Search

Summary: Background: Energy balance‐related behaviours (EBRBs), that is, dietary intake, screen, outdoor play and sleep, tend to combine into 'lifestyle patterns', with potential synergistic influences on health. To date, studies addressing this theme mainly focused on school children and rarely accounted for sleep, with a cross‐country perspective. Objectives: We aimed at comparing lifestyle patterns among preschool‐aged children across Europe, their associations with socio‐demographic factors and their links with body mass index (BMI). Methods: Harmonized data on 2–5‐year‐olds participating in nine European birth cohorts from the EU Child Cohort Network were used (EBRBs, socio‐demographics and anthropometrics). Principal component analysis and multivariable linear and logistic regressions were performed. Results: The most consistent pattern identified across cohorts was defined by at least three of the following EBRBs: discretionary consumption, high screen time, low outdoor play time and low sleep duration. Consistently, children from low‐income households and born to mothers with low education level had higher scores on this pattern compared to their socioeconomically advantaged counterparts. Furthermore, it was associated with higher BMI z‐scores in the Spanish and Italian cohorts (β = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.02; 0.10], both studies). Conclusion: These findings may be valuable in informing early multi‐behavioural interventions aimed at reducing social inequalities in health at a European scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on populist parties - or 'supply-side populism' more generally - are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand-side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross-sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single-country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left-wing socioeconomic issue positions for left-wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions for right-wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy-related preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates the relation between urban form and the socio-economic patterns of the resident population in three southern European cities ( Athens, Lisbon and Rome) featured by different processes of urban diffusion. The paper goes beyond the literature on sprawl focused on (residential, income and ethnic) segregation and the different features of the inhabitants of the suburbs and those of the inner cities residents. By integrating multivariate statistics and spatial analysis, a methodology is proposed, based on morphological and socio-economic indicators available at a fine geographical scale. Results show how urban diffusion processes vary widely according to the context, as does the socio-economic profile of the actors, stressing the need to think about different 'southern European alternatives' of sprawl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the outcomes of the efforts of Central and Eastern European ( CEE) countries to make their education systems more effective in enhancing broader social and economic goals. It focuses on those 11 Central and Eastern European countries which became members of the EU in 2004 or following this date. First, it presents a short analysis of how educational goals were connected with the broader goals of social and economic progress before and during the first phase of the transition period after the collapse of Communism. It then analyses the impact of the accession of these countries to the EU, including the impact of some European mechanisms that have contributed to the strengthening of linkages between education and social-economic progress. The third part of the article attempts to evaluate the outcomes of the relevant national education reforms, development programmes and policies, most of them generated by these mechanisms, in the light of a number of selected indicators. A key conclusion of the article is that the adoption of the lifelong learning approach of the EU has been a major engine to strengthen the role of education in social and economic development in the CEE region, but most countries still need further efforts to translate this approach into coherent and effective national policies and to implement them so that they produce relevant and significant outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forests often rebound from deforestation following industrialization and urbanization, but for many regions our understanding of where and when forest transitions happened, and how they affected carbon budgets remains poor. One such region is Eastern Europe, where political and socio-economic conditions changed drastically over the last three centuries, but forest trends have not yet been analyzed in detail. We present a new assessment of historical forest change in the European part of the former Soviet Union and the legacies of these changes on contemporary carbon stocks. To reconstruct forest area, we homogenized statistics at the provincial level for ad 1700-2010 to identify forest transition years and forest trends. We contrast our reconstruction with the KK11 and HYDE 3.1 land change scenarios, and use all three datasets to drive the LPJ dynamic global vegetation model to calculate carbon stock dynamics. Our results revealed that forest transitions in Eastern Europe occurred predominantly in the early 20th century, substantially later than in Western Europe. We also found marked geographic variation in forest transitions, with some areas characterized by relatively stable or continuously declining forest area. Our data suggest extensive deforestation in European Russia already prior to ad 1700, and even greater deforestation in the 18th and 19th centuries than in the KK11 and HYDE scenarios. Based on our reconstruction, cumulative carbon emissions from deforestation were greater before 1700 (60 Pg C) than thereafter (29 Pg C). Summed over our entire study area, forest transitions led to a modest uptake in carbon over recent decades, with our dataset showing the smallest effect (<5.5 Pg C) and a more heterogeneous pattern of source and sink regions. This suggests substantial sequestration potential in regrowing forests of the region, a trend that may be amplified through ongoing land abandonment, climate change, and CO2 fertilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on gendered