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Some sizeable, favourable, forecast revisions from the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) allowed the Chancellor to announce a significant loosening of the fiscal stance in October's Budget, while still maintaining the same margin for error against his fiscal mandate. However, forthcoming changes in the treatment of student loans in the public finances mean that the prospects of a further loosening in the fiscal stance look slim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

▀ There has been widespread misinformation in and outside Parliament about the economic case for Brexit. Outside Parliament, the rival groups – those with a negative assessment of Brexit and those with a positive one – have set out their arguments but these have huge differences in the factual and intellectual support they each bring to the debate. The group predicting a negative effect have published a wide set of empirical appraisals from academic and related research teams of the case for leaving and that against it. This, largely rigorous statistical analysis, finds strong and clear evidence of the large costs to leaving. The camp predicting a positive result for Brexit, in contrast, relies on one academic source for its case; the Cardiff University Macroeconomic Institute led by Patrick Minford. This has reported its predictions of the effects of Brexit which in contrast to the other camp, show large positive effects to growth and other key parts of the UK economy.▀ We assess the empirical quality of these two cases and conclude that the economic modelling of the Cardiff group is insufficient for them to give an adequate empirical estimate of the costs and benefits of Brexit; the Liverpool model it uses has a sparse overseas sector and does not differentiate between EU and non‐EU trade for example, so is unsuited to analyse the effects of changes in these. Our verdict is that, based on the evidence, Brexit in almost any form would be damaging to the UK.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact of Brexit, or Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union (EU), on the economic conditions of Great Britain, including on British gross domestic product (GDP). An overview of the author's use of the gravity model to analyze Brexit's effect, including in regard to borrowing, foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade, is provided.

The focus of our analysis is on how the UK government's proposed Brexit deal is likely to affect the economy. First, we assess how trade, migration, foreign direct investment, productivity and contributions to the EU budget might change by reviewing current proposals against historical evidence. Second, we use the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) to analyse the macroeconomic effects. Our assessment is that trade with the EU, especially in services, would be more costly after Brexit. This would be likely to have adverse effects on living standards in the UK. Our central estimate is that if the government's proposed Brexit deal is implemented, then GDP in the longer term will be around 3% lower per head than it would have been had the UK stayed in the EU. If the UK were to stay in a customs union with the EU, or if the Irish backstop position was to be invoked, there would still be a hit to GDP per capita of 2%. These estimates represent our considered view of the economic impact of the government's proposed Brexit deal, but they are themselves uncertain as there is no historical precedent of a country leaving a major trading block such as the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing a bivariate regime switching model, this paper attempts to examine the regime-dependent effects of inflation uncertainty and output growth uncertainty on inflation and output growth. Using monthly data of the United Kingdom and the United States, we provide evidence that both nominal and real uncertainty exert regime-dependent impacts on inflation. Furthermore, in case of both the countries, inflation uncertainty has adverse impact on output growth mainly during the period of economic contraction. Also, for these two countries, it can be argued that higher real uncertainty significantly reduces output growth only in their respective low output growth regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Long‐term unemployment more than doubled during the United Kingdom's Great Recession. Only a small fraction of this persistent increase can be accounted for by the changing composition of unemployment across personal and work history characteristics. Through extending a well‐known stocks‐flows decomposition of labour market fluctuations, the cyclical behaviour of participation flows can account for over two‐thirds of the high level of long‐term unemployment following the financial crisis, especially the procyclical flow from unemployment to inactivity. The pattern of these flows and their changing composition suggest a general shift in the labour force attachment of the unemployed during the downturn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the dynamics of output connectedness of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies using time‐varying, region‐specific, generalised connectedness measures. We find that the connectedness of APEC economies with the rest of the world is quite substantial, with the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis increasing the connectedness measures above their precrisis levels. The USA, China, and Korea are shown to be systemically important and to dominate APEC’s real activities, while outside the APEC region the roles of India and the UK are also non‐negligible. These results suggest that the majority of APEC economies are considerably open to output shocks from the dominant economies such that policymakers in APEC must be continuously conscious of headwinds originating from these sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the popular vote for the Great Britain to leave the European Union (EU) highlights many questions about how the world is governed today in the age of globalization. Topics discussed include Brexit being a protest vote in which many citizens who felt disenfranchised re-engaged with the political process, issues that informed the Brexit vote like economic circumstances and attitudinal positioning; and why the solutions suggested by the Leave campaign unsustainable.

