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Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyses whether and how fairness considerations affect citizens' support of European Union (EU) policies and integration. While past literature has revealed that perceptions of procedural and substantive fairness impact on public opinion at the level of the nation state, we know less about the fairness‐support nexus when it comes to international cooperation. We here make use of the case of differentiated integration (DI) to experimentally dissect normative and utility‐oriented considerations in the evaluation of EU policies. DI as an instrument to overcome heterogeneity‐induced gridlock has been linked to both autonomy and dominance, and it can generate winners and losers in the EU. Our experiments reveal that citizens largely support DI. However, they are opposed to forms of DI which impose negative externalities on a subgroup of EU member states. This holds irrespective of the affectedness of citizens' own member states. We take these findings as a first experimental confirmation that citizens, indeed, care about the fairness of the EU and its policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the practice of Covid‐related bank regulatory forbearance measures of eight East‐Central European Union member states from the perspective of differentiated integration. In line with the integration‐deepening nature of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, our expectation was that countries within the Banking Union (BU) would impose harmonized forbearance measures, while non‐BU members would use more discretional measures. Indeed, the practice of forbearance measures is significantly more harmonized within the BU than outside; however, there were also notable differences in the practice of BU members. For non‐BU member states, our expectation was that countries with the intention of favouring their domestic financial system would ease regulatory requirements more, while those that wanted to place the burden of the pandemic on foreign banks would ease these requirements less. However, the analysis only partially confirmed this expectation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council representatives can circumvent exclusion due to differentiated integration (DI) by complying with insider norms. This article studies whether and how compliance with procedural norms socialised amongst representatives from euro area member states (EAMS) determined patterns of non‐EAMS involvement in Eurogroup and EWG interaction during the sovereign debt crisis. The argument highlights the role of deliberation and consensus‐building norms, suggesting that they gained particular robustness amongst EAMS representatives. Those non‐EAMS representatives who consistently complied with these insider norms could secure involvement in intergovernmental debates amongst EAMS. Exclusion was mostly relevant to norm violators. This article sheds light on the institutional consequences of DI in Economic and Monetary Union, highlighting its structural effects on governance and decision‐making processes during the sovereign debt crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An extensive literature investigates individual support for European integration. However, support for differentiated integration has only recently become an important topic of study for public opinion scholars. Previous literature on this issue has not probed how differentiated integration is shaped by exclusively national identities and whether the effect varies by how differentiation has been framed. Using survey data from 2020 to 2021, I show that exclusively national citizens are most likely to support differentiated integration that allows for greater national autonomy and may oppose differentiation whose primary goal is to facilitate further integration. However, I find no clear link between elite framing of differentiated integration and popular support for it. This raises important questions both about what kind of differentiated integration will enjoy public legitimacy and how cues shape support for European Union (EU) differentiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introductory article conceptualizes the notion of third country influence on European Union (EU) law and policy and proposes an analytical framework theorizing the venues and means through which third countries may gain such impact, under what conditions and with which implications for the EU's legal and political order. The article first introduces the focus on outside‐in influence in the context of European studies, generally, and EU privileged third country relations, specifically. Thereafter, an analytical framework is developed for mapping and explaining the outside‐in dynamics on EU law and policy‐making differentiating between diplomatic, governance and discursive venues; coercive versus technocratic and normative mechanisms of influence; and the legal constraints and political implications of these processes. Turning to the potential determinants of these occurrences, the article then proposes a set of hypotheses for conditions under which third countries can influence EU law and policies, before summarizing the individual contributions to this Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an innovative, comprehensive quantitative analysis of legal integration and differentiation in the European Union (EU) from 1958 to 2020. Building on a streamlined analytical framework and new or revised datasets on EU primary, EU secondary and EU‐related international law, it challenges or qualifies several aspects of the received wisdom on European integration. Specifically, it delivers the first‐ever quantitative estimate of integration in terms of integration opportunities, shows that differentiation is deployed in a reluctant and eclectic manner and offers clear measurements for the prevalence of various modes of temporal, spatial and policy