan remains the only nonwestern nation which can be said to be industrialized. The streets of Japan's major cities are almost as choked with motor traffic as any American city of comparable size. Television antennas obstruct and mar the beauty of Japanese architecture. Yet, by no means can it be said that Japan is a western nation since many vestiges of pre-industrial Japan are readily apparent. Japanese tend to view themselves and their institutions as unique, a view that appears to be shared by many western scholars.

New Urban Sociology began in Europe at the beginning of the 1970s and then spread to the United States. It also influenced urban studies in Japan. This article examines the changing debates that have occurred in New Urban Sociology since its introduction to Japan in the late 1970s. The twenty years since its introduction from the West can be divided into three stages. The first covers the period from 1977 to 1985, when French urban sociology, particularly Manuael Castells’ theory of the state, was highly influential. The second stage, from 1986 to 1992, focused on theories of urban social movements and the concept of global city in a context of urban renewal in Japan’s major cities. The third stage, from 1992 to the present, is characterized by a transformation of New Urban Sociology into a sociological theory of space under globalization that has been heavily influenced by the work of David Harvey. Née en Europe au début des années 1970, la Nouvelle Sociologie urbaine a ensuite atteint les Etats–Unis, mais elle a aussi influé sur les études urbaines au Japon. L’article examine l’évolution des débats qui ont animé la Nouvelle Sociologie urbaine depuis qu’elle y est arrivée d’Occident à la fin des années 1970. Les vingt années qui ont suivi peuvent se décomposer en trois phases. La première va de 1977 à 1985, alors que la sociologie urbaine française, notamment la théorie de l’État de Manuel Castells, faisait autorité. La deuxième, entre 1986 et 1992, s’attache aux théories des mouvements sociaux urbains et au concept de la ville planétaire (global city) parallèlement à une rénovation des grandes villes nippones. La troisième phase, de 1992 à nos jours, se caractérise par une transformation de la Nouvelle Sociologie urbaine en une théorie sociologique de l’espace soumis à la mondialisation, concept largement inspiré des travaux de David Harvey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an abstract of the paper "Individual Patterns in Historical Change: Imagery of Japanese Youth," by Robert Jay Lifton was published in the October 1964 of the periodical "Journal of Social Issues." This paper describes three patterns of time imagery encountered in contemporary Japanese youth. These are the mode of transformation, characterized by a vision of near-total remaking of social and individual existence, and by unconscious nostalgia for the past; the mode of restoration, characterized by a conscious urge to return to ennobling symbols of personal and cultural past, and by an unconscious fascination with modern symbols; and a mode of accommodation, a quest for a modus vivendi blending imagery closest to present experience, immediate future, and recent past. All three modes, in different fashions, promote historical change. They are frequently interchangeable, as they all share an emotional--symbolic substrate, which finds its individual model of unity in the mother-child relationship, and its cultural model in the stress upon social and racial harmony.

The article focuses on the value system and economic development in the comprehensive theory of social change with special reference to Japan and Thailand. It supports the proposition that changes in political and social institutions will not bring about sustained economic development, unless the fundamental human values in the society are conducive to development. There are numerous similarities between Thailand and Japan. Both countries possess traditions of selective cultural borrowing over a long historical past, and both are within what might be loosely called the same general oriental culture area. In spite of these similarities, there was a wide disparity in the economic development of the two countries. The Japanese case represents an example of highly successful economic development involving a large part of the nation. In order for economic development to come about, it is essential that the value system fulfill two functions: it has to provide goals, either public or private, which can be promoted by increased production; and the value system must generate the propensities and the activities associated with them. The components of the value system may be identified primarily from religious and ethical teachings. The Thai value system centers around personal values as opposed to the Japanese emphasis on political values. It requires very little in terms of obligation or commitment to other individuals or institutions.

Copyright of Politics & Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on the Japanese family sociology. It states that the shifts in the ruling paradigms of family sociology for each era were formed by the position of Japan in the global context and not just from changes in Japanese society and from the intellectual impact from overseas and the domestic reaction to this.

Copyright of Infant Mental Health Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, singapore, south Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being 'recuperated,' which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the process of urban restructuring of Tokyo, Japan in the 1980s. From a long-term point of view, it might be only the first stage of a continuing process but the fact that Tokyo in the 1980s was at a turning point in its urban development cannot be denied. Will Tokyo continue to take a course to becoming a giant growth machine, solely for processing global capital and information? At present, much is uncertain, but it is necessary to consider the limit of growth which Tokyo as a network-dependent world city may face in the near future. Tokyo, which has developed rapidly with the growth of a global network system of capital and information, its global functions will be basically limited to the economic sphere. This specialization will give Tokyo many weak points. First, continuing globalization of Japanese transnational corporations may possibly lead to the relocation of their headquarters functions to other world cities, thus damaging Tokyo's present position. Second, in contrast to the hegemony which is a kind of absolute or zero-sum resource in the world-system, the influence in a network system is a relative or gradational one. To put in another way, Tokyo's position can relatively easily change in response to international and domestic factors. Tokyo and other Japanese cities are now entering a new stage of urban social change.

Japan has undergone tremendous economic and social changes. The prodigious economic growth of the 1960's has lifted Japan to third place among highly industrialized countries in terms of its gross national product. Technological innovations in industrial processes and production which have contributed to this economic development have become so widespread as to include even the process of management, and the introduction of various modern managerial techniques is making Japan into a computerized managerial society. According to the 1965 census, about 70 per cent of the total population of 98 million lives in cities, and 45 out of every 100 persons are concentrated in greater Tokyo, Japan, whose population increased by 5.5 million between 1955 and 1965. Urbanization at this speed and on such a scale has brought with it, in both urban and rural areas, many serious problems which lead to changes in the traditional outlook and customs, and, above all, in social and cultural values. The rise of new generations, the popularization of higher education, widespread ownership of television sets, etc., have contributed to these changes.

The article discusses tradition, modernity and communalism in modernization of Japan. The terms, tradition and modernity like modernization and Westernization are bound up with value preferences and social ideology, and are consequently less than useful as analytical concepts in social science. Sociologist R. P. Dore has counseled against a special theory of modernization, and advises a study of the processes on the basis of standard concepts pertaining to social change in any historical context. This approach is especially appropriate in the case of Japan. Perhaps no other society modernized so effectively on the basis of deliberate effort, planned and carried out by sophisticated elites. The process was not an invention of the late 19th century, but represented an old Japanese proclivity. Japanese intellectuals, like the planners, have approached the change process with perspectives derived from a variety of past and present cultural sources. The most fundamental observation one can make of the Japanese modernizing outlook is that while a culturally conservative position has generally dominated, there also has existed an important liberal position throughout the history of the modern era.

The article presents information on a study related to the individual patterns in historical changes in Japan. In recent work with Japanese youth the author has attempted to study the living experience of historical change through intensive series of interviews with more than fifty young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25. He was thus able to observe, for periods of from several months to two years, intellectual and emotional fluctuations in a group particularly sensitive to historical change. Their sensitivity derived first, from their age group, since as young adults they were at a stage of life characterized by an urge to experiment with the ideologies and technologies which motor historical change; second, from their selection, as they were mostly undergraduates at leading universities in Tokyo and Kyoto, outstanding in theft intellectual, organizational, or creative abilities; and third, from their modem heritage--since recent generations of Japanese students and intellectuals have been unique in the impressive combination of eagerness, quick mastery, and inner resistance, with which they have embraced outside influences, not only during the years following World War II but from the time of the Meiji Restoration almost one hundred years ago.