An introduction is provided to the articles in the issue on the theme of the effect of Brexit, or Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union (EU), on British economic conditions with topics, including economic models, migration and foreign direct investment (FDI).

The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year., Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017-18, down from 2.2-2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017-18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion-driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%., The size of the initial global market sell-off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months., One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect - but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will 'stick' than our new baseline forecasts assume., Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent months have seen the Government's endeavours to cut public sector borrowing stall. The UK's vote to leave the EU will now throw previous fiscal plans up in the air via both a likely slowdown in the economy and the possibility of a discretionary fiscal loosening. But the latter could prove a silver lining for the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely - in line with our own new forecasts - a recession is unlikely., Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though 'stand-alone' recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses., Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one-third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two-thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017., Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a 'rescue package' of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deficit reduction continues to be a slow process. And while the Government officially remains on course to meet its objective of a budget surplus by the end of the decade, it will not take much to knock that target off course, including an acceptance of the implausibility of current plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Net inward migration from the EU has been running at record levels in recent years, although the steep increase in new National Insurance numbers issued suggests that the official data may be understating the level of immigration. There was a clear step up in inflows after both expansions of the EU into central and eastern Europe, while the relative strength of the UK labour market has been an important driver of the more recent rise in inflows., High levels of immigration have helped to offset the impact of an ageing population and ensured that the UK has enjoyed stronger labour supply growth than many of its peers. With migrants typically being better educated than their UK-born counterparts, the quality of the stock of labour has also improved, and migrants have been found to have a net positive fiscal impact., But there have been some downsides, with evidence that high immigration has had a small dampening impact on wages. That migrants tend to head to London and the other southern regions over other destinations has exacerbated the imbalances in regional housing markets., Given that a desire to have greater control over immigration is usually one of the key motivations for those favouring Brexit, a vote in favour of leaving the EU is likely to see the UK abandon the policy of free movement of labour. This would probably see the UK extend the points-based system that it currently uses for non-EU countries to include EU migrants., Our modelling suggests that the adoption of a 'populist' immigration policy which lowers net inward migration by 60,000 a year could reduce the level of GDP by 1.1% in 2030 compared with our baseline forecast. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price-sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate., Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016., Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer., Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by 'Brexit' we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI., In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and 'spillover' benefits boosting economy-wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to 'crowd out' investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors., That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand., However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost., Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a major market for UK exports, the EU is not quite as significant as the headline statistics suggest and one which is likely to continue declining in relative importance. The static tariff cost of a worst-case 'Brexit' is estimated to be around ¼% of GDP, a modest sum., But the dynamic cost could be higher. And certain industrial sectors look vulnerable, notably aircraft and chemicals where sales to the EU account for over 40% of total (domestic and overseas) demand and EU tariffs are relatively high., Moreover, exports to the EU would also face non-tariff barriers, which would be of particular relevance for the services sector. That services firms export much more to the rest of the world than to the EU suggests that they are well versed in overcoming such barriers. But financial services would face particular risks from Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the Great Recession, UK households reduced real food expenditure. We show that they were able to maintain the number of calories that they purchased, and the nutritional quality of these calories, by adjusting their shopping behaviour. We document the mechanisms that households used. We motivate our analysis with a model of shopping behaviour in which households adjust shopping effort