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Sometimes, offering someone beneficial care is likely to thwart the similar or more serious medical needs of more people. For example, when acute shortage is strongly predicted to persist, providing the long period on scarce intensive care that a certain COVID‐19 patient needs is sometimes projected to block several future COVID‐19 patients from receiving the shorter periods on intensive care that they will need. Expected utility is typically higher if the former is denied intensive care. A tempting initial account of such cases is that consequentialism supports denying care to that patient and nonconsequentialism supports providing that care. This paper argues that the consequentialist case is more complicated than it may initially seem and that nonconsequentialism sides more readily with denial of the beneficial treatment. It also shows that when denying it would directly enhance public health by a lot, either ethical approach would normally recommend denying it. Practical implications are discussed, including how to address conscientious objection to this shared recommendation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, the COVID‐19 pandemic varied starkly between different racial and ethnic groups. Before vaccines were approved, some considered assigning priority access to worse‐hit racial groups. That debate can inform rationing in future pandemics and in some of the many areas outside COVID‐19 that admit of racial health disparities. However, concerns were raised that "race‐responsive" prioritizations would be ruled unlawful for allegedly constituting wrongful discrimination. This legal argument relies on an understanding of discrimination law as demanding color‐blindness. We argue that a, color‐blind understanding of discrimination would be hostile only to one of two rationales for prioritizing the relevant racial minorities in settings of racial health disparities. We also propose a method for incorporating appropriate race‐responsive concerns that is in many ways ethically and legally superior to ones suggested thus far. That method turns artificial intelligence, thanks precisely to its artificial and "black box" nature (features that underlie recent concerns about artificial intelligence's discriminatory potential), into an instrument of social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distributive theories evaluate distributions of goods based on candidate recipients' characteristics, e.g. how well off candidates are, how deserving they are, and whether they fare below sufficiency. But such characteristics vary across possible worlds, so distributive theories may differ in terms of the world which for them settles candidates' characteristics. This paper examines how distributive theories differ in terms of whether candidate recipients' relevant characteristics are grounded in the possible world that would take place if the distributor does not intervene (call it the "input" world) or if they are grounded in each possible world that the distributor can bring about through different decisions (call each an "output" world). We illustrate the importance of this distinction in relation to one distributive theory, prioritarianism. As we show, both input and output versions of prioritarianism are plausible interpretations of the literature, and there are good reasons to take input prioritarianism seriously. Ultimately, however, we argue that input prioritarianism should be rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early into COVID, human challenge trials were considered, but usually as alternatives to conventional randomized controlled trials. Instead, assessment of authorized COVID vaccines, of further COVID vaccines, and of vaccines against future pandemics should combine both designs, in five different ways, including a wholly novel one that we elaborate, Viz., combining data from both designs to answer a single question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on biomedical research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens as one that makes them so lethal, communicable or resistant to exist protections that they pose a pandemic risk and can be inherently high risk given the possibility of biosafety lapses or deliberate misuse. Topics include examines the risk to millions of nonparticipants is not only a theoretical legal possibility.

An editorial is presented on the symposium on risks to bystanders in clinical research. Topics include the risks to researchers may become a safety concern and especially for student researchers, the infectious disease studies can place bystanders at risk of acquiring the infection from study participants, and the research assistant may be at risk of assault when interviewing participants.