discourses in integration policy and the problems immigrants pose in the reproduction of inequalities in a number of European countries. There has been little consideration of how gender categories operate in relation to broader political discourses around the construction of 'us' and 'them' and the constitution of national social and political communities and identities. Yet gender issues have become significant in the backlash against multiculturalism and gender and sexual relations have moved to the centre of debates about the necessity to enforce integration, if not assimilation. The first section outlines recent developments in the immigration-integration nexus in different European states. The second section draws out some of the reasons for the focus on family migration and spouses who are seen as the main importers of the 'backward' practices and with 'doubtful' parenting practices for future generations of citizens. The third section tackles the shift of current debates about integration of migrant women from the periphery, where they were largely invisible or mere appendages of men, to the centre, where they have acquired in the process a heightened, though not necessarily positive, visibility. Too often, representations of migrant women are based on a homogenised image of uneducated and backward migrants as victims of patriarchal cultures, legitimizing in this way the use of immigration controls to reduce the numbers entering and to tackle broader social issues, as has clearly been the case with forced marriages. Furthermore, the more discourses focus on Muslim women and Islam as inimical to European societies, the more the debate becomes culturalised and marginalises the socio-economic dimension of integration and the structural inequalities migrants face. Thus pre-entry tests may have less to do with integration than with a desire to reduce the flow of marriage migrants or to raise their human capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resumen Si bien durante muchos años los países europeos han supervisado el gasto público en prestaciones de salud y cuidados de larga duración, se ha conferido menor atención a las consecuencias financieras que representan los pagos directos personales para las personas mayores que necesitan acceder a dichas prestaciones de cuidado. A través del análisis de los datos transversales procedentes de la Encuesta de Salud, Envejecimiento y Jubilación en Europa ( SHARE, por sus siglas en inglés), representativos de la población anciana de once países europeos, descubrimos que en los países europeos es muy común que las personas mayores abonen por cuenta propia las prestaciones de salud y los cuidados de larga duración. Estos gastos directos se repercuten de modo significativo en la renta disponible: el 95 por ciento de las personas mayores abonan de modo directo prestaciones médicas y el 5 por ciento de ellas, los cuidados de larga duración. Estos desembolsos provocan una disminución de los ingresos de entre el 5 y el 10 por ciento. El 0,7 por ciento de los hogares con personas mayores que recurren a prestaciones médicas y el 0,5 por ciento de los hogares con personas mayores que reciben cuidados de larga duración caen en la ruina financiera a raíz del exceso de pagos directos. Los más afectados son los pobres, las mujeres y los muy ancianos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Aim This paper identifies socio-economic driving forces of biodiversity change and analyses their political and economic dynamics by modelling socio-economic parts of three scenario storylines developed for the ALARM (assessing large-scale risks for biodiversity with tested methods) project. In the BAMBU (business-as-might-be-usual) scenario policy decisions already made in the European Union (EU) are implemented and enforced, but no additional measures are introduced. The GRAS (growth applied strategy) scenario describes a future world orientated towards economic growth and complete deregulation. And finally, SEDG (sustainable European development goal) is a normative scenario focusing on the achievement of sustainable development. Methods The GINFORS (global inter-industry forecasting system) model is applied to quantify the effects of different sets of policy measures representing the three scenarios. It allows investigation of the inter-relations between socio-economic driving forces and the state of the environment. Results The presented results for the 25 EU countries focus on the following variables: unemployment, material extraction, energy supply and CO2 emissions. The lowest amount of unemployment is in the SEDG scenario, where it steadily decreases from 2005 to 2020. In BAMBU it falls to a level that is also below that of 2005. In GRAS, the number of unemployed people in 2020 is clearly over the value of 2005. The development of total material extraction from 2005 to 2020 is nearly stable in BAMBU, while it clearly increases in GRAS. Only in SEDG is there a reduction in resource use. None of the scenarios achieves a substantial reduction in energy use. However, the development of CO2 emissions shows a decoupling from energy supply. For BAMBU there is a slight decline in CO2 emissions over time, for GRAS they increase but with a slightly smaller growth rate than energy supply. In SEDG the emissions are reduced. The decoupling trends can be explained by a shift to more renewable energy sources in all scenarios, with the highest share in SEDG. Main conclusions The results indicate that a growth-oriented policy design, such as presented in the GRAS scenario, is not compatible with the conservation of biodiversity. Only in the SEDG scenario do the policy measures support the idea of a sustainable development, but in some respects they are still not ambitious enough. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses sociopolitical elements of European countries that could lead to a major paradigm shift in the way the countries are organized and governed. It is attested that elements such as health care benefits, social security, and early retirement are detrimental to the continued economic success of the continent. The author references the major economic downturn in Greece as a microcosm of what is occurring throughout Europe. Also discussed is how the failure of European countries to unify will impact the U.S. and what role the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may play in European economics.