and the characteristics of their shopping basket in response to economic shocks. We use detailed longitudinal data and focus on within-household changes in basket characteristics and proxies for shopping effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employment scholars have a longstanding interest in the potential for an active industrial policy to shift the UK economy to a high-wage, high-skill trajectory. This article addresses this topic by examining policy, performance and employment in the UK pharmaceutical sector, which has historically benefited from substantial government assistance. While weaknesses are apparent, overall the industrial policy context has supported the performance of the UK sector, underpinning a sizable number of highly skilled and paid jobs. The findings demonstrate the potential of an active industrial policy to facilitate a shift to a higher skills trajectory. Wider considerations of relevance and policy recommendations are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Conservative party's ability to embrace popular concerns around value, place and equality has enabled it to resurrect the old pre-crisis growth model, says Craig Berry, in a move which none of the post-crisis narratives offered by the Labour party has yet been able to disrupt or overturn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the effect of an increase in the stock of human capital due to skilled immigration on the innovative performance of recipient economies? Combining firm-level micro-data with area-level labour force information, this paper investigates the impact of skilled international migration inflows on firms' product and process innovation in British local labour market areas. The paper supports the evidence in favour of a causal link between immigration and innovation. Results also show that the nature of the innovative process and the typology of innovative activities performed by local firms play a key role in the relation between immigration and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of the past couple of months have led us to push out our call for the first UK rate hike from February 2016 to May 2016. The financial market turmoil of late summer, increasingly dovish commentary from the MPC, the enduring strength of sterling and the likelihood of lower inflation over the next six months are all factors which point to the first rate hike coming later., This is a modal forecast which is consistent with our baseline forecast playing out. But the escalating downside risks would imply a mean forecast which shows the first rate hike coming even later still and the subsequent path of monetary tightening being shallower. This explains why the expectations of financial markets may appear to be more bearish than our own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A consistent drop in public sector net borrowing in the first half of the year has stalled recently. And signs of a weaker pace of growth in the economy also points to borrowing in 2015-16 not falling as fast as the OBR expects. But evidence that the economy's potential is stronger than previously believed may allow an easing of the longer-term fiscal squeeze. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the UK pension system is gender blind and is structured around a heteropatriarchal experience. It does so by analysing two key pieces of UK pension policy: the New Flat Rate State Pension and Auto-Enrolment. Since the 1980s the value of the British state pension has fallen, and it is now worth half what it was in 1979. This presents a particular disadvantage for women who not only tend to be lower paid, but because of a gendered occupational life course, also tend to work part-time hours, and thus also fail to work the number of qualifying years for the full state pension. Traditionally, this results in a pension penalty for women. It is argued that the New Flat Rate State Pension and Auto-Enrolment will counteract this disadvantage, and political discourses used by policymakers claim that they will also create a fairer society. The argument presented here seeks to demonstrate that this claim is problematic by exposing how (i) gender blindness prevents gender equality in pension provision delivery, and (ii) how the formulation of these policies are actually reinforced by a heteropatriarchal welfare system, which fundamentally undermines the contribution made by women to the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper emphasizes differences among short-term contracts in terms of career prospects. Using French data over the 2002-2010 period, we rely on a dynamic model with fixed effects to disentangle state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. Although fixed-term contracts may provide a 'stepping-stone' to permanent positions, temporary agency work is hardly better than unemployment in this regard. The Great Recession of 2008 has changed the dynamics on the labor market and amplified the difference between fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work. For both types of temporary workers, providing overtime work does not significantly increase the transition to permanent employment. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chancellor's post-election 'Summer Budget' saw pragmatism trump ideology, with a relaxation of the squeeze on departmental spending and a slower path of deficit reduction. But the price for this was a sharp cut in the welfare budget and a hike in taxes. Overall, fiscal policy is set to remain a drag on the economy.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several charts are presented which shows economic forecast for Great Britain from 2004-2019 which include household consumer expenditure, short-term interest rate, and government financial balance.

