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Some of the best-known social scientific theories of risks are those that have been elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Although their arguments differ greatly, they agree in seeing the technologically induced risks of today’s “Risk Society” as global—so pervasive that they transcend all socioeconomic as well as geopolitical and national boundaries. Most empirical work, however, provides greater support for a theoretical tradition exemplified by Short and Erikson. In this paper, we argue that many of the technological mega-risks described by Giddens and Beck as “transcending” social boundaries are better described as “Titanic risks,” referring not so much to their colossal impact as to the fact that—as was the case for the majority of the victims on the Titanic—actual risks are related to victims’ socioeconomic as well as sociogeographic locations. Previous research has shown this to be the case with high-risk technologies, such as nuclear energy and weaponry, and also with localized ones, such as toxic waste disposal. This article illustrates that the same is true even for the most genuinely “global” risks of all, namely those associated with global climate disruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most discussions of legitimation focus on factors that are expected to contribute to it, such as tradition, expertise, or prosperity. Less attention has been paid to “the dark side” of legitimation, which depends heavily on evading attention. A potentially informative approach is to learn from professionals with special expertise in evading attention while making things “disappear”—magicians. Rather than seeking overt control over the audience, they perform in plain view, largely by using well-timed distractions, or “misdirection.” Preliminary evidence suggests that similar techniques may be widely used in political contexts, with some of the most effective forms of misdirection involving diversionary reframing—diverting attention away from any questions about existing distributions of privilege, not by brute force, but by changing the subject, especially by raising questions about the legitimacy of critics. These and related techniques clearly deserve to be the focus of additional research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macrostructural analyses have long dominated the field of social theories of modernity, with the work of Habermas, Giddens, and Beck providing influential cases in point. Empirical studies, however, have raised questions about the applicability and empirical soundness of macrostructural approaches to risks, technology, and nature, and U.S.-based sociologists have offered alternative theories that have been identified in some studies as providing better predictions and explanations than the macrostructural analyses. Informed by all of the above theories, this article examines the “Atoms for Peace” program, which established the civilian uses of nuclear energy, providing one of the central scientific and technological achievements of modernity. Given the mixed results of nuclear technology development, the mid-range, structurally informed perspectives of Short and other U.S.-based sociologists do appear to provide the best interpretations, both for the “Atoms for Peace” program and for the broader legacy of the technological and environmental risks of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent reviews have contrasted U.S. sociologists' "empirical" work on technological risks with the "theoretical" risk work of Giddens and Beck, but the reality is more complex. Most U.S. sociologists are less likely than Giddens or Beck to see risks as "transcending" socioeconomic and other divisions, but the United States-based work tends to interpret the trustworthiness of scientific-technical expertise in ways that lie between the arguments of Beck and Giddens. An examination of early nuclear technologies indicates that the United States-based perspectives provide a better "fit," for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. The development of nuclear technologies was mixed, rather than high or low, in its competence and trustworthiness, and it created social and environmental risks that did not so much "transcend" social divisions as to reinforce them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]