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so-called lowest-low-fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest-fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest-low-fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the core theory recently proposed by Putnam on the relationship between ethnic diversity and dimensions of social capital. Hypotheses are derived from this theory, but also from other theories that propose competing hypotheses on relationships between national characteristics and dimensions of social capital. Essentially, the authors propose more rigorous empirical tests of Putnam's hypotheses by including these competing hypotheses: tests of these hypotheses provide possibilities to evaluate Putnam's and these other theories in terms of general (i.e. cross-national) tenability for the European continent. The general question is: To what extent do national-level characteristics like ethnic diversity, next to other national characteristics, actually affect dimensions of social capital of individual citizens in European countries? The authors set out to answer this question by testing hypotheses on cross-national data from 28 European countries. These data contain valid measurements of a number of dimensions of social capital. The individual-level data are enriched with contextual- (i.e. national-) level characteristics to be included in more advanced multilevel analyses. The main finding is that Putnam's hypothesis on ethnic diversity must be refuted in European societies. Instead, it is found that economic inequality and the national history of continuous democracy in European societies turn out to be more important for explaining cross-national differences in social capital in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the development of integration policies concerning third country nationals at the level of the European Union (EU). Starting with the discovery of recent policy developments at the European level, including new European directives mainly granting social rights to non-EU citizens, the paper proceeds to examine the reasons that enabled this shift from the national to the European level of decision making. It concludes that integration policies have been created as a new EU policy field amidst the also fairly new policy field of immigration policies. In light of the theoretical concept of “organisational fields,” the interests and motives of the main actors involved in the emergence of this policy field are analysed. The research combines neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist assumptions, and it results in the following conclusions: First, a European integration policy could only be established within the emerging field of immigration policies, which laid the groundwork for member state collaborations in this highly sensitive policy area. Secondly, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, several non-governmental organisations and most notably the European Commission played an important role in promoting integration policies at the European level. Their engagement is interpreted as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for the establishment of this policy field. Thirdly, these actors tried to strengthen the status of integration policies by emphasising the linkage between successful integration policies and economic and social cohesion. This semantic strategy, among other discussed reasons, facilitated the member states’ decision at the European summit in Tampere 1999 that all third country nationals shall be granted comparable rights to EU citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that, despite globalisation forces, national education and training systems have kept their particularities. Policies of convergence, enhanced by supranational organisations such as the European Commission, have not yet led to a homogenisation of national education and training systems. The latter are still influenced by the political, economic and social framework. Thus, no single model of lifelong learning prevailed in Europe. There were countries close to the demand-led model of ‘voluntary partnership’ (e.g. UK), countries representative of the ‘formalised social partnership’ model (e.g. Sweden) and countries adhering to the ‘statist’ model (e.g. Greece). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of effective management strategies to optimize the quality of life for allergic patients is currently hampered by a lack of good quality information. Estimates of how many individuals suffer from food allergy and the major foods involved vary widely and inadequacies of in vitro diagnostics make food challenges the only reliable means of diagnosis in many instances. The EuroPrevall project brings together a multidisciplinary partnership to address these issues. Cohorts spanning the main climatic regions of Europe are being developed in infants through a birth cohort, community surveys in school-age children and adults and an outpatient clinic study. Confirmatory double-blind placebo-controlled food challenge diagnosis is being undertaken using foods as they are eaten with titrated doses to allow no-effect and lowest-observable effect levels for allergenic foods to be determined. The cohorts will also facilitate validation of novel in vitro diagnostics through the development of the EuroPrevall Serum Bank. Complementary studies in Ghana, western Siberia, India and China will allow us to gain insights into how different dietary patterns and exposure to microorganisms affect food allergies. New instruments to assess the socioeconomic impact of food allergy are being developed in the project and their application in the clinical cohorts will allow, for the first time, an assessment to be made of the burden this disease places on allergy sufferers and their communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lowest-low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate at or below 1.3, has rapidly spread in Europe during the 1990s. This article traces the emergence of this new phenomenon to the interaction of five factors. First, tempo and compositional distortions reduce the total fertility rate below the associated