The pace of deficit reduction has continued to disappoint against a relatively healthy economic backdrop. Structural changes in the labour market and income tax receipts auger against a dramatic improvement in 2015. Longer-term, the implausibility of spending cuts implied by current fiscal plans points to borrowing continuing to run ahead of official expectations... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The solid pace of expansion in the economy has still yet to be matched by a commensurate improvement in the public finances. And with deficit reduction proving grindingly slow, a question mark continues to exist over the feasibility of current fiscal ambitions... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the impact of the financial crisis to the economy of high-income countries particularly Great Britain and its five tranformative events. Among the transformative events of the financial crisis include economic transformation, fiscal consequences, and monetary transformation.

The article focuses on the ways Great Britain managed to recover economically through its austerity policy. It mentions the condtion when the coalition of Liberal Democrats and Conservatives took over the British government when there is a need for the country's finances to be under control. It presents a comparison on the way Margaret Thatcher and George Osborne govern the country as its chancellor.

The article focuses on the status of inflation in Great Britain. It discusses the history of inflation, some useful functions of inflation for the British government and its impact on the economy. It argues that inflation in the country is more likely than not to rise in the coming ten years considering the current escalation of British government debts.

Is 'predistribution' as championed by Ed Miliband, or old fashioned 'redistribution' as adopted, if stealthily, by Labour from 1997, the best way to create greater equality? Some critics have argued that a strategy of predistribution-aimed at closing the income gap before the application of taxes and benefits-would not work and that it will be necessary to rely mainly on redistribution. This article examines the potential impact of weak and more radical predistribution-style measures on one of the key drivers of inequality-'wage compression'. It examines the potential of a mix of policies for raising the wage floor. It argues that reliance on traditional redistribution would face its own set of constraints and that creating a more equal distribution of the cake, before taxes and benefits, is a necessary condition for lowering the risk of continuing economic crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several charts are presented that show economic forecasts for Great Britain from 2002-2017 including household consumer expenditure, real gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate.

The UK's export performance since 2008 has been disappointing, especially when sterling's depreciation in 2008-09 is taken into account. This reflects a deterioration in relative wage costs, particularly relative to the US and Germany. In the four years from Q2 2009, export volumes grew by 17%. In contrast, Germany's exports grew by 34% over the same period. The poor performance of exports is one of the key reasons for lacklustre growth in the UK, with GDP still below pre-crisis levels... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Austerity has become the norm of economic management in the EU, Britain and the USA. In each it is offered as the answer to different problems but everywhere the result is cuts in public spending, higher unemployment and low growth, none of which helps recovery from recession. Labour's response should not be to endorse or continue austerity but to initiate a Keynesian expansionary stimulus based on borrowing and spending on a huge programme of building public housing for rent. This should be accompanied by a competitive exchange rate, an industrial policy to boost the manufacturing sector and a National Investment Bank, the aim being to expand the production base so that it can pay the nation's way in the World and support the structure and the improvements Labour needs. This makes the choice at the next election the issue of what kind of Britain the electorate wants to see: a low wage, mean economy or a determined attempt to rebuild a stronger nation with a more powerful economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at economic conditions and economic policy in the European Union (EU) countries not in the eurozone as of September 2013, including Great Britain, Poland, and Denmark. It presents data on economic indicators for 2007-2012, including gross domestic product (GDP) growth, unemployment, and government debt, and provides brief economic summaries for each of the non-eurozone EU countries. It assesses the prospects of the EU economies using the "national systems of innovation" concept of economist Christopher Freeman, which looks at factors including research and development (R&D), higher education, information and communication technology, and intellectual property protection.

A list of tables showing economic forecasts for Great Britain is presented, which include gross domestic product components, cross exchange rates, and labout market indicators.

The first decade of monetary policy independence saw a period of low and stable inflation, but over the past six years this has given way to higher, and more volatile, inflation. The increase in inflation rates has both external and domestic origins. Higher commodity prices, in particular food, and rising prices of manufactured goods imported from emerging markets have been important. In both cases the sharp depreciation of the pound in the aftermath of the financial crisis has compounded the impact on the UK. There has also been a marked step upwards in domestic inflationary pressures which has largely come from administered & regulated prices, such as domestic energy prices and university tuition fees. These categories account for just 10% of the inflation basket, but over the past six years they have contributed 0.9ppts to an average CPI inflation rate of 3.1%... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumer spending has consistently disappointed since the onset of the financial crisis, hampered by a severe squeeze on real wages and the need to deleverage. Spending is currently more than 3% lower than the late-2007-peak, a marked contrast with previous recoveries when spending had risen well above previous peaks by this stage. However, the consumer finally showed signs of life in 2012 following a firm rebound in real household incomes. This improvement was driven by robust growth in employment, weaker inflationary pressures and the high uprating of social benefits... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on the economic condition in Great Britain. The output of the economy appears to have been flat since 2010, while employment has increased and unemployment recently. It is stated if a given increase in gross domestic product (GDP) can be achieved with a smaller addition to the stock of capital, there will be less need for increasing funds for investment at private expense or public consumption.