The ethics of research on human subjects is often construed as a fine balance between the interests of patients in need of novel health interventions, and those of study participants who should remain safe in the process. But there is a third group in the mix. Some people belong to neither category, yet research can affect or jeopardize them. Call such people "bystanders." This article shows that thinking about bystander protection can question whether there is an upper limit on the risks that studies may legitimately visit upon their participants. Thus, thinking about appropriate bystander protection can shed light on the appropriate protection of study participants. Core research ethics, which focuses on the latter, must consider the former as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human challenge trials to test the efficacy of vaccine candidates against SARS‐CoV‐2, the novel coronavirus behind Covid‐19, could save considerable time and many lives. But they may initially seem unethical because they expose healthy volunteers to a live virus that is killing many people and for which no cure exists. This article argues that this is not the correct test of their ethics. The correct test is comparative. And in the special circumstances of the Covid‐19 pandemic, human challenge trials meet the correct test better than standard efficacy testing would. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite doing well on antiretroviral therapy, many people living with HIV have expressed a willingness to accept substantial risks for an HIV cure. To date, few studies have assessed the specific quantitative maximal risk that future participants might take; probed whether, according to future participants, the risk can be offset by the benefits; and examined whether taking substantial risk is a reasonable decision. In this qualitative study, we interviewed 22 people living with HIV and used standard gamble methodology to assess the maximum chance of death a person would risk for an HIV cure. We probed participants' reasoning behind their risk‐taking responses. Conventional inductive content analysis was used to categorize key themes regarding decision‐making. We found that some people would be willing to risk even death for an HIV cure, and some of their reasons were plausible and went far beyond the health‐related utility of an HIV cure. We contend that people's expressed willingness to take substantial risk for an HIV cure should not be dismissed out of hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In political philosophy and in economics, unfair inequality is usually assessed between individuals, nowadays often on luck‐egalitarian grounds. You have more than I do (through no fault of my own) and that's unfair. By contrast, in epidemiology and sociology, unfair inequality is traditionally assessed between groups. More is concentrated among people of your class or race than among people of mine, and that's unfair. I shall call this difference the egalitarian ‘divorce’. Epidemiologists, and their ‘divorce lawyers’ Paula Braveman, Norman Daniels, and Iris Marion Young, explain that not every inequality between individuals is an inequity. Only inequality between social status groups is unfair. Only such inequality stems from problems like partiality, discrimination, oppression, inequality‐related population health problems, and unfair distribution of prospects. And it alone is actionable. By contrast, inequality between individuals, e.g. in longevity, is natural, inevitable, less important, or otherwise less informative — not unjust. In ‘divorce trial’ mode, I respond to epidemiologists that group inequalities lack the intrinsic disvalue that they ascribe them. They may be instrumentally or contingently bad or wrong, not essentially so. I then shift to ‘remarriage’: although group inequalities lack intrinsic badness or wrongness, for multiple reasons they remain useful to measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis and a normative assessment of rationing through inconvenience as a form of rationing. By “rationing through inconvenience” in the health sphere, we refer to a nonfinancial burden (the inconvenience) that is either intended to cause or has the effect of causing patients or clinicians to choose an option for health‐related consumption that is preferred by the health system for its fairness, efficiency, or other distributive desiderata beyond assisting the immediate patient. We argue that under certain conditions, rationing through inconvenience may turn out to serve as a legitimate and, compared to direct rationing, even a preferable tool for rationing; we propose a research agenda to identify more precisely when that might be the case and when, alternatively, rationing through inconvenience remains ethically undesirable. After defining and illustrating rationing through inconvenience, we turn to its moral advantages and disadvantages over other rationing methods. We take it as a starting assumption that rationing, understood as scarce‐resource prioritization, is inevitable and, in a society that has goals beyond optimizing health care for individual patients—such as improving societal health care, education, or overall welfare—prudent and fair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Incidences of basal cell carcinoma ( BCC) on the lower extremities in elderly patients are rising. Surgical approaches to the treatment of BCC are subject to possible difficulties in healing, failure of skin grafts, and wound infection. This study assessed the efficacy of intralesional cryosurgery in the treatment of BCC of the lower limbs in elderly patients. Methods This study included eight patients aged >60 years in whom a total of 10 nodular or superficial BCCs of the lower limbs were confirmed by biopsy. The patients' medical histories revealed comorbidities including hypertension, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, venous insufficiency, and deep vein thrombosis of the legs, congestive heart failure, chronic renal failure, and ischemic heart disease. Using liquid nitrogen, an intralesional cryosurgery needle (CryoShape) was inserted into the tumor to facilitate its complete freezing. Treatment success was confirmed by biopsy taken approximately 3 months after complete healing of the cryo-wound. Results The average size of the lesions treated was 2.49 cm2 (16.4 × 15.2 mm). Mean recovery time was 79.9 days. Biopsies were obtained at a mean of 85.3 days after the wound had healed. All 10 biopsies verified the complete destruction of the tumor. There was no evidence of wound infection or tumor recurrence over a follow-up period of 28 months. Conclusions This study demonstrates that a single intralesional cryosurgery session can completely eradicate BCC on the lower extremities in elderly patients. This technique is associated with relatively minor complications, is well tolerated, and represents a safe and effective therapeutic modality for BCC of the lower limbs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]