level of cohort fertility. Second, socioeconomic changes--including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood--have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals and couples. Third, social interaction effects reinforce this behavioral adjustment and contribute to large and persistent postponement in the mean age at birth. Fourth, institutional settings favor an overall low quantum of fertility. Fifth, postponement-quantum interactions amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when combined with ongoing delays of childbearing. The article concludes with speculations about future trends in current and prospective lowest-low-fertility countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This note is a response to a critical review of some of my own work published recently in the British Journal of Sociology but it does not reply to the specific criticisms made in that article. Rather it addresses the question of what constitutes appropriate critique in sociology by developing a distinction between abstract and engaged criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the declines in fertility in Europe and the Third World. Lower levels of fertility were largely due to the adoption of innovative behavior within marriage. So far this transformation of reproduction has been monotonic and rapid. Socioeconomic development is associated with the timing of the onset of the transition and is responsible for differences among groups during the transition, although it is not yet possible to rule out alternative explanations such as ideational or institutional change The pace and pervasiveness of the declines, however, suggest that a mechanism of diffusion is involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on several initiatives in Europe for the sustainable improvement of food security in face of climate change. It says that Europe, as a global leader in greenhouse gas emission policy, is capable of addressing issues of food insecurity and natural resource preservation. It mentions the Joint Programming Initiative on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change (FACCE-JPI), joined by 21 European countries that will tackle with the said issues. It cites various factors to consider for the achievement of goals such as connecting to models of agro-ecology and socioeconomics.

It is commonly recognized that social exclusion is a dynamic process, but it operates within well-established political, social and economic structures. A breadth of empirical data is used to explore various dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion, including Australian, Canadian and European data. While all the articles explore different aspects of social exclusion, common themes emerge. All authors note the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion. The importance of social networks in providing information and advice to the integration of young people is also identified. Common to all articles though is the firm belief that national governments should be centrally involved in tackling social exclusion. As currently formulated, the extent of government commitment to rural development programmes is questionable. These programmes tend to be short-term with insecure and limited funding. At any rate, the capacity of local partnerships to address issues of social exclusion is restricted. The responsibility for economic, social and civic inclusion of citizens rests primarily with national governments.

Focuses on the population trends and demographic differences affecting the social and economic conditions of the world. Regional shift in world population; Consequences of differential rates of population growth at the sub-regional level; Reasons for the smaller and older populations of Japan and all countries of Europe; Reliance of many developed countries on international migration to compensate for modest population growth.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses several reports published within issue on topics including European economic and constitutional crises; Europeanization of economic policy; and European socio-economic constitution.

Introduction and Aims: This study estimates cross-country variation in socioeconomic disparities in adolescent alcohol use and identifies country-level characteristics associated with these disparities.Design and Methods: The association between socioeconomic status (family wealth and parental education) and alcohol use (lifetime use and episodic heavy drinking) of 15- to 16-year-olds from 32 European countries was investigated. Country-level characteristics were national income, income inequality and per capita alcohol consumption. Multilevel modelling was applied.Results: Across countries, lifetime use was lower in wealthy than in less wealthy families (odds ratio [OR](girls)  = 0.95, OR(boys)  = 0.94). The risk of episodic heavy drinking, in contrast, was higher for children from wealthier families (OR(girls)  = 1.04, OR(boys)  = 1.08) and lower when parents were highly educated (ORs = 0.95-0.98). Socioeconomic disparities varied substantially between countries. National wealth and income inequality were associated with cross-country variation of disparities in lifetime use in few comparisons, such that among girls, the (negative) effect of family wealth was greatest in countries with unequally distributed income (OR = 0.86). Among boys, the (negative) effect of family wealth was greatest in low-income countries (OR = 1.00), and the (positive) effect of mothers' education was greatest in countries with high income inequality (OR = 1.11).Discussion and Conclusions: Socioeconomic disparities in adolescent alcohol use vary across European countries. Broad country-level indicators can explain this variation only to a limited extent, but results point towards slightly greater socioeconomic disparities in drinking in countries of low national income and countries with a high income inequality. [Gomes de Matos E, Kraus L, Hannemann T-V, Soellner R, Piontek D. Cross-cultural variation in the association between family's socioeconomic status and adolescent alcohol use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]