This paper reviews the argument for a slowdown in the fiscal consolidation policy of the UK government. It reviews the existing literature and the evidence of the interwar period in the UK where a recovery occurred without a relaxation of the tight fiscal regime of the period. It argues that even in a zero-lower-bound, the evidence for a plan B is weak. Given that there may have been significant capacity destruction, the paper suggests a third way that calls for a supply-side framework that sets the condition for an improvement in long-term growth and productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institutions of collective bargaining and worker representation are eroding in many nations, not least in Germany and Britain. This is the first article to explore transitions into and out of these arrangements. Using successive waves of the German IAB Establishment Panel and both cross-sectional and panel components of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey for the period 1998-2004, we find industrial relations are in flux, with many workplaces switching into and out of collective bargaining and other agencies of worker representation, respectively, works councils in Germany and joint consultative committees in Britain. Yet although there are some commonalities in behaviour, the driving forces behind the decline in collective bargaining differ markedly in the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from the Labour Force Survey to show that employed and unemployed job seekers in Great Britain originate from different occupations and find jobs in different occupations. We find substantial differences in occupational mobility between job seekers: employed job seekers are most likely to move to occupations paying higher average wages relative to their previous occupation, while unemployed job seekers are most likely to move to lower paying occupations. Employed and unemployed job seekers exhibit different patterns of occupational mobility and, therefore, do not accept the same types of jobs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's housing problem has become an economic one. Finding ways to boost the supply of housing across the UK is currently near the top of the Government's economic growth and jobs agenda. As a result of failed policies over the past 60 years - policymakers' unwillingness to tackle NIMBY interests, a complex national planning system, developers' unwillingness and inability to build housing at the volume required to maintain stable prices, changing preferences amongst the population - the scale of the problem is vast. However, for any hope of success for the Government's housing strategy, it is vital to understand the extent to which the housing landscape varies significantly across different parts of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to estimate the impact of population ageing on house prices. There is considerable debate about whether population ageing puts downwards or upwards pressure on house prices. The empirical approach differs from earlier studies of this relationship, which are mainly regression analyses of macro time-series data. A micro-simulation methodology is adopted that combines a macro-level house price model with a micro-level household formation model. The case study is Scotland, a country that is expected to age rapidly in the future. The parameters of the household formation model are estimated with panel data from the British Household Panel Survey covering the period 1999-2008. The estimates are then used to carry out a set of simulations. The simulations are based on a set of population projections that represent a considerable range in the rate of population ageing. The main finding from the simulations is that population ageing - or more generally changes in age structure - is not likely a main determinant of house prices, at least in Scotland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study presents a very simple model in which housing equity can influence mobility, and then estimates parameters that gauge the impact of housing equity, local house prices and other variables associated with household structure and change on residential movement within the UK. The data come from the British Household Panel Study over 1992-2008, which allow us to use within-person variation to identify the parameters. The parameter estimates indicate that estimates based on cross-section variation are seriously biased in our analysis. We check the robustness of our results to errors in measuring equity using an instrumental variable estimator. Our main finding is that an increase in a household's housing equity encourages residential mobility substantially, and a decline discourages it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A partir de una tipología de la calidad del empleo basada en la remuneración, las horas de trabajo, la cualificación y la estabilidad laboral, el autor compara la evolución al respecto en Quebec y en el Reino Unido de mujeres y hombres, con o sin hijos. Entre 1998 y 2008 disminuyó la diferencia entre los géneros entre las personas con hijos pequeños. La situación de las madres en comparación con la de los padres es mejor en Quebec que en el Reino Unido debido al contexto económico, a las políticas sociales y a que los padres quebequeses trabajan menos horas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]