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An essay is presented on Fact, Fiction and Fantasy. It states that analysis of fiction in terms of imagination supports that knowledge from fiction is from imagination but it does not involve that all knowledge from fiction is from imagination. It mentions that counterfactual conditional is true if in most similar possibilities to actuality in which its predecessor is true and knowledge from fiction is modal knowledge as it surround knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary and possible.

It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis-the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]