differentiation. These methodological and empirical findings confirm the fruitfulness of the quantitative approach to the study of European integration and point to promising avenues for future research on international integration and comparative regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation is not only a design feature of European integration, it is also a Member State strategy to overcome preference divergence. However, putting together an optimal group is difficult: Either the resulting club lacks the capacity to produce the club good efficiently; or differentiation attempts lead to an equally suboptimal outcome of a club too large and too heterogeneous to be effective. This paper develops an explanation of this differentiation paradox. When an avant‐garde group proposes differentiation, the presence or absence of its go‐it‐alone power determines the outcome. The former leads to suboptimally large clubs due to the bandwagoning dynamic that produces a cascade. By contrast, the absence of go‐it‐alone power triggers a blockade and results in suboptimally small clubs. This actor‐centred approach to differentiated integration is tested by analysing the establishment of Permanent Structured Co‐operation in security and defence, which declined from an ambitious idea into a diluted reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of differentiated integration (DI) has spawned a wide‐ranging research agenda that has significantly advanced scholarly understanding of the complex and often uneven process of European integration. Discussions about DI have suffered, however, from conceptual stretching as DI has been applied to an increasing number of EU policy areas, including those that function on the basis of intergovernmental co‐operation rather than supranational integration. To address this problem, we propose to distinguish between DI and differentiated co‐operation (DC) as two subtypes of differentiation, depending on whether such a phenomenon occurs in a policy area that operates along the lines of integration or co‐operation respectively. We illustrate the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). We conclude by highlighting avenues for further research that the distinction between DI and DC suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the public form preferences about differentiated integration (DI)? The literature on mass‐elite linkages offers two perspectives: top‐down, political elites cue the public, or bottom‐up, political elites react to public preferences. This paper develops expectations based on both perspectives, and presents novel empirical data on citizens, political parties, and governments to test them. We distinguish preferences over differentiated policy integration, like 'Opt‐Outs', from preferences over polity differentiation, such as 'Two‐Speed Europe'. Although our evidence is observational and therefore cannot establish causal relationships between elites and the mass public, our results are most compatible with the notion of a top‐down linkage. This is because DI preferences are generally of low salience, and first revealed at the European level in the context of negotiations. Subsequently, this revelation of DI preferences shapes domestic discussions about DI, especially at the level of political parties. Yet, this mostly pertains to situations when governments do not yet have clear DI preferences of their own, meaning government preferences are not yet formed and revealed in the context of the supranational negotiations. Overall, this study suggests that mass‐elite linkage in the preference formation on DI might be more tenuous than either the top‐down or bottom‐up perspective might assume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sheds light on how academic experts assess the benefits and risks of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU). DI denotes particular member states either being allowed to opt out of specific EU policies, or being excluded or exempted from participating in them until certain conditions are met. The findings of a novel expert survey (n = 95) highlight two key divisions amongst experts, namely, first a regional divide between scholars based in Western Europe and those based in Eastern Europe, with the former more favourable to DI than the latter; and second, a substantive divide between those, more numerous, who are favourable to DI, and those who are more critical. For the former, the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived risks. What drives the support of or objection to DI also differs between experts. Whereas supporters favour pragmatic reasons for DI, opponents mostly mobilize principled reasons against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article provides a normative assessment of parliamentary representation in fields of differentiated integration in the European Union. Based on three criteria of legitimate democratic representation, autonomy, accountability and equality, we evaluate four alternative representation models. These models comprise (I) complete representation of all members of the European Parliament (MEPs), (II) insider representation through the creation of new, regime‐specific assemblies, and (III) partial representation without and (IV) with inclusive deliberative stages. We find that the current system of complete representation, while honouring the principle of equality, violates autonomy and accountability in areas of differentiated integration. We therefore advocate a model of partial representation: MEPs elected in opt‐out states should not take part in EP voting but should be invited to participate in the deliberative stages of parliamentary decision‐making. This reconciles the principles of autonomy, accountability and equality, at least as long as there is no truly European electoral system in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multifaceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a ground‐breaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five empirical models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the EU: the European economic area model, the Danish model of (quasi‐)permanent differentiation, the Swedish model of de facto differentiation, the instrumental model and the Brexit process of differentiation. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article also introduces the contributions to this symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit. This article is part of the 2019 Symposium titled 'Responding to Brexit: Differentiated integration and disintegration in the European Union', which also includes On the Methodology of Studying Differentiated (Dis)integration: Or How the Potential Outcome Framework Can Contribute to Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Opting In or Out by Marian Burk and Dirk Leuffen (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12958), The End of Exceptionalism and a Strengthening of Coherence? Law and Legal Integration in the EU Post‐Brexit by Paul James Cardwell (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12959), Differentiated (Dis)integration in Practice: The Diplomacy of Brexit and the Low Politics of High Politics by Øyvind Svendsen and Rebecca Adler‐Nissen (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12960) and Rethinking Britain's Role in a Differentiated Europe after Brexit: A Comparative Regionalism Perspective by Philomena Murray and Alex Brianson (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12961). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the British referendum to leave the European Union and the European Commission's 'White Paper on the Future of Europe', it is not only time to take stock of the existing literature on differentiated integration, but also to rethink the perimeters of disintegration. We argue that phenomena such as Brexit embrace forms of differentiation which trigger the need for conceptualizing differentiated disintegration altogether. This article first sketches the path of the scholarly debate in a chronological way to grasp the breadth of existing literature. Second, it discusses differentiated disintegration as a potentially new area for research. Mapping several scenarios for future research, we propose that differentiated (dis)integration needs to be conceived as a negotiated, but profoundly path‐dependent process, which is structurally locked‐in, and deeply conditioned by pre‐existing organizations and institutions of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU is divided between member states that have adopted the euro and those that have not. This article looks at the issue of differentiated integration with particular reference to eurozone integration and the euro-outsiders. I explore the recent public debate in the UK on euro-outsiderness, comparing this with debates in Denmark. The article highlights some striking differences between the UK and Denmark when it comes to the actual management of euro-outsiderness in Brussels as well as some of the dilemmas facing euro-outsiders such as the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Poland as the EU struggles to exit its crises. Finally, I discuss the future of two-speed European integration and the UK's possible exit from the EU. The UK cannot escape the dilemma of favouring either influence or autonomy; whether the UK remains in or leaves the EU, it will need to allow the eurozone to proceed in order to prevent further eurozone crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature suggests that legislative politics among European Union Member States is characterised by economic exchanges, and constrained by the social norms of a European community of legislators. Both views draw a clear line between the legislative process and the conflicts over sovereignty that have left their mark on treaty making and European public opinion since the 1990s. This article suggests revisiting this view, based on an analysis of why Member States have opted out of legislation from the 1970s to today. It argues that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU's intrusion into core state powers. The article presents evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter. The results indicate greater European-level legislative responsiveness towards national sovereignty demands than previously recognised. They underline that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the topic of differentiated integration in the European Union has become increasingly discussed in both political science research and politics in general. Whereas differentiated integration is viewed as necessary for deeper cooperation, recent findings suggest that it increases the gulf between participants and non-participants, making it difficult for non-participating countries to join in later negotiations. However, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work regarding the relationship between different levels of participation in the EU and national policy outcomes. This article addresses this question by comparing the policy outcomes in fully participating, selectively participating (opting-in) and nonparticipating (opting-out) EU Member States relative to EU legislation. The findings show that selective participation (opting-in) increases state conformity with EU laws relative to no integration at all (optingout), but it does not completely bridge the gap between fully integrated Member States and nonparticipants. The results suggest that countries with flexible arrangements are generally less likely to implement EU laws than full participants, even when they choose to legally commit to the EU requirements. This finding raises some further questions about the rationale behind selective participation and its consequences for policy conformity, if its application expands to other policy areas and more Member States in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]